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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Changing the European (communicative) environment 
 
Even though the European integration has an almost century-long history, it has 
experienced endless evolution over time, given to continuous changes of circumstances, 
of the composition of member states, of leading political ideologies, of public opinion and 
the quality of interconnection. Contemporary the media in Europe are reshaping, as 
elsewhere in the world.1 There is a growing competition and consolidation due to existing 
broadcasting systems’ outreach. Digitalization enables television channels to broadcast 
also abroad, therefore television companies started to grow geographically speaking. Just 
as the media systems have changed, so too have media organizations. New technology, 
new media, new generations of journalists, and the more competitive marketplace all 
contributed to changes within news organizations.2 
However, in past decades both politically and geographically growing European 
integration had an increasing impact on member states’ policy-making and therefore a 
major influence on its citizens everyday life. European policy-making is not a process that 
is easily distinguished from national policy-making, despite its continuous changing not 
only regarding the number of its member states, but also its concept especially after 
1989.3 This growing influence of the European policy-making caused an increase of 
communication in this matter. Media started to dedicate more attention to EU affairs. The 
EU’s development as a new kind of polity is therefore closely connected with the range 
and depth of its development as a communicative space. Inasmuch as the Union actually 
serves as an exponent for the development of post-national democracy at the 
supranational level, surely such a process has to be rooted in the reshaping of the EU as 
an overarching communicative space (or spaces).4 Last but not least, the relatively recent 
appearance and diffusion of digital television also contributes to the defining of a changing 
coverage of EU affairs.5 
                                                        
1 Papathanassopoulos, S., Negrine, R. M.: European Media. Polity Press, UK and USA. [2011] 
2 Semetko, H.A.; de Vreese, C.H.; Peter, J.: Europeanized politics – Europeanized media? European integration and political 
communication. West European Politics, 23:4, 121-141 [2000] 
3 Ibid 
4 Schlesinger, P; Fossum, J.E.: The European Union and the Public Sphere: A Communicative Space in the Making? 
Researchgate, www.researchgate.net [2007] 
5 Semetko, H.A.; de Vreese, C.H.; Peter, J.: Europeanized politics – Europeanized media? European integration and political 
communication. West European Politics, 23:4, 121-141 [2000] 
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Studies confirm that the less direct contact people have with a given issue the 
more the media becomes important/popular as intermediary. There are no doubts that 
media plays an important role in giving information to people about EU initiatives, policies 
and actions. And also Antonio V. Menéndez Alarcón claims that: “Because European 
citizens rely on the media for information about the EU, it is important and relevant to 
evaluate how the EU is portrayed in the news.”6  
For this reason not only did editors and publishers needed to adapt to the new 
ways of communicating the European integration, but also the European institutions 
needed to emphasize a coordinated information diffusion in order to define the European 
image. According to De Vreese, whenever Europe has developed a communications 
strategy, it has tended to be elitist, self-congratulatory, and without an understanding of 
how the news media actually work. Nevertheless, the aim has been defined as making 
people love Europe, not to give people the information they need in order to be able to 
understand and tolerate it.7 The EU institutions need to provide all the means to 
journalists to explain European policy-making. This is important as by ‘normalizing’ and 
getting European politics into national politics, we are most likely to see a “legitimate 
Europeanized public politics” develop.8  
EU directives however seem to have been caught between the realization of a 
common communication strategy regarding European issues inducted by the European 
institutions, and the desire to maintain a plurality of media provision to enhance the 
competitiveness of the European media sector.9 Therefore I agree with Harrison (2012), 
who said “we need to clarify and define what the media sector ‘does’ and ‘wishes to do’ 
to and with Europe and to what Europe ‘does’ and ‘wishes to do’ to and with the media.”10 
  
                                                        
6 Menendez Alarcón, A.V.: International Journal of Communication 4, p. 398-415 
7 De Vreese, C.H.: Communicating Europe. Next Generation Democracy: Legitimacy in Network Europe project [2003] 
8 Ibid 
9 Stevenson [2012] 
10 Harrison [2012] 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
1.2. Does the communication deficit mean a democratic deficit? 
 
As said before, the European integration process is inevitably accompanied by an 
increasing media visibility and an international media convergence. This means that the 
level of European issues appearing in mass media grows according to the developing 
integration. Media visibility thus contributes indirectly to the legitimacy of the EU as such, 
as it depends not only on its institutional arrangements but on the degree to which it is 
discussed publicly as well.11 Given that a vast majority of citizens across Europe repeatedly 
identify news media as their most important and preferred source of information about 
European integration, there is an increasing number of studies on the relationship 
between media and politics. 12 Especially that the dynamics of the interaction between 
these actors can be studied from a variety of angles, including, for example, the role of 
news in the political process and influence on changes in public opinion. Taking a cross-
national perspective offers an escape from the ethnocentrism common to most research 
in the field of political communication.13 
But unlike national states, the European Union has limited access to means of mass-
communication for reaching out directly to its citizens. As Page and Shapiro (1992) argue, 
the media are more likely to shape our perceptions of international and foreign policy 
issues than of domestic politics with which we often have direct experience.14 And indeed, 
“very few citizens have first- or even second-hand contact with Community affairs in 
Brussels.”15 Increasing the visibility of EU news, boosting the presence of EU level actors 
or sparking the number of cross-references across EU countries in such a system can 
therefore only be achieved indirectly. First and foremost by making it politically more 
                                                        
11 Wessler H., Peters B., Brüggemann M., Kleinen-von Königslöw K, Stift S.: Transnationalization of Public Spheres. 
Houndmills. [2008] 
12 De Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H.G.: Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union, JCMS 
2006 Vol. 44. Nr. 2. Pp. 419-36 [2006] 
13 Gurevitch M., Blumler J.G.: The Crisis in Public Communication. London: Routledge [1995]  
Przeworski, A., Teune, H.: The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley & Sons [1970]  
Swanson D., Mancini, P.: Politics, Media and Modern Democracy. London: Praeger [1996].    
14 Page, B. I., Shapiro, R. Y., Chicago: University of cago Press, [1992] in De Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H.G.: Media Effects 
on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union. JCMS 2006 Vol. 44. Nr. 2., pp. 419-436 [2006] 
15 Dalton and Duval, [1986], p. 127 in De Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H.G.: Media Effects on Public Opinion about the 
Enlargement of the European Union, JCMS 2006 Vol. 44. Nr. 2., pp. 419-436 [2006] 
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relevant. This places the responsibility on the side of ‘politics’16  and only in the second 
place on the media. 17 
The ongoing processes are contradictory. As integration has become more decisive 
on a national level, the quantity of European-related news has slowly increased, as stated 
by Mr. Duch, the European Parliament’s Spokesperson: “Compared to 20 years ago, today 
the quantity of news broadcasted in television on the European Parliament has increased 
significantly, and this is related to the growing importance of this institution.” 
Nevertheless, the last data provided by 2014 Parlemeter display how the gap in news 
coverage is far from being filled, with a large majority of Europeans (67%), who declare 
not to feel well informed about the European Parliament’s activities. The problem is 
acknowledged and underlined by Mr. Duch himself, who stresses the existence of a 
mismatch between the impact of European policy-making on citizens’ everyday life 
(“Policies with capital P”) and the insufficient information provided both by national 
governments and news media.18 
This is due to the fact that existing European channels of communication are 
followed mainly if not exclusively by a so-called European intellectual élite. Even if 
traditional media are still the main source of information, news on European issues still 
appear scarcely and often from a misleading national prospective. As a consequence, in 
recent years the European institutions have invested substantially in online 
communication, as a direct channel and therefore, the most convenient way to reach 
European citizens.19 
But as democracy relies on communication between citizens and power holders 
the European communication gains major importance. The EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit which is accentuated by a striking communication deficit. In its institutional reform 
process, the EU needs to take communication seriously—and not by developing 
communication plans that are self-congratulatory.20 The European Union would like 
European citizens to be more involved in its political processes and to cast off this 
                                                        
16 Schuck, Andreas R.T., Azrout, Rachid, Boomgaarden, Hajo, Elenbaas, Matthijs, van Spanje, Joost, Vliegenthart, Rens and 
de Vreese, Claes H.: “Media Visibility and Framing of the European Parliamentary Elections 2009: A Media Content Analysis 
in 27 Countries”, in Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections, (Eds.) Maier, Michaela, Stro ̈mba ̈ck, 
Jesper, Kaid, Lynda L., pp. 175–196, Ashgate, Farnham [2011] 
Koopmans, R., Statham, P. (Eds.): The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, 
Communication, Society and Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York. [2010]. 
17 De Vreese, C.H. : The EU as a public sphere. Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 2, No. 3 [2007] 
18Arcostanzo, F.; Retfalvi, F.: When Institutions Go Online: Case Study on the European Parliament’s Facebook Fan page. 
Bologna, Molino S.p.a 365-387 pp. [2015] 
19 Ibid. 
20 De Vreese, C.H.: Communicating Europe. Next Generation Democracy: Legitimacy in Network Europe project [2003] 
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“democratic deficit.” A functioning European public sphere has been seen as both a 
solution and an instrument for producing a European identity that might motivate more 
participation. 21 
However media performance is often held responsible for the European Union’s 
perceived “democratic deficit,” and its lack of visibility, resonance and legitimacy in the 
“hearts and minds” of citizens. Media—and in particular television—are key resources for 
citizens across Europe when learning about the EU. Strikingly, however, we know hardly 
anything about how the EU is represented in broadcast news. Nonetheless, journalists are 
often blamed for contributing to cynicism about EU affairs.22 
Also politicians are never slow to blame the media when their EU integrationist 
aims founder, whereas EU elites see better communication through national media as the 
best way to improve their legitimacy.23 Thus, as said earlier, the EU’s institutional 
“democratic deficit” is linked to, or partly caused by, the above mentioned 
“communication deficit.” From a normative viewpoint, adequate political 
communications are essential in response to the multi-levelling and the spread of 
governance beyond national borders that have resulted from advancing European 
integration, not least to ensure effective links between political institutions and citizens. 
This is the thrust of the growing Habermas-inspired24 “European public sphere” research 
(e.g. Koopmans, 200725; Peters et al., 200526; Statham, 2007a;27 Trenz, 200728). 
So it has become increasingly—and pressingly—relevant to discuss whether there 
could be a European public sphere wherein citizens might simultaneously address 
common issues across state borders and see themselves as the authors of the EU laws 
                                                        
21 Gripsrud, J.: Television and the European Public Sphere. European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications 
Vol22(4): 479-492. [2007] 
22 De Vreese, C.H.: Communicating Europe. Next Generation Democracy: Legitimacy in Network Europe project [2003] 
23 This is a finding of EurPolCom’s ‘Constitution’ project (ESRC RES-000–23–0886), see Michailidou (2007). Statham,P.: 
Making Europe news. How journalists view their role and media performance. SAGE Publications Vol9(4): 398-422 [2008] 
24 Habermas, J.: ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, in E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum and A. José Menéndez (eds) Developing 
a Constitution for Europe, pp. 19–34. London Routledge. [2005] 
25 Koopmans, R.: ‘Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers and Opponents in Europeanised Political 
Debates’, European Journal of Political Research 46(2): p. 183–210. [2007] 
26 Peters, B., Stifft S., Wimmel A., Brüggerman M. and Kleinen von Königslöw K.: ‘National and Transnational Public 
Spheres: The Case of the EU’, European Review Supp. No. 1: p. 139–60. [2005] 
27 Statham, P.: ‘Political Communication, European Integration and the Transformation of National Public Spheres: A 
Comparison of Britain and France’, in J. E. Fossum and P. Schlesinger (eds) The European Union and the Public Sphere: A 
Communicative Space in the Making? London: Routledge, p. 110–34. [2007] 
28 Trenz, H. J.: ‘Quo Vadis Europe? Quality Newspapers Struggling for European Unity’, in J. E. Fossum and P. Schlesinger 
(eds) The European Union and the Public Sphere: A Communicative Space in the Making?, pp. 89–109. London: Routledge. 
[2007] 
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they have to abide by. Especially that the European public sphere contributes to a general 
knowledge, to informedness, participation, democracy and therefore also to the 
legitimacy of the European Union. Also according to one of the main researchers of this 
field, de Vreese, in the specific case of the EU, public communication can further advance 
democratization of the EU and it is a necessary condition that public communication 
contributes to knowledge about European affairs.29 And these principles foster legitimacy 
that requires citizens to hold beliefs about a political system that are motivated by 
informedness and knowledge. These beliefs should motivate them to support, accept 
obligations vis-`a-vis the system, and act according to its rules. Crucially, these beliefs and 
attitudes should be articulated in public discourse. 30 
Consequently, media and especially the European communication space contribute to 
the legitimacy of the European Union. This idea is embraced by the theory of the European 
public sphere, which is “an arena for ‘the perception, identification, and treatment of 
problems affecting the whole society” according to Habermas.31 Numerous researchers 
study the existence and challenges of the European public sphere, the previously 
mentioned, ‘Europeanization’ of media and their influence on the European identity and 
public opinion.  
 
1.3. The European public sphere and legitimacy 
 
The complex and interconnected communication platform within the European 
integration (and beyond) shapes both our European identity and moreover the European 
public sphere. Against the background of the democratic deficit of the European Union, 
scholars recognized that the process of European integration must be accompanied by 
Europeanization of political communication in order to overcome the lack of legitimacy 
and popular involvement in the EU by European citizens32. Numerous models regarding 
Europeanization of political communication across the EU, and the possible development 
of a European public sphere, have been presented in the last decade by a variety of 
scholars, and several of these are outlined in this research33. However national public 
                                                        
29 De Vreese, C. H.: [2007] pp. 8 
30 Peters, Bernhard, 2005, “Public Discourse, Identity and the Problem of Democratic Legitimacy”, in, Eriksen, E. O. (Ed.): 
Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU. Routledge, London, pp. 84–123. [2005]  
31 Habermas, J.: Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bu ̈rgerlichen Gesellschaft (The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society), Hermann Luchterhand 
Verlag, Neuwied. [1962] 
32 Koopmans & Pfetsch [2003] 
33 Van Os, Jankowski & Wester [2012] 
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spheres of all other countries are also more and more fragmented and/or pluralized as a 
result of social changes, technological developments and media reregulation. The 
coherence of public spheres of all sorts is increasingly based in networks of discourses and 
symbols rather than in geographical proximity between participating citizens.34 Also 
cultural diversity adds to this. The EU has not so far produced a collective identity; nor can 
it draw on the shared norms and values that communitarians find necessary to sustain a 
community. In communal terms, the EU may be understood less as a coherent community 
and more as a Union of deep diversity. 35  
With the European integration gaining importance, not only the European 
communication became a crucial aspect but also the academic debate widened in this 
regard. The numerous studies of media effects theorists may also enrich our 
understanding of European integration in that it encourages a perspective which not only 
focuses on what Europe does with the citizens, but also on what the citizens do with 
Europe.36 Also the development of the methodological background and know-how of 
measuring the public sphere contributed the proliferation of empirical studies and 
assessments of the scope and parameters of a European space. Also this research, such all 
future studies are charged with the challenge and necessity to arrive at comparable 
operationalizations and shared measures. 37 
The new forms of access to, and consumption of news continue to develop rapidly 
and it is important to try and assess their impact. Although the measurement of such 
activity is an industry itself in its infancy, I have tried where possible to present data that 
reflects both the efforts of news channels to be widely available to their audiences, and 
also the use and viewing of audiences of television news and their contribution to a mutual 
understanding of the European Union and so the European public sphere. 
Previously theorizing the public sphere was limited as there was a mismatch 
between the level of theorizing on a European public sphere on the one hand and the 
                                                        
34 Lingenberg, S.: The Audience’s Role in Constituting the European Public Sphere: A theoretical approach based on the 
pragmatic concept of John Dewey’, pp. 121-32 in N. Carpentier et al.  (eds.) Research Media, Democracy and Participation. 
Tartu: Tartu University Press [2006] 
35 Fossum, J. E.: ‘Still a Union of Deep Diversity? The Convention and the Constitution for Europe’, in E. O. Eriksen, J. E. 
Fossum and A. J. Menéndez (eds): Developing a Constitution for Europe. London: Routledge. [2004] 
36 In a singular and exceptional study linking media coverage about the European Union to  public opinion, it was reported 
that a press, persistently sceptical towards the new currency, had damaged early confidence in the euro. Monthly 
fluctuations in the direction of the news coverage of that issue were related to changes of public support for the new 
currency. Y et in contrast to that rather issue-specific public opinion, an effect of the news coverage on more general 
attitudes towards the EU was not found - although the tone  of the news about the EU was modestly, but consistently, 
negative; see Norris, A Virtuous Circle.   
37 Esser, F., Stromback, J. and de Vreese, Claes H.: “Reviewing key concepts in research on political news journalism: 
Conceptualizations, operationalizations, and propositions for future research”, Journalism, 13(2), p. 139–143. [2012] 
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availability of empirical studies on the other, this shortcoming is becoming partly 
alleviated. A catalyst for this development has been the completion of a number of large 
scale international and comparative studies and the accompanying availability of 
systematically collected data.38 
According to de Vreese, we can distinguish three strands of research. One group 
of studies has concentrated on the necessity and prerequisite for a “truly” European public 
sphere. A second group of studies has focused on specific cases and specific segments 
amongst which a European public sphere is or has been in existence, while a third group 
of studies has focused on the indicators and extent to which Europeanization in the 
national public spheres can be identified.  
The first two strands are, in terms of empirical explorations, much more limited than 
the third strand which is where the majority of studies are located.39 Also this research 
shall foster the third category. And now let us see how this research is structured and what 
results it has obtained. 
1.4. Structure of the research and outcomes 
1.4.1. Structure and results: European public sphere (Chapter 2) 
 
This research is structured in four main sections (besides introduction and 
endnotes). In the first section (chapter 2) I aimed to collect existing studies in order to give 
an overview and preliminary explanation about the European public sphere. This chapter’s 
additional value shall be the way it assumes the existing studies and outcomes on this 
matter, paragoning the different standpoints and scholars’ view.  
The terminology of the European public sphere, generally refers to the place where 
public opinion takes form through the discussion of questions, political issues and 
decisions and where the political power is placed under scrutiny.40 Therefore I first 
clarified the conceptual point of view and what the phenomenon means. By examining up 
researches and the broadcasting space tried to understand how the European Union tends 
to establish the European public sphere.  
As a result, I could categorize academics and their studies into three streams. In 
the first stream are those political philosophy studies that focus on the EU’s democratic 
deficit and the possible solutions that communication processes can offer while creating 
a supranational public sphere. (see, for example Eriksen, Schlesinger, Habermas, Fossum). 
                                                        
38 De Vreese, C.H. [2007] pp. 13 
39 Ibid 
40 Fossum, Schlesinger [2007] 
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The second group might be literature that discusses empirically the existence of a 
transnational public sphere. (Schlesinger, Ionescu). Studies dealing with the topic of the 
Europeanization of the national public spheres can be distinguished in the third group. 
(Van de Steeg, Risse, Trenz). 
Research conclusions and consequences depict a not thoroughly united picture of 
the process, effects and results of Europeanization. Moreover they appear not to have 
proposed a clear alternative description and explanation of how the mechanism of 
communication is actually operating at the EU level and of how it should function in order 
to enhance democratic legitimacy.  
The existence of a solid European communication space fosters various elements 
of general opinion and behavior of the public. The measurement of the manifestation of 
the consequences of the European public sphere can be also used as indicators to examine 
whether the EPS exists. These characteristics are the following: first of all a working 
European public sphere emphasizes the general knowledge and informedness about the 
European institutions and affairs. Second legitimacy is crucial. As previously mentioned, 
media are important to legitimate the EU and the whole process of European integration. 
Third democracy, as the EPS is also crucial in framing public opinion and therefore 
condition political decision-making. A solid European public sphere shall be the controller 
of the political power. Forth participation, as knowledge is a key-predictor for 
engagement, political participation is an indicator of EPS. Fifth identity. A common 
knowledge also contributes to a common identity, a European identity and to a we-feeling 
that we can mention as sixth. A European public sphere contributes to a shared identity 
and participation that are connected to the so-called we-feeling that, as mentioned, an 
existing and efficiently functioning EPS can foster. 
As we could see, these features can’t really be tackled independently and shall be 
results of a well-functioning European public sphere. 
However I aimed also to explain the various groups of EPS, the Europeanization of 
national public spheres, the Europeanized news, the role of the social media and the 
European institutions within this context. 
1.4.2. Structure and results: Broadcasting space (Chapter 3) 
 
In this chapter, chapter 3, I was dedicating major focus to the examination of the 
European broadcasting space and to its trends. I have found that the number of TV 
channels established in Europe has increased notably since 2009, but more than half of 
the growth can be attributed to the launch of HD channels, generally simulcasts of existing 
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channels. The 60% of the net increase of channels was due to HD channels that were the 
main reason of the growth.41  
I have examined influencing factors, just as how the changing media landscape can 
influence the competitivity of private channels and influence public ones. Also the 
European law plays part in determining European tendencies in broadcasting. Today 
audiovisual media are treated as other goods and services within the EU policy and there 
are certain EU-wide rules that ensure the free circulation of films and broadcasting 
content on the free market of Europe independently from how they are delivered: 
traditional TV, video-on-demand, Internet, etc. This is regulated by the EU’s audiovisual 
and media policy, more precisely by the audiovisual media services directive. 
Last but not least I have listed all the European initiatives that tried to overcome 
of the lacking European Union owned media and the EU’s direct contact to its citizens 
through media, especially as I could see that there is a significant correlation between 
feeling informed and understanding the EU, that affects also the belief in the EU and 
feeling European. First the MEDIA Program that is an initiative promoted by the European 
Commission that aim to support audio-visual production, distribution and cross-frontier 
cooperation. Unfortunately, research prove that the European cultural and political 
integration didn’t provocate positive results yet.42 Also specialized European media, just 
as Politico Europe, EurActive, New Europe and EUObserver that however, they effectively 
address only the “Brussels bubble” of EU officials, Members of the European Parliament, 
lobbyists, think tanks, political observers, and PR companies and a certain elite that 
follows and understands European jargon and the complex policy-making-system. Last, 
but not least, the European Broadcasting Union that contains 75 organizations of Public 
Service Broadcasting from 56 countries has launched various projects in order to facilitate 
cooperation and content-share within the European context: such as the Eurovision song 
contest, Eurosport, News Exchange and also Euronews. 
After getting to know these facts and recognizing the European effort invested in 
its communication, I focused on the evaluation of participants of this field and the general 
opinion on the European communication. 
 
 
                                                        
41 Schneeberger, A., Fontaine, G.: Mavise Extra: Linear and on-demand audiovisual media services in Europe 2015. p. 14. 
[2016] 
42 Collins R.: Broadcasting and Audio-visual Policy; Humphreys: Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe; 
Weymouth A. and Lamizet B.: Markets and Myths. [1996] 
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1.4.3. Structure and results: The European dialogue (Chapter 4) 
 
As I have specified the dialogue between the European institutions and its citizens isn’t 
direct but journalists, editors and news-producers are mediating it. For this reason the 4th 
chapter is dedicated to the major understanding of the first step of this communication, 
the one between journalists and institutions. 
In media effects research, agenda-setting, priming, framing and persuasion as a result 
of tone of the news are amongst the most applied concepts to understand. Media impact 
on public opinion formation is the core question of numerous research and studies.43 
Frames can mean a template for journalists to compose a news story in order to optimize 
audience accessibility. In turn, news frames are potentially important resources for public 
thinking about, understanding of, and support for contemporary political and economic 
issues, such as the EU. However national frames adopted by news media cause a scarcity 
of knowledge beyond the lack of information. 
News however show a low priority to EU issues, as they are in public agenda.44 
Moreover news are both, positive and negative on EU matters: positive regarding 
utilitarian benefit considerations and negative with regard to the democratic nature and 
functioning of the EU.45 Therefore the European institutions need to invest in 
communicating with news-representatives in order to set the agenda and encourage 
framing in a favorable way. 
However the EU faces challenges in this process, as the information that they need to 
transmit is complex, voluminous and scattered. Commission, Parliament and Council aim 
to pass through information on their functioning, however they don’t coordinate among 
themselves. The DG COMM, Directorate General of Communication of the Commission is 
not coordinating with the Directorate General of Media of the European Parliament that 
has a growing importance ultimately due to the growing influence of the EP in European 
decision-making and also the easier communicability of parliamentary debates.  
This chapter uses many of the observations of the interviewees to explain tendencies 
and evaluate processes. I have interviewed various figures from the European 
communication space in order to gain insight into the various aspects of the publishing, 
                                                        
43 McLeod, D. M., Kosicki, G. M. and McLeod, J. M.: “Resurveying the boundaries of political communications effects”, in 
Bryant, Jennings, Zillmann, Dolf (Eds.): Media effects: Advances in theories and research. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. p. 215–
267. [2002] 
44De Vreese, C., Boomgaarden, H. G.: Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union. JCMS 
2006 Vol. 44. Nr. 2, p. 419-36. [2006] 
45 Schuck, Andreas R.T., Azrout, Rachid, Boomgaarden, Hajo, Elenbaas, Matthijs, van Spanje, Joost, Vliegenthart, Rens 
and de Vreese, Claes H. [2011] 
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elaboration and distribution of the news. Among the interviewees I have had 
representatives of the European institutions, such as from European media providers and 
news agencies, and journalists and editors from private and state television channels both 
from European member countries – Eastern and Western – and extra-European countries. 
The qualitative methodology, the semi-structured interviews enabled me to give deeper 
insight into details.  
Outcomes were quite interesting when comparing the different opinions of the EU’s 
communication initiatives. First of all journalists and editors gave an insight in their 
everyday functioning – order of meetings, choosing the editorial line etc. -  and so we have 
seen that there are differences in the number and availability of Bruxelles correspondents, 
therefore they need to find alternative ways of gathering information. Local media, social 
media, interviews and also sometimes phone calls, nevertheless being only partially 
reliable contribute to news-production, as journalists admit that they are not first case 
witnesses in many cases. Journalists and editors claimed that these informal sources are 
often more useful in regard the European institutions, than are press releases and official 
communications. In addition, broadcasters use very often news agencies’ materials just as 
their own internal database.  
On the question whether nationality counts in gaining information or presenting them, 
opinions vary. Regarding social media as news source replies showed that journalists 
retain that the European institutions, just as politicians and news sites, the importance of 
social media as an information source is growing, however social media can be cited as an 
official news source general opinion was contradictory. 
According to the interviews one very interesting topic were the factors that influence 
the editorial decision-making. Interviewees have mentioned transparency, accuracy, 
objectivity and balance as main principles of journalism and broadcasting. Nevertheless, 
we have learnt that visual, guests, language, context and pictures are the fundamental 
elements of balancing news, objectivity can be manipulated by proportioning these 
elements in order to fulfill editorial requirements.  
Results regarding editorial aspects, public broadcasters follow lines defined by the 
general opinion and by the state, on the other hand, private channels follow market 
demand and the EU aims to overcome the two-stepped communication with its citizen. 
For this reason, the EU institutions tend to balance their targeting messages in order to 
make them become more interesting and relevant for citizens and at the same time they 
try to transmit information to all of the citizens to foster a European way of thinking, a 
common knowledge.  
Despite European institutions don’t coordinate their communication, each of them 
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tends to contact journalists independently through press materials, live streamings, press 
releases etc. but most of the time journalists find the European communication too heavy, 
not interesting to citizens life, not enough personalized and difficult to make a story out 
of it. Some of the interviewees blame institutions to speak only to the ‘Bruxelles bubble’. 
Naturally EU officials claim that there is no such thing as the European bubble, however 
news editors and journalists believe that the European institutions don’t put enough effort 
in establishing and fostering a direct contact with the European citizens. 
 This is why EU affairs doesn’t always make it to the top news according to 
journalist. However according to the interviewees, EU institutions find difficulties as not 
only their topic and issues are distant and difficult, but also their organigram and everyday 
functioning is complex to explain to the public as it seems to be abstract and distant and 
there are numerous “talking heads” that makes the EU become impersonal and difficult 
to relate to.  
European institutions aim to find the balance between targeting information and 
addressing all Europeans. Nevertheless journalists generally apply a national perspective 
to allocate a relevancy to European news in order to make them become more relevant 
for citizens, and so narratives can become distant from the EU and can shed a negative 
light on EU affairs. 
Therefore the research aimed to understand to what extent these narratives affect 
the general opinion. This is what the next chapter focuses on. 
 
1.4.4. Structure and results: Analyzing the audience (Chapter 5) 
 
The 5th chapter is crucial mainly for the understanding on the one hand how the 
European broadcasting space is affected by certain elements such as ownership or 
language. On the other hand, it aims to depict the other side of this reciprocal relationship, 
how the European broadcasting affects the perception of certain elements, such as trust, 
informedness, news independence and diversity of news. This latter implies than that we 
can define the main pillars of the general opinion: the image of the EU, feeling European 
and trusting the EU. 
First of all I have seen that not only the European integration evolves, but also 
digitalization and market demand does so. As a consequence, the accessibility of the 
European broadcasting space and also content changes. I have seen that the broadcasting 
market was growing in the past decade: new channels appeared, new content-providers 
started to increase competitivity, viewer indexes increased also in a geographic reach out 
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and in absolute number due to the diffusion of digital tv. Many broadcasting companies 
started to air content abroad, or internationally, especially as language doesn’t seem to 
be a limit. 
This is why, after examining the dynamics and tendencies within the broadcasting 
market, I have focused on language being an element defining the European broadcasting 
space or moreover, limiting the evolution of a European public space. We have found that 
despite provisions, language seem to have rather a positive effect on feeling European 
according to data. Also the audiences are increasing of foreign language channels that in 
addition contribute to this feeling European. Therefore, we can agree with Mr. Thibault 
Lesenecal, the Head of Web Communication Unit at the European Parliament, who said 
that multilingualism is not a barrier. 
The next aspect was ownership. There are significantly more private channels than 
public ones despite the influencing factors that determine their everyday functioning, 
such as content and framing news as they have to satisfy market demand to maintain or 
increase their market share, increase reach out, and last but not least to cooperate with 
the public administration and follow the national laws as the juridical background for the 
European broadcasting space is not harmonized. Some might say that this is also due to 
the televisive heritage that member states carry, as for example the times of the Iron 
Curtain have had an impact on the degrees and forms of modernization. Consequently, 
the present differences in terms of public sphere in general and television in particular 
between East and West. And this had also an impact on the entire process of media system 
evolution and change. 46 
In relationship to the juridical background, I have examined also news 
independence, general trust in media and diversity of content. Regarding this latter, 
respondents believe that news diversity is balanced.  Not like independence. 
Independence of general media varies country by country, and the range starting from 
12% (Greece) goes up to 78% (Finland). Regarding public service media that shall be more 
informative and educative, 60% of the respondents retains public service media not 
independent only 35% agree on public service media being independent. Also the 
trustworthiness of the main information sources move on a wide scale. It came out that 
radio is the most trusted information source, followed equally by television and 
                                                        
46 Jakubowicz, K.: Ideas in our Heads: Introduction of PSB as Part of Media System Change in Central and Eastern Europe. 
European Jounrla of Communication 19(1): 53-74 [2004] 
Gripsrud, J.: Television and the European Public Sphere. European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications Vol22(4): 
479-492. [2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
newspapers. The analysis also showed that trust specifically in television varies among 
member states but the majority of the EU countries is above the European media.  
Examining trust in media, it was also important to conduct a terzier research analyzing 
correlation between watching television and the EU having a positive image, or things 
going in a right direction I have found that there is no relationship between the two. So 
television doesn’t seem to influence general opinion of European policy-making. 
Last, but not least I focused on informedness. In regard I have found that the most 
viewed news-channels are CNN, SkyNews, Euronews and BBC. This confirms also the 
findings of language, as foreign language channels, especially those English-speaking gain 
more visibility as there is no linguistic barrier. Interestingly I have found that the regularity 
of watching television news doesn’t influence the feeling of being informed, neither was 
there any correlation between being into political discussion and to think that things are 
going into a good direction. But there was a significative relationship between 
informedness and trust as results show that as the sense of informedness increases so 
does trust in European institutions.  
After all this, I wanted to depict the general opinion mirroring the image of the EU, 
the feeling citizen and trust in the EU. As I said, there was no correlation between the 
amount of information and the positive image of the EU. So informedness doesn’t 
necessarily increase a positive opinion about EU affairs. Nevertheless, if the information 
is positive than people feel more attached to the EU. 
Regarding trust in EU and its institutions, trust towards the EU is higher than 
towards national parliaments or national governments, despite the decreasing tendency 
in general. And even if 54% of Europeans think that their voice doesn’t count in EU affairs, 
feeling citizen has a significant impact on trusting the European institutions. 
As a conclusion we can say that this complex matrix of interdependent factors 
needs to be evaluated from different points of view keeping in mind that there is a 
connection between each element. Language, ownership, diversity, independence, trust 
and informedness all contribute to the evolution of each other and each has an impact on 
the general opinion. These are secondary elements that are defined also by news-frames. 
 
1.5. Methodology and limitations 
 
The main objective of the research is to explain how these features and dynamics 
in the European broadcasting space influence the evolution of the European public sphere, 
whether they contribute to the establishment of it or they put some limits. 
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Therefore this research, besides discussing the mainstreams of the European 
public sphere(s) and summarizing and updating the ongoing debate over its 
existence/nature, primarily aims to address two additional academic aspects: on one hand 
it seeks to provide insight to the main communication channels and dynamics of 
information-exchange within the European network of journalists, news-agencies and 
television broadcasters—for this a qualitative method was used and interviews were 
conducted with journalists, editors and broadcasters. On the other hand, it aims to 
monitor and measure the perception of European and Europeanized news on national 
(public) television channels with regard to the European institutions’ role in agenda 
setting, the impact of trust, informedness, language, diversity of news, independence and 
the channels’ ownership. Quantitative methods were used and I have designed graphs and 
diagrams using raw data from Eurobarometer. Let me explain more in detail how. 
As mentioned there is a wide academic debate regarding the existence and 
perception of the European public sphere. This question can be answered by following 
two methodologies: on the one hand several studies focus on the content analysis of news 
and information as most the objective variable in examining such phenomenon is to 
measure the appearance of European news. However studies focus on the quantity 
(regularity or timing of European news) rather than the quality of them (evaluating or 
labeling the stories, point of view, national prospective, objectivity, neutrality etc.). This 
latter is examined mainly by the other methodology, using surveys and by examining the 
audience. Audience-analysis is a common way of measurement of the European public 
sphere, especially in audiovisual communication. However it is not viewing the existence 
of the EPS strictly speaking, rather the effects of it, the consequences of its existence. 
This thesis aimed to make a European comparison, viewing all European member 
states not only some of them. As this aim was highly ambitious regarding content analysis 
mainly because of the lack of knowledge of all the official languages, I needed to focus 
rather on the feedback of the audience. In addition to existing researches and statistical 
results, I have conducted several independent tables by using the raw data offered by the 
European Commission’s previous survey answers and aiming to find correlations between 
my own variables and preferred focus points. In order to explain these results and to 
understand trend, tendencies and reasons, I made several interviews with professionals 
from each side of this media-communication process: EU officials, journalists and 
broadcasters. 
 In order to examine the existence of the European public sphere, and with taking 
in consideration the limited amount of information and data on my disposal, I identified 
four aspects that might depict the answer, whether television news on the European 
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Union contributes to an EPS. These are: (1) Common knowledge of the EU, (2) a common 
European identity, (3) a We-feeling and (4) the legitimization of the EU that manifests itself 
in trust and positive image. However these are values that a well-functioning European 
public sphere assures to its members and therefore if these can be measured in society, 
we might know that the fundaments of an EPS are set.  
 In order gain results in this regard I have examined the following aspects: (1) I 
retained that informedness of citizens is an indicator for common knowledge, (2) the 
general evaluation of the image of the EU fosters the European identity, (3) for we-feeling 
I have examined the general feeling of being a European citizen and last, but not least for 
(4) the function of legitimization I have examined trust if citizens in the EU and the 
European institutions.  
Nevertheless these categories still need to be connected with the European 
communication, more precisely the EU in television news. Therefore, I have measured 
general opinion and several aspects that influence it, just like informedness, trust in media 
and its elements, evaluation of media independence and the diversity of information that 
are showing the belief in the independence and trusting the media. 
Whilst conducting the research I had to face the lack of content analysis that has left 
unexplained the direct connection between the above-mentioned aspects and the impact 
of the television. Despite the thorough insight in European initiatives and agenda-setting 
means, content analysis would have show more clearly the connection between the 
European efforts in shaping the European public sphere and its general evaluation. 
Therefore this significant field can be subject to further research such as the relation 
between the various elements, namely how ownership influences the diversity of 
information, how media independence has an impact on trust in media and whether there 
is a correlation between trust and informedness.  
For every case this research is unique as it explains European communication in 
national broadcastings both from an empirical and practical point of view through 
interviews, and also aims to understand general opinion based on public televisions and 
their capacity of transmitting European news.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The main aim/topic of this chapter is the discussion of the impact of media 
representation in the European Union, and more precisely how media representation 
influences citizens’ identification with EU.  
Furthermore the main argument of this dissertation relies on a detailed analysis of 
the concepts of public sphere and the European public sphere. To establish a wide 
theoretical base (before examining empirical statistics and interviews detailed in the next 
chapter) we will also focus on the definition and formation of public sphere in general. 
To be able to analyze the European public sphere, it is necessary to explicitly 
connect our topic to the European Union. Thus an important part of the chapter will be to 
examine some of the main characteristics and elements of the EU. 
After an examination and short historical overview of the EU we can start our 
explication of the public sphere and the European public sphere. Later we will analyze the 
evidence that suggests there is no unified understanding of the phenomenon of European 
public sphere, and that despite its heterogenic vision academics agree on its importance 
and existence. 
 
2.1. European integration and EU information diffusion 
 
2.1.1. The European Union’s identity 
 
At the beginning of the 21th century the wish for European integration started to 
grow because of previous historical and political conflicts from the preceding decade. 
Nations started to feel the need for an institution that stood for peace and represented 
“collective identity, common values and common interest to promote social and political 
integration”. This is the main reason European integration started to gain importance. 47 
According to the CIVITAS Institute for the Study of Civil Society we can describe the 
phenomenon of “European integration” the following way: “reducing barriers on 
transactions between countries. The process of EU integration means that states agree to 
allow decisions to be made at a European, rather than a national level.” 48 Moreover many 
scholars of European integration have maintained that a democratic Union must emulate 
                                                        
47 Snyder T.: Nations, Empires, Unions: European Integration and Disintegration Since 1914. Fritt Ord, Oslo, [2014] 
48 Daley C.: CIVITAS Institute for the Study of Civil Society. [2015] 
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the nation state and develop pre-political elements such as a collective identity, common 
values and common interests, to promote social and political integration. 49 
Following Schlesinger and Fossum, in order to analyze and understand the complex 
nature of the EU, there are two distinct conceptualizations to follow in order to 
understand the function of the EU. Both methods cast the EU in terms of a nation state, 
which will be an important recurring aspect of this dissertation and later on I will explore 
its importance from different aspects.50 
One of the above-mentioned conceptualizations is the ‘regulatory’ one, which sees 
the EU as transnational governance that consists of specialist agencies and regulatory 
bodies. Transnational governance stays above the nation state and helps with its function 
to the member states. Because of the fact that transnational governance raises the 
question of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, it is important to look at the 
other model which shows that the EU is a political community that works in a democratic 
way and so is based on citizens’ decision and works in their mutual interest. This second 
understanding stands for a ‘federalist’ explanation. 51 
However the EU’s role and its relation with nation states remains an unfinished 
debate. There are opinions asserting the democratic nature of the EU because of the 
central decision-making role of the national governments, moreover with the presence of 
national representatives from EU member states in the European Parliament 
(representative democracy). Those representatives were elected in democratic manners 
view domestic elections in each member state. On the other hand, some opinions are 
skeptical of the significance of the European Parliament and claim that the European 
Commission is a much stronger body and, as we know, it is non-elected. 
The exact classification of the EU is still under debate (see the debate between 
Moravcsik 200152 versus Føllesdal and Hix 200653, for example).  Since transnational 
governance involves more than states and formal treaties, it questions the democratic 
quality of decision-making procedures, and thus also legitimacy of the policy outcomes. 
                                                        
49 Grimm, D.: ’Does Europe Need a Constitution?’, European Law Journal 1(3): 282-302. Morgan, David (1999) The 
european Parliament, Mass Media and the Search for Power and Influence, Alderhot: Ashgate Publishing. [1995] 
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51 Ibid 
52 Moravcsik, A.: In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’. Reassassing Legitimacy in the European Union. JCMS 40, no. 4. 
pp. 603-24.  [2002] 
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Moreover following Schlesinger and Fossum: “Whatever sense of direction could be 
derived from a decades-long process of integration has apparently given way to profound 
uncertainty and heightened contestation over the Union’s future development.”54 
 
2.1.2. Communicating the integration 
Since the beginning of European integration, the media has played a crucial role as 
the main tool that disseminates the initiatives of the Union to the public. The people have 
never had direct contact to the European Union, and the only sources were newspapers 
and TV channels that diffused the idea and policies of the EU.  
A study by Robinson from 2010 confirms that the less direct contact people have 
with a given issue the more the media becomes an important/popular intermediary. There 
is no doubt that the media plays an important role in giving information to people about 
EU initiatives, policies and actions. As Antonio V. Menéndez Alarcón claims: “because 
European citizens rely on the media for information about the EU, it is important and 
relevant to evaluate how the EU is portrayed in the news.”55 
This is supported by studies that say that nevertheless European countries are not 
reporting more about each other today than 30 years ago, in terms of quantity in referring 
to discussions and topics and European speakers, they report a relative stability over the 
past two decades.56 Even De Vreese et al. (2006) 57 state that in terms of visibility and 
share of EU actors, the trend between 1999 and 2004 is one of increase. The 2009 
European Parliament elections were more prominent in the news than in previous 
elections58. Moreover, it was found that media coverage of the 2009 EP elections was 
more evaluative, polarized, and positive towards the EU compared to previous EP 
elections. 
Also news-production changed its operativity in terms of their allocation of 
resources, strategic placement of correspondents and editorial staff, and choices for 
constructing news stories. The previously nationally organized news desks shifted towards 
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the international, or rather European focus. The Editor-in-Chief of the BBC Nine o'Clock 
News describes this shift: “Earlier we compared ourselves to America, today we are much 
more likely to compare ourselves to another European country such as Germany or France 
... We now have bureaux in Brussels, Frankfurt, Paris, Berlin and Rome and we can tap into 
BBC World's correspondents in places such as Warsaw and Vienna.” 59 The Editor-in-Chief 
of Britain's Channel 5 news program also comments on the implications of European 
political integration for news organizations: “ When setting up the program, we had to 
decide whether to have a bureau in Washington DC or in Brussels. We opted for Brussels 
as almost anything that comes out of there has importance, directly, for Britain, much 
more so than what comes out of Washington.” 60 
Not only editors and publishers had to adapt to new ways of communicating the 
European integration, but the European institutions themselves needed to emphasize a 
coordinated information diffusion in order to define the European image. According to De 
Vreese, whenever Europe has developed a communication strategy, it has tended to be 
elitist, self-congratulatory, and without an understanding of how the news media actually 
works. Accordingly, the aim was defined as making people love Europe, not necessarily to 
give people the information they need in order to be able to understand and tolerate it.61 
The EU institutions are responsible for providing all the means to journalists to explain 
European policy-making. This is important because by ‘normalizing’ and injecting 
European politics into national politics, we are most likely to see a ‘legitimate 
Europeanized public politics’ develop.62 
Anyway, we need to see that two different components of this overall evaluation 
were distinguished: In most countries, news portrayed the EU positively regarding to more 
utilitarian benefit considerations and, at the same time, negatively with regard to the 
democratic nature and functioning of the EU. As Schuck et al. (2011a) conclude, the 
picture – overall – is highly balanced, but evaluations are clearly polarized into a (positive) 
benefit and a (negative) democratic deficit dimension. 63 
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2.2. What is the European Public Sphere? 
 
2.2.1. Understanding the Public Sphere 
 
Jurgen Habermas, founder of public sphere theory defined the public sphere as 
“an arena for ‘the perception, identification, and treatment of problems affecting the 
whole society’”. 64 
According to Habermas (1989), originally the public sphere was developed first as 
a literary public sphere, centering on fictional literature (such as novels) and critical 
discourses related to it. And from this grew an explicitly political arena with numerous 
organizations and publications. Still the original remained essential in liberal democracies: 
“They formed the public sphere of a rational-critical debate in the world of letters within 
which the subjectivity originating in the interiority of the conjugal family, by 
communicating with itself, attained clarity about itself.”.65  
Also according to Habermas’ characterization, the public sphere “can best be 
described as a network of communicating information and points of view [...]; the streams 
of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they 
coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, 
so, too, the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action, for which mastery 
of a natural language suffices; it is tailored to the general comprehensibility of everyday 
communicative practice.” 66  
Later on, other researchers attempted to define the public sphere, such as 
Schlesinger and Fossum, who said that “the public sphere has a triadic character, with a 
speaker, an addressee, and a listener. ‘Public sphere’ entails that equal citizens assemble 
into a public and set their own agenda through open communication.”67 In this sense they 
maintain that the public sphere is a “communicative space (or spaces) in which relatively 
unconstrained debate, analysis and criticism of the political order can take place.” This 
resonates greatly with the words of Habermas: “…arena which enables citizens to interact 
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and talk about (the same) political issues.”68 
This idea is important, as de Vreese’s elaborates: “interpersonal communication is 
important for understanding both knowledge gains and an increased propensity to turn 
out the vote.” This finding is in line with much scholarship suggesting that discussions of 
politics are at the core of democratic citizenship. Although one of the aims of public sphere 
is to arrive on a common consensus, in reality public and political life mostly entails lack 
of correspondence. This is due to the fact that “the public sphere largely assumes 
homogeneity and consensus whereas public and political life is often characterized by 
heterogeneity and disagreement”. 69  
At this point it is worth to mention the growing role of the media. The media 
traditionally has been taken as the best ‘proxy’ and ‘location’ for expression of the public 
sphere.70 This affects the ontological status of the public sphere: “The public sphere 
remains an ideal, but it becomes a contingent product of the evolution of communicative 
action, rather than its basis”.71 With the appearance of new media and social media, media 
consumption of the public in general became a significant focus of numerous studies as it 
explains the public sphere in different manners. This thesis does not aim to debate the 
merits of this topic, only dedicate a brief acknowledgement. 
 
2.2.2. Defining the European public sphere according to scholars 
 
The complex and interconnected communication platforms within the European 
integration (and beyond) shape both our European identity and moreover the European 
public sphere. Against the background of the democratic deficit of the European Union, 
scholars recognized that the process of European integration must be accompanied by the 
Europeanization of political communication in order to overcome the lack of legitimacy 
and popular involvement in the EU by European citizens72. Numerous models regarding 
the Europeanization of political communication across the EU, and the possible 
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development of a European public sphere, have been presented in the last decade by a 
variety of scholars, and several of these are outlined in this proposal73. 
Even though social media is gaining importance regarding the examination of the 
European public sphere, there is still a significant emphasis on traditional information-
distribution, namely the television. Paraphrashing the words of Mr. Jaume Dutch Guillot, 
Director for the Media of the European Parliament, as the European integration is 
becoming deeper and wider, news on European issues gain more legitimacy, even if the 
EU’s information and communication policy, in fact, has been present in the European 
agenda since the very beginning of the integration process.74 
The neverending ways of defining the European public sphere reflect a deep and 
wide academic debate on its existence. I have collected some of the definitions proposed 
by researchers that also partially explain the way scholars relate to this phenomenon.75 
● According to van de Steeg, a public sphere exists if “the same topics are discussed 
at the same time with the same intensity and structure of meaning”  76  
● A public sphere is “an intermediate sphere of public actions, affiliations, and 
relations beyond the state and the market, where citizens as relatively free and 
equal members of society and its polity use many, independent, and party rival 
associations and media to learn, discuss, organize collective action, and bargain, 
among other things, and where such practices of citizenship tend to protect and 
promote constitutional democracy under preconditions of maturity” (de Beus 
2010: 14); 77  
● The public sphere is dynamic, it can “no longer be seen as one uniform national 
public sphere, but as a polymorph, polyphonic and even anarchistic” (Eriksen 
2004:6);78 
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● It is a “space for communication between political actors and citizen for discussions 
of matters of common interest” (Brantner et al. 2005); 79 
● The public sphere public sphere is “the place where civil society is linked to the 
power structure of the state” (Eriksen 2005: 342); 80 
● It is an “arena of communicative discourse to which citizens have access and may 
freely contribute to rational discussion of issues collectively deemed of societal 
importance” (Jankowski and van Os 2004).81 
● The public sphere is“ a system of communication where issues and opinions are 
being gathered (input), processed (throughput) and passed on (output)” 
(Neidhardt 1994: 8); 82  
● The public sphere is that social space where “every state holds a conversation with 
its subjects as to the legitimacy of its existence” (Price, E.M. 1995:234)83 
 
As mentioned before scholars are not only very divergent in finding definitions for 
the European public sphere, but also they represent different point of views on whether 
or not this phenomenon even exists. De Vreese, one of the main researchers of this topic, 
retains that even though there is no consensus about the extent to which Europeanized 
public spheres exist, the contours of a European public sphere can still be sketched. 84 Also 
Trenz describes this phenomenon by saying that in relation to Europe, a European public 
space can be equated largely with “European political communication” being any form of 
communication which refers to European governance in the wide sense, expressing 
consensus or dissent with regard to particular issues85 and then he adds that despite cross-
national differences, there are positive indicators of an absolute degree of European 
public sphere. 86 
Numerous researchers are of the opinion that this conception of the EU does not 
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conceive of the public sphere in monolithic terms, but rather as a set of overlapping 
publics.87 Therefore the very notion of a European public space will continue to be 
important to revisit: what is emerging is hardly a replacement of national public spheres, 
i.e., not a supranational structure but rather a composite composed of national public 
spheres. This notion of a European public sphere is indeed far removed from Habermas’ 
(1996) criteria for a monolithic European public sphere. Many say that the European public 
sphere is accumulating and divided.88 This is also due to the European Union being neither 
a state nor a nation, as it is still developing and continuously evolving. For this reason, 
whatever public sphere we might foresee developing in the EU will not necessarily be 
structured on the model of the modern nation state, as Schlesinger and Fossum contend.89 
The opinion of Swantie Lingenberg emphasizes this vision as he outlines three views in the 
scholarly literature on the subject. 
Firstly, a proper European public sphere requires conditions similar to those of the 
national public spheres – a common language, a European-wide media system and citizens 
with a European identity. Secondly, one can speak of a European public sphere where the 
national public spheres provide the infrastructure but where there is also more or less 
simultaneous reporting (and discussion) of European issues seen in a European 
perspective. Finally, the European public sphere is “a pluralistic ensemble of issue-
oriented publics that exists once the same issues are discussed simultaneously and within 
a shared frame of relevance”.90   
Nevertheless, many agree, with de Swaan, Eriksen and Schlesinger, included, that a 
common European public sphere is needed for an effective deliberative democracy to 
operate and that the present segmentation of the EU into national publics weakens its 
deliberative potential. They also add that overlapping flows of information do not of 
themselves ensure that overlapping publics will mean a common European public sphere. 
91 This is because the by now largely rejected notion of a singular, supra-national, pan-
European public sphere was conceptualized as communicative space requiring a common 
language, a shared identity and a transnational media system.92  And so the current nature 
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of the EU’s formation means that while there is a transnational public sphere based on 
the workings of policy, there is no corresponding general public possessing of a common 
collective identity. 93 This resonates with the idea of Kielmansegg (2003)94 and critics of 
this notion of a European public sphere: the European Union “is not a community of 
communication, hardly a community of shared memories; it is merely, and in a limited 
sense, a community of shared experiences”95.  
But what does a “community of communication” mean? What is the role of media 
in this regard? This is what we will examine in the following section. 
 
2.3. The media’s role in the European public sphere 
 
For some two decades now, there has also been a growing body of work that 
addresses the complex relations between media and public spheres in the EU at the 
national or supranational level. Given the centrality of media in public sphere theory, we 
need to inquire more into the media, public opinion, and the responsiveness of politics to 
public opinion, 96 keeping in mind the question of whether traditional media, in particular 
print media, is the sole and most appropriate ‘proxy’ for a public sphere 97, even if “where 
people know and care little about the issue, and where it is remote from their everyday 
experience of life and their values, then the impact of the media may be greater”. 98 
Indeed, most of what citizens experience about politics involves media to some extent and 
the media represents an organized and confined space where certain speakers and actors 
can provide input for public discussions. News media is an arena in which political actors, 
civil society and even citizens can express views and make announcements. 99 
And so at this point it is worthwhile to summarize the tasks that media ought to 
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perform in democratic political systems, following the thoughts of Habermas, citing 
Gurevitch and Blumler: first (1) is surveillance of the sociopolitical environment, reporting 
developments likely to impinge, positively or negatively, on the welfare of citizens; (2) also 
meaningful agenda-setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including the forces that 
have formed and may resolve them; (3) platforms for an intelligible and illuminating 
advocacy by politicians and spokespersons of other causes and interest groups;  (4) 
dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power- holders (actual and 
prospective) and mass publics; (5) mechanisms for holding officials to account for how 
they have exercised power;  (6) incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become 
involved, rather than merely to follow and kibitz over the political process; (7) principled 
resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their independence, 
integrity and ability to serve the audience; (8) a sense of respect for the audience member, 
as potentially concerned and able to make sense of his or her political environment.100 
Despite identifying the previously mentioned functions of the media, its nature shall 
be described as the structure of media content is not neutral, even though it follows 
professional, organizational and cultural conventions and the content also includes 
commentary and interpretation.101 For this reason numerous studies that focus on 
newspapers, television, journalists and the impact of social media use the methodology 
of content analysis in order to examine the public sphere through media. 
For example, Trenz in an analysis of broadsheet newspapers in 2000 in Germany, 
France, Britain, Italy and Spain found evidence of a ‘transnational resonance of political 
communications’ implying that in relation to specific actors and institutions there are 
cross-references. He distinguished three types of ‘European’ news: news characterized by 
a shared meaning of European events and issues; Europeanized news characterized by the 
secondary impact of European events and issues on national news coverage; and national 
news on domestic events and issues characterized by evolving forms of European 
monitoring and rhetoric. And in this study Trenz concluded that despite cross-national 
differences, there are positive indicators of an absolute degree of European public 
sphere.102 Just like Trenz, many other researchers have found evidence of a Europeanized 
news coverage in broadsheet, quality newspapers: Eder and Kantner,  Wessler and others 
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and Trenz and Eder103 for example. 
Others who have examined television news, might describe a more variegated 
picture. Following relevant studies, some say that television is the most widely cited 
source of information about the EU for its citizens (Eurobarometer)104 and it does not 
provide a virtual space for the European public sphere and it gives only an occasional sign 
of Europeanization105. On the other hand, Fiske and Hartley say that television is one of 
the most highly centralized institutions of modern society. This is not only a result of 
commercial monopoly or government control, it is also a response to the culture’s need 
for a common centre, to which the television message always refers. Its centralization 
speaks to all members of our highly fragmented society.106 Also Gripsrud says that in 
Europe broadcast television has been one of if not the most important institution in the 
national public spheres (outside parliaments) for the last 50 years or so, delivering 
essential information and a broad cultural repertoire to citizens and also providing central, 
common forums for entire nation-states. The question can thus be altered to how 
television might function in the context of the EU and a European public sphere.107  
The centrality of the medium of television to the public sphere and the traditionally 
national community it addresses was in early critical television theory first and best 
captured in Raymond Williams’s (1975)108 idea of broadcast television functioning in a 
situation marked by a historically unprecedented concentration of power and resources, 
on the one hand, and what he called ‘mobile privatization’ on the other, i.e. the dissolution 
of traditional communities and their replacement by nuclear families and swinging singles 
on the move both geographically and socially. In such a situation, centrally located 
broadcast television is a key distributor of essential information and a much-needed 
provider of social coherence and identity.109  
Also Habermas says that “broadcast television has been a key structural 
component in the public spheres of western countries since the 1950s. It is commonly 
assumed that the mass media in general and broadcasting in particular have contributed 
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greatly to the production of national identity, which fosters a strong inclination to 
participate in political processes within the nation-states of Europe 110. Consequently, one 
would think something similar could apply to the EU.”111  
Overall we can say that the criteria to be able to define a common European public 
sphere in the media includes corresponding media coverage in different countries with 
shared points of reference in which ‘speakers and listeners recognize each other as 
legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as 
common European problems’.112 Koopmans and Statham (2010)113 additionally list 
visibility, inclusiveness, and the presence of contestation. At the very least, a European 
public sphere should reflect national media reporting on the same topic using common 
sources, including EU sources and sources from other EU countries. In this framework for 
example Schlesinger perceives contradictory tendencies in the EU’s communicative 
spaces: on the one hand there are transnational networks and communicative flows and 
the steady rise of a lingua franca; on the other hand, media communication is still 
predominantly framed in national terms, despite the growth of news interest in the EU.114 
However I need to state that the media is not, ceteris paribus, responsible for the 
public sphere falling short of normative standards, elite dreaming or decreasing support 
for advanced European integration. As Trenz and van de Steeg emphasize, the media is 
bounded by a number of constraints that limit it in performing this role of sole-
responsibility such as market forces and other developments in the media and 
communication landscape.115 Hereby, the ‘prime responsibility’ is actually a political one 
with problems to be addressed (or solved) on the side of institutions, parties and 
politicians.116  
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2.4. Why the European public sphere is an important aspect? 
 
This wide debate on the existence of the European public sphere is due to the 
multiple roles it would have to take in the European integration process. Based on 
previous research, a European public sphere would fulfill many (if not most) of the 
following functions:117 A transparency function as it is a space for all social groups and 
opinions. It also has a validating function for being a space for voicing, debating and 
possibly revising one’s own opinion. The EPS has an orientation function as being a space 
for voicing and being confronted with opinions, it would have a legitimating function for 
being a space where opinions and policies are made visible, a forum for gaining (or not) 
public resonance and legitimacy. A responsive function as being a space for policy makers 
to infer opinions of the citizenry. It has an accountability function as it is a space where 
power holders would be discussed and held accountable. And last, but not least a 
participatory function as it is a space in which contributions would be encouraged.   
These definitions imply that the public sphere may be more or less explicitly 
present in different spaces. And as said before, one important space is constituted by the 
media. The media and communication can facilitate discourses 118 and helps the 
functioning of the European Union. 
Knowledge 
 
Many see the Union less as a creature in the hands of the member states and more 
as a political system sui generis, whose most distinguishing feature, perhaps, is its 
inordinate complexity along cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and social lines. The EU is marked 
by great institutional complexity, in both vertical and horizontal terms, and by enormous 
discrepancies in the member states’ sizes and institutional workings.119 The media has its 
role to share information on these matters in a comprehensible manner that increases the 
general knowledge of them. This is crucial as public knowledge such as participation in 
politics are at the core of democratic processes. The quality of citizenship and the health 
of the collective are preconditioned by political knowledge, and there is a positive 
relationship between knowledge and the act of voting120. Generally, scholars agree that 
the media play a role in the process of public learning and engaging in politics. According 
to de Vreese and Boomgaarden, two scholars, Price and Zaller compared self-reported 
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measures of media use, interpersonal communication, and knowledge levels as predictors 
for recalling current news events. They find knowledge to be the strongest and most 
reliable predictor of recall and conclude that when investigating reception of political 
communications, knowledge is a better predictor than media use. However, when looking 
at change in knowledge it becomes necessary to assess the diet of information that 
individuals are exposed to and not merely predicting knowledge as a function of 
knowledge due to potential imprecision in exposure and media use  
measure.121 
Although most scholars agree that knowledge about politics and public 
participation in political decision-making is beneficial to democracy, the literature is 
divided on whether or not the media helps in this matter, with some scholars focusing on 
the informative and mobilizing role of the media (e.g., Neuman et al., 1992; Norris, 2000; 
Dalton, 2002) and others on the contribution of the media to public cynicism, political 
inefficacy, and disengagement (e.g., Robinson, 1976; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Schulz, 
1998; Putnam, 2000). 122 
 
Legitimacy 
 
In the context of European integration, the underlying assumption is that a shared 
European space, a European public sphere, may contribute to the public legitimacy of the 
EU polity and its policies, in much the same ways as have been suggested for national 
public spheres. As the media are often held responsible for the EU legitimacy problems123. 
Meyer (1999)124 observes that the fragmented and technocratic profile of the EU is 
particularly noticeable in the European Commission’s interface with journalists. 
Therefore, a better understanding of EU-media relations might help to clarify the 
structural deficiencies at the core of the EU ‘communication deficit’.125  
In other words, even as the European Union celebrates 60 years of existence, 
worries are still frequently expressed over its democratic deficit and the low degree of 
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citizens’ participation in its key political processes. The EU’s 2001 ‘White Paper on 
Governance’ expressed concern with the growing disparity between the EU organization 
and citizens of the Union, since the connection between Europe and its citizens “is the 
starting condition for more effective and relevant policies”. The EU is worried that the 
European public has lost interest in its political process, and that there is an increasing 
distrust in politicians and their institutions within the general population: “many people 
are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex system to deliver the policies 
that they want. [Furthermore,] the Union is often seen as remote.”126 This is due to a 
segmented set of public spheres that has little capacity to challenge the democratic 
shortcomings of the EU and no evident ability to generate an overarching public sphere.127 
These segmented spheres are involved in practical problem-solving and do not 
constitute an overarching European public in democratic terms. They tend to be narrowly 
confined issue communities. 128 
The public sphere is a precondition for realizing popular sovereignty, because in 
principle, it entitles everybody to speak without any limitations. It is an idealized common 
space for free communication that is secured by legal rights to freedom of expression and 
assembly, where problems are identified, but also thematized and dramatized and formed 
into opinions and wills that formal decision-making agencies are to act upon. The modern 
concept of a public sphere extended across Europe. 129 
However, the media is important to legitimate the European institutions and the 
whole process of European integration as power holders’ basis of legitimacy is changed as 
citizens become equipped with rights against the state (through, for example, media-
provided information). Decision makers are therefore compelled to enter the public arena 
in order to justify their decisions and to gain support.130  
 
Democracy 
 
A critical issue pertaining to public sphere is the character of the link between 
public sphere and democracy. This means the extent to which public opinion frames and 
shapes the operations of the political system as opposed to simply responding to the 
system’s actions. A healthy public space can provide a forum for exchange between 
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citizens themselves and between citizens and elites, therefore it can improve the 
democratic quality of a system and contribute to the legitimacy and accountability of 
power holders.131 
Nevertheless we should not assume, in any case, that national public spheres are 
paragons of openness and democratic participation. Decision-making does not follow 
upon free and open debate; instead political questions are decided behind closed doors, 
through institutionalized bargaining. This tendency has the effect of undermining the 
public space as forum and as critical assessor of what takes place inside the political 
system. The speaker and the addressee are inside the system and the public is left on the 
sidelines and relegated to the passive role of a spectator or mere reactor to what the 
system produces. 132 
Media is one of the means, if not the most important one that can legitimate 
certain political tendencies and while fostering common knowledge on certain issues it 
reinforces certain political power. This is particularly true given the critical importance of 
the media in today’s age of ‘permanent campaigning’ in which politicians (and their spin-
doctors) increasingly plan their activities around the requirements of the media, not only 
during campaigns preceding elections, but also in daily politics.133 
This is why considerable effort has been invested in trying to expose and analyse 
the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union whilst examining its presence in 
the media. There is disagreement about the nature of the EU’s democratic shortcomings 
(see the debate between Moravcsik 2001 versus Føllesdal and Hix 2006 and Hix 2008, for 
example) that are than represented also in the national media. Some argue that the EU is 
fully democratic due to the central role in decision making of elected national 
governments, whose actions are followed by parliaments, media, and voters at home. 
However, the European Parliament has increased its powers since its inception, and it has 
invested also in its media-appearance. Others argue that the European issues play only a 
marginal role in domestic politics, that power holders are thus not scrutinized, that the 
European Parliament is still too insignificant and that the Commission (a non-elected 
body) is too powerful. 134 In every case, scholars agree that media has a significant role in 
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emphasizing the basic principles of democracy by sharing information and increasing 
political participation.  
Participation 
 
The diffusion of the information on European topics and news on European affairs 
are crucial even in increasing the political participation. This means that the political 
knowledge is a key predictor for engagement. 135 This is why we agree with De Vreese that 
a well-functioning public sphere alleviates some of the concerns with regard to the 
democratic quality of the EU. 136 Actually, effective scrutiny mechanisms, even when they 
produce criticisms, should be welcomed by the EU. Although they will increase negative 
as well as positive news coverage of the EU, this type of political communication is the 
only mechanism through which real public legitimacy of the European construction can 
emerge. Enhanced scrutiny will also foster opinions of EU policies which, when negative 
and critical, will nonetheless be better informed and intelligent, and which are anyway 
preferable to the present voters’ apathy.137 
In other words, the media coverage of EU news can indirectly increase political 
participation. Logically this entails a ‘European-wide public sphere’ in which citizens and 
elected power holders deliberate and interact across borders in the same way as they 
interact within them. The same De Vreese writes that “This largely theoretical argument, 
traditionally part of the attempt to build a ‘European demos’, may come across as 
appealing and, in terms of democratic theory, ideal. However, the proposition is naïve. 
Previous top- down attempts to stimulate a common communication system have shown 
that a monolithic European public sphere does not work in practice”.138 Although being 
sceptic of the existence of a homogenous European public sphere, in a study written with 
Boomgaarden, he investigated the differential impact of exposure to different news media 
outlets, including both public and commercial television news and broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers, and linked this impact to the actual content of the news outlets. They have 
demonstrated that news media exposure affects knowledge and political participation 
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positively. 139 And for the same reason I retain that the European communicative space is 
important for political participation. 
Identity 
 
I have mentioned before that communication is fundamental for sharing 
information that enforces common knowledge and therefore a common identity. A 
European public sphere is important for establishing and growing a European identity. For 
Eriksen, the prospects of an EU public sphere remain tied to greater public participation 
at the EU level, facilitated by transnational media and based in new modes of collective 
identification. 140 
Ultimately the European identity is a more complex phenomenon than the scope 
of this thesis. In a few words, I would quote Habermas who writes that social integration 
has two important pillars: a cultural and a political one. “The former denotes the kind of 
integration needed for individuals and groups who conceive of themselves as members of 
a community of values and beliefs, and often, as an ethnie. Cultural integration 
emphasizes the role of affiliation, language and history in the formation of a collective 
identity. It is premised on forms of cohesion – involving trust and solidarity in particular – 
which might transform an aggregation of people into a group with a distinct identity. It 
involves thinking of the nation as having a cultural basis”. 141 Despite that most of these 
elements are present on a European level, the European identity cannot become 
homogene due to the dominant national aspect that appears even in news. I will write 
about this more in detail in chapter 5. For now, it is enough to state that a functioning 
European public sphere is important for forming citizens’ European identity and a certain 
we-feeling. 
What seems clear is that there is an interest in a European public sphere among 
EU citizens, an interest that shows an awareness of there being a European polity that one 
might well see as an expression of a European identity. The Eurobarometer survey 189a, 
for which fieldwork was conducted in September 2006, asked respondents whether they 
were interested in knowing the opinion of citizens in other EU member states on a dozen 
important political and social issues. The answer was affirmative from 60 percent or more 
on all issues. Over two-thirds answered ‘yes’ to nine of the issues and five issues 
(protection of the environment, terrorism/organized crime, securing energy supply, job 
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creation and religious tolerance/protection of human rights) had positive answers from 
over 80 percent of respondents. The interest in learning the views of other Europeans is 
quite uniform across the 25 member states, regardless of, for instance, whether they 
voted yes or no to the proposed European constitutional treaty in 2005.142 This explains 
very well how the European public sphere can increase a common, European identity. 
We-feeling 
 
Related to identity, a certain we-feeling appears with regard to the European 
public sphere. In fostering a common identity, I increase the sense of belonging to a wider 
community. This is why, according to Schlesinger, the nation, ideally, due to its deeper ties 
of belonging and trust, makes possible the transformation of an aggregation of individuals 
and groups into a collectivity capable of common action. A distinction can be made 
between the cultural or value basis of a political order and the constitutional order of such 
a society. The latter does not necessarily presuppose an underlying culture but may rather 
appeal to transcultural norms and universal principles on the basis of which it is possible 
to reach agreement between given cultures. 143  
And so, in the frame of communitarianism identity is value-based.144 People need 
to regard each other as norm-abiding actors in order for solidarity and collective action to 
come about on a voluntary basis. What is more, communitarians hold that political 
integration requires a deeper sense of belonging and commonality.145 And in this sense a 
European public sphere that increases knowledge, identity, participation and a we-feeling 
is a highly significative element for fostering a political integration, or rather European 
integration. This is explained even in a study made by Wessler et al. that shows that even 
though the relative stability is invariant over the past two decade of discussions of topics 
with a European focus and European speakers appearing in media s, nevertheless 
‘Europeans’ as a collective or ‘we’ is nearly absent, albeit marginally increasing over time. 
They label this a “significant and steady, albeit modest process of increasing 
Europeanization over the past two decades”.146  
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2.5. Explaining the process of Europeanization 
 
Contemporary with the rise of the debate over the European public sphere, the 
expression and phenomenon of Europeanization gained space. This expression is used by 
numerous scholars such as Gerhards, who contend that a more realistic scenario is not a 
genuine supranational European public sphere in the singular and monolithic sense, but 
rather a Europeanization of national public spheres.147 
Two criteria are listed for such a Europeanization of national public spheres: an 
(increased) proportion of coverage of European themes and actors and the evaluation of 
these themes and actors from a perspective that extends beyond their one country and 
its interests.148 However, Trenz differently defines the category of Europeanized news 
based on the notion of a “transnational resonance of political communications”, implying 
that there are cross-references between specific actors and institutions. He distinguished 
three types of “European” news: news characterized by a shared meaning of European 
events and issues; Europeanized news characterized by the secondary impact of European 
events and issues on national news coverage; and national news on domestic events and 
issues characterized by evolving forms of European monitoring and rhetoric.149 
Although there is a certain consensus on the process of Europeanization, different 
aspects emerge if for example we look at research crystallizing around the notion of 
varying (increasing) degrees of Europeanization of national public spheres...150 
Researchers agree that this process is “imperfect” compared to the (theoretical, ideal 
type) pan-European benchmark, and there is still no consensus about the extent to which 
Europeanized national public spheres exist.151 
Cross-national comparison of this kind tends to challenge Trenz’s finding that the 
elite press as a whole can be seen as kind of cross-national cheer-leader for the EU, but 
the contexts of public reception differ greatly. At this point we need to mention the 
interesting fact that Europeanization can be witnessed in the harmonized media 
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regulation, the increasing European media-ownership that could foster this process, but 
also that content tends to be less Europeanized due to the different editing policies and 
journalistic behavior. Semetko, de Vreese and Peter assert so in their study: “While the 
changes in domestic media systems and news organizations can be linked both directly 
and indirectly to the processes of European integration, little can be said about the 
changes over time in media content, particularly news, as a result of 'Europeanisation'”.152 
Accordingly, we can measure a certain Europeanization within news but also 
depict differences in point of views. Following Semetko, the category “foreign affairs” 
(defined as “Europe and the EU, relation with foreign countries”) increased its share of the 
European campaign topics from one to six per cent on television and from 0 to 12 per cent 
in the press.153 Albeit looking at EU news outside the elections, i.e., during routine periods 
when there are no scheduled events of the magnitude such as European Council meetings 
for example, EU politics appears marginally in national news.154 
Other studies on media content underline the uneven presence of EU institutions 
and country-oriented approaches in the news155. Sifft et al. (2007), focusing on the quality 
of press in Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria and Denmark, distinguished different 
types of transnationalization. In terms of what they label “monitoring governance”, i.e. 
reporting about the EU and its institutions, they find a clear process of Europeanization 
between 1982 and 2003. However, in terms of horizontal integration they report negative 
developments over time. This means that European countries are reporting less about 
each other today than 20 years ago.156 Overall, we can see that evidence of the 
Europeanization of national public spheres comes from studies focusing on the quality 
broadsheet press, whereas studies focusing on the popular press, television and new 
media provide little evidence (yet) of a Europeanization trend. 
However the notion of a European(ized) public sphere in some form remains 
crucial as it is expected to not only inform about the EU but also to contribute towards the 
legitimacy of the polity and the understanding of EU politics. Indeed it can be argued that 
a Europeanized public sphere is a precondition for democratic decision making in the 
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EU.157 According to Meyer EU governance should communicate the following to the 
media: ‘accountability (who is advocating what); procedural (how does decision-making 
work); and issues (what is about to be decided).158 To quote Habermas: “The deficit in 
democracy can only be eliminated if a European public sphere comes into existence in 
which the democratic process is incorporated... the pan-European political public sphere 
is the solution to the problem of insufficient social integration in the processes of 
Europeanization”. 159 
Last but not least, the process of Europeanization is beneficial, if not boosted and 
guided by the European institutions. Accordingly, their self-defined strategic principles 
underlying the initiatives are 1) listening to citizens (taking their views and concerns into 
account), 2) communicating how EU policies affect citizens’ everyday lives, and 3) 
connecting with citizens by “going local” and addressing citizens in their national and local 
settings. 
While these principles may appear somewhat trivial, they do in fact represent and 
embody a real increase in investing in communication from within the EU institutions. As 
Meyer160 noted, there was—prior to the mid 1990s—virtually no interest in or awareness 
of media coverage of European politics from the side of EU institutions.161 Today there is 
a well-planned and complex machine fostering increase of the EU-policies appearing in 
the media, moreover trying to drive the content and be proactive by framing news. We 
will examine this topic in detail more in chapter 4, but first let us view how scholars 
differentiate within the various types of the European public sphere. 
2.6. Interpretations of the European public sphere 
 
The term European public sphere generally refers to the place where public 
opinion takes form through the discussion of questions, political issues and decisions and 
where political power is placed under scrutiny.162 In this wide debate concerning the 
European public sphere various point of views, categories, and different interpretations 
of the phenomenon emerge. 
                                                        
157 de Vreese, C.H.: p. 8 [2007] 
158 Meyer, C.O.: Political legitimacy and the invisibility of politics: exploring the European Union’s communication deficit. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 4: p. 617–39. [1999]  
Martins, I. A.; Lecheler, S.; de Vreese, C. H.: Information Flow and Communication Deficit: Perceptions of Brussels-Based 
Correspondents and EU officials, Journal of European Integration, 34:4, p. 305-322. [2012]  
159 Habermas, J.: “Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung? (Why Does Europe Need a Constitution?)” [2001], online 
resource, Die Zeit. URL http://zeus.zeit.de/text/2001/27/200127 verfassung lang.xml. 
160 Meyer, C.O. [1999] 
161 De Vreese, C.H., [2007] 
162 Fossum & Schlesinger [2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
By grouping previous studies three streams can be identified. In the first stream 
there are those political philosophy studies that focus on the EU’s democratic deficit and 
possible solutions that communication processes can offer while creating a supranational 
public sphere. (see, for example Eriksen, Schlesinger, Habermas, Fossum) The second 
group is literature that discusses empirically the existence of a transnational public sphere. 
(Schlesinger, Ionescu) The third consists of studies dealing with the topic of the 
Europeanization of the existing national public spheres. (Van de Steeg, Risse, Trenz). 
Although research conclusions and consequences depict a not-thoroughly united 
picture of the process, as of the effects and results of Europeanization, they do leave 
unquestioned the assumption that there is a link between communications policy and the 
fostering of our European identity163 and the European public sphere. However various 
categorizations were depicted by researchers that differentiate between various types of 
the European public sphere(s). 
The first category is between horizontal and vertical European public sphere. This 
is maybe one of the most important categorization of the European public sphere and was 
made by Koopmas and Statham. There is one important difference between news about 
the EU, its policies and institutions on the one hand and news about events and issues 
from other European countries on the other. The two sides of this distinction have been 
coined vertical and horizontal Europeanization, respectively. Vertical Europeanization 
refers to national actors addressing European actors, national actors addressing European 
issues or European actors partaking in national debates on European issues. Horizontal 
Europeanization is referred to as national media covering issues in other EU member 
states and national actors addressing issues or actors in another EU member state.164165 
The second category is based on distinction here is between ‘strong’ and ‘general’ 
publics. Strong publics are spaces of institutionalised deliberation “whose discourse 
encompasses both opinion formation and decision making”, and weak – or what scholars 
term ‘general’ – publics are spaces “whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in 
opinion formation and does not also encompass decision making”. 166 
Thirdly in the literature, we can observe a development from focusing on a ‘public 
sphere heavy’ notion of a singular, pan-European public sphere to focusing on a ‘public 
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sphere light’ notion of co-existing national public spheres with regard to European 
politics.167 
The fourth category is between theoretical and real European public sphere, as 
several scholars have pointed out that there is a gap between the theoretical (and ideal) 
and observable (and real) European public sphere.168 
Last, but not least the utopian, the elitist and the realistic groups can be named. 
The ‘utopian’ notion of a European public space would imply a supranational public space, 
EU level actors dominating, truly European themes being addressed, ideally in (pan-) 
European media. Transnational, segmented European spheres have been identified in 
relation to relatively confined issues and time spans.  
The group of ‘elitist’, describes ‘bubbles’ of discourse that primarily involve 
specific, elitist segments of society and can hardly be said to be a public sphere but rather 
an ‘elitist’ notion of a European public space. This is because segmented transnational 
public spheres which have been conceptualized as issue-specific communicative space are 
largely dominated by political and economic elites 169. 
The ‘realistic’ notion refers to the Europeanized national public spheres. This 
notion is based on observations of parallelization and synchrony in topics and an increase 
in salience of European issues and actors, a horizontal and vertical dimension of 
Europeanization. Most of the divergence in the literature can be explained by the focus 
on different media (e.g., national broadsheet, quality newspapers vis-`a-vis television 
news). 170 
Continuing this thread, it is important to speak about social media with regard to 
the shift in the television sector in relation to the information-consumption habits and the 
digital media field, as social media influences the establishment of the European public 
sphere. Nevertheless the aspect of social media is not strictly related to the research topic, 
however it sheds it. 
The public sphere was from the beginning fundamentally tied to the emergence of 
modern mass media, in the form of books, journals and newspapers, and this dependence 
on media has radically increased over the last century. Consequently, the actual, 
functioning public sphere encompasses a lot more than the parliamentary assembly and 
explicitly political debates on the op-ed pages of leading high-brow newspapers.171 In 
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addition we have to acknowledge that information-sources became multiplicitous, 
consumers became conscious, and that there is the fragmented emergence and 
significance of non-mainstream sources of news and information. 172 
While media such as newspapers and television news remain crucial sources and 
indicators of a European public sphere, online sources play an increasingly important role. 
This role pertains to communications from the EU institutions themselves and between 
individual parties or actors that may communicate directly through the usage of social 
media (including Facebook and Twitter), and it also pertains to news sites, fora etc. 
Koopmans and Zimmermann (2010), however, caution that political communication on 
the internet with respect to European integration is remarkably similar to communication 
in the mainstream media. 173 
The European institutions use social media to increase their direct dialogue with 
its citizens, but nevertheless the academic debate on social media contributing to a 
European public sphere is getting wider. However, this thesis focuses merely on the 
existence of the European public sphere in television. Therefore, let us go more in-depth 
on this topic. 
 
2.7. European coverage in television 
 
The media coverage of European affairs is in lieu of a constant flow of news and is 
well described with three main characteristics.  
First is that media coverage of the EU is cyclical, with occasional peaks and long 
periods of little news (de Vreese 2002; de Vreese et al. 2001; Peter and de Vreese 2004). 
Key events, such as national referendums on EU issues (e.g., de Vreese and Semetko 2004; 
Hobolt 2009), EU summits (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; van der Brug et al. 2007), 
and European Parliament elections can take up a substantial part of the news (de Vreese 
et al. 2006; Maier and Maier 2008; Schuck et al. 2011b).174 For example Pippa Norris, 
analyzing data obtained monthly from monitoring Euromedia reports, concluded that with 
respect to the period from January 1995 to autumn 1997 most European issues received 
minimal coverage in the news media. If there was coverage, then it cyclically peaked 
around the EU summits. During routine periods, however, coverage of European affairs 
                                                        
172 De Vreese, C.H., [2007] p.13 
173 Koopmans and Zimmermann [2010] 
De Vreese, C.H., [2007] 
174 de Vreese, C.H.: The EU as a public sphere. [2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
remained ephemeral. The predominant topics in the 33-month period discussed by Norris 
were monetary union and EU development; in other words, issues that journalists could 
use for further analysis. 175 
Second is that most of the news is seen through the prism of the nation state. In a 
study by Semetko, De Vreese, and Peter, the British government chose to stay outside 
EMU and the euro, whereas Germany was not only in from the beginning, but played a 
key active role in bringing about the 1 January 1999 launch. An analysis of the television 
news coverage in Britain and Germany around the introduction of the euro revealed some 
important national differences in the way this common European key event was covered. 
176 
And third is that television news is peripheric according to studies in which 
researchers have focused on the differential effects of television depending on the choice 
of programming. Putnam, for example, showed negative correlations when considering 
television the primary form of entertainment against a variety of civic engagement 
measures.177 De Vreese and Boomgartner also found that in the countries with a lower 
visibility of political news, the positive effects were less pronounced. Therefore, while the 
proliferation of commercial news may not be worrying it is important to note that if news 
is moved to the periphery of prime-time programming, as for instance in Great Britain 
(e.g., Semetko, 2000), there is reason to worry about negative consequences for the 
political process. If informational programs become less popular and the public’s interest 
and attention shift further toward entertainment and fiction, then some segments of the 
public might indeed be caught in a downward spiral of ever decreasing political knowledge 
and engagement. 178 
But how do European institutions contribute to news on EU affairs? 
 
2.8. An introduction to European institutions communicating through television 
news 
 
As television news consistently remains the most important source of information 
for Europeans about Europe, the framing of news about “Europe” plays an important role 
in contributing to public opinion formation about issues. News frames provide the 
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audience with direction on how to conceive of European issues, such as the introduction 
of the euro and the enlargement of the European Union.179  
The EU institutions recognize the importance in framing news and therefore try to 
be proactive and share sufficient information on their operation. But needless to say, the 
European Union (as of 2007) has only some features of a state and many more differences 
including behind-closed-doors decision making, a weak parliament and a fragmented 
media system.180 For this reason, the EU institutions face a different path to follow than 
do national politics, especially as they must base their communication mainly on national 
information channels rather than their own.  
The national news media plays an active role in providing a national spin on the 
major events. The study of Semetko and De Vreese, in which they qualitatively analyzed 
the news in Britain and Germany, found that conflict frames, and in particular economic 
consequences frames, were most common across all television news program. In addition, 
studies focusing on the printed press’s role in Europe have shown that the Council and the 
European Parliament are under-represented in the press coverage of EU-affairs and that 
the Commission tends to generate negative press coverage.181 
This is due to several factors. The studies on EU press work confirmed the existence 
of a disparity between the perceived importance of the institutions’ political messages 
and their respective communicative performance. The political-legal profile of the 
Commission emerges as a double-edged sword: while its right of initiative favors 
permanent media attention182, the consensus-striving nature of this unelected 
institution—often criticized for policies owned by the Council—constrains its press work. 
This at least partially explains the recurrently negative evaluation by our interviewees. 
Conversely, the EP press releases are praised for their openness, but the institution’s 
excessive transparency decreases its newsworthiness.183  
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I will examine in more detail the news-framing initiatives of the European 
institutions and its evaluation by journalists in chapter 4, but I retained it important to 
note with regard to the existence of a European public sphere the active role of the 
European institutions in guiding these processes. 
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3. More on the European Broadcasting Systems 
 
It is highly important to examine broadcasting channels from within their context 
as there are several contextual factors that might have an impact on broadcasting and 
content. The channels tend to be influenced one one side by the size and wealth of a 
country and on the other side by factors such as content allocation, ownership structures 
and funding schemes. This is why in this chapter I will examine trends in the broadcasting 
space, ownership and its changes, and address the impact of the legislative background 
and within this context I will analyze the European initiatives. 
 
3.1. Recent trends in Broadcasting 
 
At the dawn of the new century, the European broadcasting systems look 
remarkably different than from only two decades ago. There has been a structural shift 
from national public service broadcasting monopolies towards international and national 
broadcasting markets with competing public and private outlets.184 In the 90’s, all 
European countries (with the exception of Britain, Italy and Luxembourg) had only public 
service broadcasting channels. By 2000, all public broadcasting monopolies had come to 
an end.  
This change is important because of the consequences it had on the provision of 
public affairs news and information. Research comparing various national broadcasting 
systems around the world in the early 1980s showed that the more 'commercial' the form 
of financing the system, the less room there was in prime-time schedules for information 
about political and current affairs.185   
The above is the reason why while the shift from public monopolies to competitive 
broadcasting markets coincided historically with the increased pace of European 
integration processes in the 1980s and 1990s, it is not an easy task to determine the 
relative influence of European integration on the changes in broadcasting systems.186  
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3.1.1. Trends and tendencies regarding the number of channels within Europe 
 
First of all it is important to consider the proliferation of television channels in 
Europe as this contributes to the fragmentation of information and diversification of 
content. In this evaluation I can rely on the outcomes provided by an analysis made by 
Schneeberger and Fontaine with a focus on the linear and on-demand audiovisual media 
services in Europe. They have found the following key-results187: First of all the number of 
TV channels established in Europe has increased notably since 2009, but more than half 
of the growth can be attributed to the launch of HD channels, generally simulcasts of 
existing channels. In half of the 28 EU countries people were able to watch over 400 
television channels. A total of 2563 on-demand audiovisual services were established in 
the European Union by the end of 2015. Video-on-demand services and catch-up 
television services taken together represented 73% of the total number of services. And 
last, but not least 46% more TV channels established in the EU in 2015 than seven years 
earlier: The total number of channels established in the EU188 grew from 3615 in 2009 to 
5274 in 2015. This represented a total net gain of 1659 TV channels in seven years.  
Moreover the figure below (Figure 3.1.) show that the increase of the number of 
TV-channels is concentrated in three countries. TV channels established in the UK 
(N=1556), France (N=489), and Germany (N=398), accounted for 46%, nearly half, of all TV 
channels licensed in the EU in 2015; the top ten countries accounted for 76% of the same 
figure.  
It can be also seen that in almost every country there was growth regarding TV 
channels: Well over 90% of EU countries had more channels licensed in their territories in 
2015 than seven years ago. The few exceptions to this rule were Sweden and Italy whose 
number of channels slightly decreased due to the migration of licenses in the first case 
and the closure of various time-shifted and entertainment channels in the latter.  
Out of these newly established channels two thirds was shared among five EU 
countries: Three major EU economies including the UK (+481), France (+175) and Germany 
(+149) as well as the Czech Republic (+153) and the Netherlands (+101) were among the 
countries that registered the highest net increase of licensed channels in their respective 
territories in the period from 2009 to 2015. Their cumulated net increase of TV channels 
represented 64% of the total net increase of tv services in the EU.189 
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Figure 3.1: Number of TV channels by country of establishment in EUR38 (2009, 2015) 
The conclusion can be drawn that this increase was not only significant in the absolute 
number of TV channels but also in the diversification in their genre and content. 
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3.1.2. Genre of television channels in Europe 
 
Digital television has led to a remarkable increase in the number of television 
channels in Europe. With the increasing fragmentation of audiences, the spectrum of 
genres in the television landscape has been expanded considerably.190 Always following 
the study of MAVISE Extra made by Schneeberger and Fontaine I can depict two pan-
European trends: first that the 60% of the net increase of channels was due to HD channels 
that were the main reason of the growth. And second that as it can be also seen on Figure 
3.2. sport (12%) and entertainment/TV fiction/games (11% of the total net increase) were 
the dominant genres of this increase. Figure 3.2. also shows that two-third (65%) of all TV 
channels founded in 2015 can be categorized by 6 different genres:  HD (22%), 
entertainment/TV fiction/games (13%), sport (11%), film (7%), culture/education/ 
documentary (6%) and  music channels (6%). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Breakdown of linear audiovisual services established in the EU28 by genre 
(2009,2015)  
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3.2. How does ownership change in the broadcasting system 
 
Ownership is a very interesting factor in European media as it is an adapting 
evolution to digital innovations and legislative changes, moreover it can have a significant 
impact on the European public sphere.  
According to Semetko and De Vreese, liberal European legislation has fostered a 
new environment for media ownership, with several cases of large-scale cross-media 
ownership. Especially strong publishers have entered the European broadcasting market, 
significant examples are Germany's Springer and Bertelsmann, and Australia's Rupert 
Murdoch. Non-press media companies as well as large businesses have entered the 
broadcasting scene with Italy's Berlusconi (Fininvest) and Germany's Kirch as well-known 
examples. The rise of international media holdings goes hand in hand with national 
restrictions on cross-media ownership and European competition legislation. Britain, 
Spain and the Netherlands, on one hand, have very restrictive regulations on cross-
ownership of press and broadcasting, whereas the Scandinavian countries, Germany and 
France, on the other, have no or only limited restrictions on cross-media ownership. The 
situation today seems to be one in which both national and European policy-makers are 
dealing with cross-media ownership by adjusting current policies to national situations.191 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) have examined in detail the correlation between media-
ownership and the presence of the state in this field. They have distinguished three 
models of media systems in the western world which all assign a different role for the 
media. In the first model, the Polarized Pluralist model (found in most Mediterranean 
countries) there is strong state intervention: the media industry (in particular the press) is 
heavily subsidized and ‘obligations’ and expectations from the political side for editorial 
content are possible (but not necessarily desirable). In the second model, the Liberal 
model (found most pronouncedly in the U.S. and Britain), market domination is strong, 
the level of professionalization is high, and the possibility for political influence (except in 
cases where the party-paper parallelism remains high) is minimal. The third model, the 
Democratic Corporatist model (found in north-western Europe, including the 
Netherlands), is characterized by state intervention in the provisions of public 
broadcasting and press subsidies, but also by a strong degree of professionalization and 
editorial autonomy from political influences.192 
This aspect of ownership is very important as cross-national media-services could 
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mean a homogeneous European public sphere or at least have an impact on news-
harmonization due to shared national coordination. Broadcasting services have a direct 
influence on content and thus on the coverage of European affairs. By focusing on the 
effects of the latter, “the process of European integration is ultimately reconceptualised 
from a too simplistic unidirectional flow with European integration as independent 
variable to a more reciprocal model with European integration as both an independent 
and dependent variable” – states Semetko, De Vreese and Peter in their study. They also 
add that there is a relation between media content and public opinion that explains 
European integration not only as a top-down process but also as a bottom-up process that 
contributes to the common understanding of a European public sphere. 193 
Last but not least, media ownership tendencies in Europe are interesting and 
important also for the competitive and changing landscape for public service media that 
have to cope with new challenges. According to Peter Dahlgren, public service media can 
be associated with the realization of the public sphere and commercial broadcasting, and 
the market model of financing can be portrayed as a threat to it.194 However, Kevin, 
Pellicano and Schneeberger did note in their study that the proportion of public service 
news channels is quite high and greater than that of the proportion of public channels 
with regard to the entire universe of television channels in Europe. In certain countries 
the public service broadcaster plays a dominant role in the provision of television news 
channels (Spain, Denmark, the Czech Republic and Ireland). Countries where private 
corporations dominate the news market include France, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Belgium, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Sweden, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The “Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, and Slovakia.195 
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3.3. The influence of the law 
 
Agreeing with Schlesinger and Fossum, I take into consideration that a public 
sphere is imbricated in a set of legal and institutional arrangements which have been 
traditionally linked to the nation state. Consequently, it has been quite common to 
imagine the public sphere in rather monolithic terms on a national level.196 But as the 
European Parliament  began to harmonize national legislation and numerous European-
level initiatives entered in force, national broadcasting started to become European 
regardless of the fact that member states can decide their own regulation of this field. 
According to Semetko, de Vreese and Peter: “Whereas the impact of European integration 
is perhaps only indirectly related to some of the general changes in the structures of 
western European broadcasting systems, it is possible to identify a range of direct and 
specific impacts of European integration on broadcasting legislation, ownership, and 
quota restrictions on cultural products. This impact of increased European integration, in 
turn, shaped the European broadcasting landscape in which political communication takes 
place.”197 
Legislation in the field of broadcasting and media was essentially a national policy 
issue until the early 1980s. International broadcasting legislation did not exist, not like in 
telecommunications and media. This sector was addressed in 1987 and 1990 by the Green 
Papers on telecommunication and satellite communication, and in 1997 with the Status 
Report on European telecommunication policy. Media policy and telecommunications 
policy had a long tradition as distinct areas of policy-making.198 
With IT development and the evolution in digitalization many new media 
technologies entered the market. Decision-makers had to notice that the policy-making 
did not sufficiently address the growing disparity between distribution and content. A new 
generation of integrated communication policies was required.199 The rapid growth in use 
of the Internet has posed new policy challenges and has raised new issues of copyright 
and ownership.  
                                                        
196 Schlesinger, P; Fossum, J. E., [2007] 
197 Semetko, H.A.; de Vreese, C.H.; Peter, J., [2000] 
198 McQuail D. and the Euromedia Research Group: 'Caging the Beast: Constructing a Framework for Analysis of Media 
Change in Western Europe', European Journal of Communication 5, p. 313-32. [1990] 
199 van Cuilenburg J. and Slaa P.: 'From Media Policy Towards a National Communications Policy'. Journal of 
Communication 8, p. 149-76. [1990] 
J. Melody, 'Communication Policy in the Global Information Economy: Whither the Public Interest', in M. Fergurson (ed.), 
New Communication Technologies and the Public Interest. London: Sage [1993]   
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
The European Community most notably addressed broadcasting in the 1984 Green 
Paper on 'Television without Frontiers'. As Peter Humphreys notes, the “initial impulse for 
a European-level media policy was the optimistic expectation ... that transfrontier 
broadcasting might give a welcome fillip to the process of European cultural and political 
integration”.200 According to Anthony Weymouth and Bernard Lamizet much policy-
making in this field was driven by the changes implemented by transnational satellite 
broadcasting.201 The 'Television Without Frontiers' Green Paper, eventually adopted in the 
Directive of 1989 on television broadcasting, was aimed at opening national borders for a 
flow of television programmes thus creating a single market for broadcasting, unhindered 
by national legislation.202 The core of this Directive was generally in line with the notions 
of deregulation and liberalism as embedded in the 1992 creation of the Single European 
Market.  
The 'Television without Frontiers' act was updated by 1997 due to the challenges 
posed by the digital-related televised services, tv-shopping and new way of regulating 
advertising and sponsorship. The directive now addresses diverse issues such as the 
necessity for major events (particularly sport) to be carried on unencrypted networks, the 
protection of minors, and  restrictions on broadcasting violence and pornography.203 
Even today, audiovisual media are treated as other goods and services within EU 
policy-making, and there are certain EU-wide rules that ensure the free circulation of films 
and broadcasting content on the free market of Europe independently from how they are 
delivered (traditional TV, video-on-demand, Internet, etc.). This is regulated by the EU’s 
audiovisual and media policy, more precisely the audiovisual media services directive. 
This directive has set a goal of coordination among national legislation. This 
coordination manifests itself in the creation of comparable conditions for emerging 
audiovisual media, in protecting children and consumers, in stopping racial and religious 
hate speech, fostering cultural diversity, safeguarding media pluralism and ensuring that 
national media regulations remain independent. 
The guidelines of which each country is encouraged to follow minimum standards 
are the following: Major events (like sport events, Olympic games or World Cups) need to 
be available to a wide audience. Children need to be protected by controlling violent or 
pornographic content. Strict advertising rules for certain products, like tobacco or alcohol. 
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Content needs to be accessible even for those with visual or hearing impairments. There 
are rules and incentives for the promotion of European films and audiovisual content. 
In 2013, the Commission held a public consultation on the implications of 
the convergence between traditional TV and the internet. Feedback from this 
consultation was published and the next step is to carry out a REFIT (the Commission’s 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance program) evaluation of the Directive.  
The EU is not only fostering a common European audiovisual space through 
regulation but also through incentives. The EU is investing 1,4 billion Euros in the 
audiovisual and cultural sectors through a program called Creative Europe. The goal of this 
program is to foster the production and distribution of European audiovisual content. 
Last but not least, it is important to mention the effort put forth by the European 
institutions on public service broadcasting as they recognize their responsibility to provide 
for democratic, social and cultural needs that are not met by the market (Treaty of 
Amsterdam 1990). Government grants to public broadcasters are thusly exempt from the 
EU's strict rules on state subsidies, as long as the funding is to be used for public service 
goals and does not unfairly disadvantage private sector broadcasters. 
 
3.4. Past European initiatives in fostering the European communication 
 
Considering the absence of European mass media—except for a few institutional 
channels such as Europarl.tv, which until now had remained confined to an elite core of 
citizens already interested in EU issues—providing information about the EU relies mainly 
on national mass media. The topic of mass media inadequately covering EU-concerned 
issues has been widely acknowledged in literature (de Vreese, 2007; Liebert and Trenz, 
2010; Bennett, 2012 among many others). When asked to give a tentative explanation of 
such a phenomenon, Mr. Duch, Head of the European Parliament’s Media Unit, identifies 
two main reasons that might help to explain the reticence of national media in covering 
EU issues. The first one is a matter of appeal, as “television doesn’t like the European 
Parliament much, as they believe it is a distant and complicated object that doesn’t go 
well with the broadcasting language. Furthermore, televisions usually don’t like 
parliaments in general, because parliaments discuss, vote and are very often too 
technical”. The second reason is to be found in organizational practices of national 
newspapers, as “a newspaper based in Milan has usually twenty correspondents in Rome 
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and only one in Bruxelles: it is clear that this is not in line with the present political balance, 
which is different from the one of twenty years ago”.204  
However distributing information on European matters is crucial for many reasons, 
as we explained in chapter 2.4. Following the graphs below, I attempted to confirm the 
following hypothesis: The more the news speaks about the EU in the news, the more the 
citizens think they understand how the EU works. Raw data was taken from 2015 
Eurobarometer and the indicators of “Informedness”205 and “Understand how the EU 
works” were correlated, which are the two axes of the diagram. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Informedness about EU issues in relation to the understanding the EU 
 
From the graph we can see that the more people disagree with the statement of 
understanding how the EU works, the more people think that there is a lack of general 
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informedness grows. And, the contrary is also quite visible on the graph: as the sense of 
informedness grows, respondents agree that they understand how the EU works. 
As a next step, we can sense a certain correlation between respondents’ image of 
the EU and feeling European. Figure 3.3 shows that more people feel negative about the 
EU, the more they are attached to their national identity rather than the European one. 
Also Figure 3.5. supports the hypothesis that the more you believe in the EU, the more you 
feel European, as it shows a significative correlation between feeling positive about the 
image of the European Union and identifying as European.206 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Connection between image of the EU and feeling “European” 
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Figure 3.5: Impact of the level of positivity of the EU image on feeling European 
Assuming that European institutions need to communicate efficiently with their 
citizens if they want to confirm their legitimacy, I will now shed light on the common 
initiatives of these institutions, what platforms they operate and which alternative forms 
of communication they use for transmitting values and informing people about EU policy-
making. 
 
3.4.1. European policy-making in favor of European programming 
 
The European Commission, besides having the concern of creating a unified 
European culture, also recognizes the more realistic value of the cultural diversity that 
characterizes Europe, and they have put effort into maintaining and safeguarding it.207 
When the Single Market was introduced in 1992, a certain fear grew that dominant market 
leaders with high production of low-cost programs would gain strength, namely that the 
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North-American market and large, competitive, neighboring countries would dominate 
the small countries. This imbalance and vulnerability led to a cultural policy intervention.  
The first immediate Eu initiative was the MEDIA program which aimed to support 
“audio-visual production and distribution by initiating cross-frontier co-operation, 
prioritizing small and medium-sized operators as well as respecting national differences 
and cultural identities”. The second program was the so called “Audio-visual Eureka”. This 
initiative absorbed cultural and industrial EU policies and created space and market for 
HDTV. Last but not least, a third program was proposed: “Euroimages” aimed to support 
and strengthen European film and television production and appearance. 208 
Following these media policies some controversial media quotas were introduced 
in the 80s. For instance, the French government asked for a quota of 60% European 
produced programs in the European broadcasting system which intended to supersede a 
large percentage of non-continental news. This stirred controversy in the common, 
deregulated and liberal market with its highly protectionist and national regulation.209 
In opposition, the US government claimed that this quota system introduced in 
European countries violated the international General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Despite this fact, in 1997 the European quota system was accepted in the 
“Television without Frontiers” directive that confirmed it until 2002, when it was to be 
reappraised and, unless modified, to be continued. Individual member states were 
anyway given some discretion and flexibility in interpreting and implementing the 
requirements for European programming: “member states shall ensure where practicable 
and by appropriate means that broadcasters reserve for European works ... a majority 
proportion of their broadcasting time”.210 
Unfortunately, research shows that European cultural and political integration did 
not provocate positive results in long term, despite supportive pan-European media 
channels’ cooperation in the production and exchange of program, moreover the 
European Commission’s support to the European Broadcasting to develop two pan-
European channels. The Eurikon experiment in 1982 and similarly the Europa TV in 1985 
showed already in their first year of existence the unsuccess of international news 
channels ('”neither viewers nor advertisers were attracted by the channel”)211 while 
viewers’ continued to prefer national broadcasting systems, mostly because the national 
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TV was in their own language.212 Two later attempts, Eurosport (a joint venture between 
Sky and EBU members, launched in 1989) and Euronews (launched in 1993), have proven 
more successful, but both channels play only peripheral roles in terms of audience ratings 
and are only accessible via satellite and/or cable television.213 
Due to all of this, the notion of a monolithic, singular and pan-European public 
sphere has also been largely discarded in light of the evidence where attempts to create 
pan-European media (including for example the newspaper The European and the heavily 
subsidized Euronews) have failed.214 This is perhaps due to initiatives appearing to target 
specific markets and segments, and are perhaps do not yield an appropriate forum for a 
larger audience. Since most people don’t belong to these specific high-interest groups, the 
news comes across as boring, particularly in televisual terms, and it almost encourages the 
audience to change the channel.215 
These unfulfilled European intentions to provide pan-European TV and 
newspapers increases the weight of national political communication. As a consequence, 
not only can European institutions mainly communicate through national media 
platforms, but also the role of the national parliaments is crucial in providing public media 
services so that European political debates, for example, can make into the news.216 
3.4.2. Specialized EU media 
 
In this part, I do not aim to debate the merits of the European institutions’ agenda-
setting techniques, as this will be addressed in the following chapter, but it is important 
to describe the previous and existing European initiatives related to the broadcasting 
system. 
There are only a few media outlets which specialize in the European Union at a 
supranational level. However, they effectively address only the “Brussels bubble” of EU 
officials, Members of the European Parliament, lobbyists, think tanks, political observers, 
PR companies and a certain elite that follows and understands European jargon and the 
complex policy-making system. The four most important EU media are Politico Europe, 
EurActive, New Europe and EUObserver. All these four news-distributors are in charge of 
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providing information on up-to-date outcomes and ongoing events, to produce news on 
EU policy-making that can be absorbed both by citizens of the member states and 
journalists wanting to elaborate on this information. 
3.4.3. European Broadcast Union 
 
The European Broadcasting Union is the first and most successful European 
transnational organization; it has around 300 employees and contains 75 organizations of 
Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) from 56 countries in and around Europe. Its main aim is 
to promote cooperation between PBS broadcasters, lobbies and their interests in Brussels 
and elsewhere, to be involved in technological developments and, last but not least, to 
buy collective rights to programming (such as sports events), organize programming 
exchange and deliver certain types of original programming. The EBU can be called the 
first successful example of transnational European television, because of both program 
Eurovision and that it became one of the most important news agencies fostering 
international news exchange. 
Eurovision song contest 
A few years after the first multinational, live television transmission took place in 
June 1953, at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, the Eurovision program exchange 
coordination center was established in 1956. 1956 is a highly significant year in the history 
of European television for another reason: the European Broadcasting Union organized 
for the first time the Eurovison song contest in Lugano, Switzerland. Eurovision changed 
the history of European television as it was the first show that addressed a “European” 
audience at a time when international television broadcasting was still tentative at best. 
The first countries that participated in this revolutionary event were Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and West Germany. Sources claim that these 
years were highly empirical moments in the life of the television but having such a 
program as the ESC was rather unusual.217 Today Eurovision attracts around 100 million 
viewers from some 40 countries each year. 
Eurosport 
The EBU was also a driving force behind Eurosport, the dominant satellite and 
cable sports channel on the continent. Eurosport was launched in 1989, eight years after 
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the thematic channel was first proposed. It represented a commercial turn in European 
public service television since it was based not only on cooperation but also co-ownership 
with Rupert Murdoch’s News International and its Sky TV.218 Murdoch pulled out as Sky 
TV merged with BSB in 1991, and was replaced by the French channel TF1, an EBU member 
with Bouygues as majority owner. In 2001, TF1 took over ownership completely. Eurosport 
now reaches 110 million households and 240 million viewers in 59 countries and its 
program are in 20 different languages.219  
News exchange 
Last but not least, in 1958 experiments with the exchange of news items began, 
resulting in daily news exchanges by 1961. The EBU now illustrates the volume of its 
activities with these figures: ‘More than 100,000 transmissions in 2002. 15,000 hours of 
sport and cultural events transmitted per year. 30,000 individual news items exchanged.’ 
There is, in other words, a lot of communication between European public broadcasters, 
and so chances are that offerings on television screens across the continent may in a sense 
be more Europeanized than viewers (and media researchers) are aware of.  
 
Euronews 
Throughout 2013 Euronews (Euronews S.A.) celebrated its 20th anniversary with 
new programming, a number of special events and the launch of a new image campaign. 
Euronews was originally launched in January 1993 as the first multilingual news channel 
to broadcast continuously and simultaneously in five languages (English, French, German, 
Italian and Spanish). It now has 13 language channels (with Polish audio also available in 
some cases) and aims to cover world news from a pan-European perspective while also 
reflecting the integration of governance and economics at the EU level.220 It employs 800 
staff, half of whom are journalists from more than 25 countries. The channel has a daily 
audience of more than 6.5 million television viewers and reaches them audiences via 
multi-platform offerings including apps for smartphones and tablets, web radio, a 
multilingual realtime news website and a VoD service.221 Euronews, in collaboration with 
                                                        
218 Collins, R.: Supper with the Devil – A case study in private/public collaboration in broadcasting: The genesis of 
Eurosport. Media, culture and society 20(4): p. 653-63 [1998] 
219 Gripsrud, J., [2007] 
220 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger, A.: Television News Channels in Europe. European Audiovisual Observatory 
[2013] 
221 1993-2013 Euronews things big for its 20th Birthday: URL: 
http://www.espacedatapresse.com/fil_datapresse/consultation_cp.jsp?idcp=2753983 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
ABC News, opened a permanent news desk in Washington DC in 2012 in addition to its 
bureau in Brussels, London, Doha, Cairo, Paris, Moscow and Kiev. 
Today, Euronews claims to reach 189 million households in 121 countries all over 
the globe, broadcasting simultaneously in seven languages. Its reach of 168 million 
households in Europe beats the competition – CNN reaches 122 million, CNBC 73 million 
and BBC World 70 million. Based on people meter data, it is calculated that it attracts over 
6.5 million daily viewers (about 3.4 million through satellite and cable and an additional 
3.1 million through terrestrial distribution in some countries). The corresponding figures 
for CNN and BBC World are 1.64 million and 0.77 million, respectively.222 
How does the European Broadcasting Union, its initiatives and existence 
contribute to the theory of public spheres and in particular the European public sphere? 
Some are sceptic like Bourdon, who in his article “recounts the numerous attempts to 
create or promote a European identity through television and explores the reasons for 
their failure”, quoting his own abstract, which ends as follows: “Even when they reached 
an audience, these attempts failed with respect to their main aim, as they were based on 
a false, deterministic view of television as a medium and on a dated, communicative view 
of the nation where media have the power to shape collective identities”.  He claims that 
everything the EBU and others have done related to television has “failed to promote, let 
alone create, a sense of belonging to a common Europe”.223 
On the other hand, many scholars such as Gripsrund believe that the work of the 
EBU, from the mundane to the spectacular, and channels such as Eurosport and 
EuroNews, have actually established in practice a common European public sphere, albeit 
multilingual and seriously limited in many ways. Moreover, the practice of watching 
‘foreign’ television enjoyed by so many Europeans contributes in the same direction as tv 
series and formats overtaken in numerous, if not all of the member states can contribute 
to the establishment of a common memory and a mutual understanding of certain 
phenomena, therefore it is contributing to an albeit limited, but still existent European 
public sphere.224 
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4. Who frames the content of the European news? 
 
In this chapter, I will focus on the content of news. In order to understand whether 
or not the European public sphere exists, and if yes, in what form, I suggest to examine 
the frames used in news-production. This chapter will focus on both sides of the dialogue 
between the European institutions and journalists and correspondents. Therefore, I will 
first shed light on the various agenda-setting techniques of the European institutions. This 
is important as the underlying question is not only whether issues are addressed 
simultaneously, but also how they are discussed. In terms of news framing, European 
news has been found to be framed both along the lines of conventional journalistic frames 
and with Europe-issue specific frames.225 Moreover, scholars make a distinction between 
the various forms of a certain European public sphere in this sense, as they tackle on the 
one hand news speaking about the same topic and on the other news speaking about the 
same topic from the same point of view. 
Another interesting question is not only the quality of the European public sphere 
but also the different aspects of Europeanization. One important difference is between 
news about the EU, its policies and institutions on the one hand and news about events 
and issues from other European countries on the other. This distinction has been coined 
vertical and horizontal Europeanization as previously mentioned.226 Vertical 
Europeanization refers to national actors addressing European actors, national actors 
addressing European issues or European actors partaking in national debates on European 
issues. Horizontal Europeanization refers to national media covering issues in other EU 
member states and national actors addressing issues or actors in another EU member 
state. In order to better understand the dynamics of news-production, from where to 
where the information flows before arriving to the audience in the form of news, I will 
review interviews with journalists and editors who will give insight into their world of 
agenda-setting. 
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4.1. Framing news, a contextual overview 
 
In the field of media effects, agenda-setting, priming, framing and persuasion as a 
result of tone are amongst the most utilized concepts to understand media impact on 
public opinion formation.227 The basic idea of agenda-setting was formulated in 1963 by 
Bernard Cohen, who investigated the power of the press to influence public opinion about 
foreign affairs: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what 
to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”228 Some 
years later Max McCombs and Donald Shaw were the first academics to advance the 
agenda-setting hypothesis in 1972,229 and since more than 200 investigations have 
provided empirical evidence that the visibility of an issue in the news influences the 
perceived importance of that issue by the public.230 Agenda-setting refers specifically to 
the visibility and perceived importance of a problem or issue due to its visibility or salience 
in the news. Agenda-setting is limited to visibility and does not include the valence or 
evaluation of that issue in the news or by the public.  
Agenda-setting goes hand by hand with the expression and phenomenon of 
frames. The definition of frames following Gamson, Williams and Modigliani is as it 
sounds: “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip 
of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy 
is about, the essence of the issue.” .231  
However, extant research is divided over the role of salience in the frame-setting 
process. One perspective suggests that framing does not affect how audiences think about 
issues “by making aspects of the issue more salient.”232 Another perspective, however, 
concludes that to frame is essentially about making some aspects of reality more 
salient.233 In this vein, framing research has demonstrated how frames make certain 
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considerations more salient for subsequent judgements.234 It remains an open question 
whether audiences pick up more from the news frame or the core news facts when 
conceiving of an issue presented in the news235, it is inescapable that news frames affect 
attitudes by stressing specific values, facts, or other considerations and endowing them 
with greater relevance to an issue than under an alternative possible frame. Therefore I 
can state that the relative importance of the frame of a news story is generally influential 
in shaping an individual’s direction of thoughts on a political issue.236 
Differently but accordingly, frames can mean a template for journalists to compose 
a news story in order to optimize audience accessibility. In turn, news frames are 
potentially important tools for public thinking about, understanding of, and support for 
contemporary political and economic issues, such as the EU. As Denis McQuail puts it in 
the study of de Vreese, “news is presented within frameworks of meaning which derive 
from the way news is gathered and processed”. Standard organizational procedures, work 
routines, and news values all function as ‘guidelines’ in the quest for fast and regular news 
output. News in itself has little value unless embedded in a meaningful framework which 
organizes and structures it.237 And for this reason framing is a crucial technique for political 
actors also as their mobilization attempts constitute their own “agenda-building” or 
“agenda-setting” activities. 238 Often these are purposeful and strategic attempts to 
“symbolically package”, “frame”, and target information at journalists. Such efforts and 
their reception are discussed in journalism studies as “source strategies”.239 
In light of this, I share the opinion of de Vreese who in connection to the 
enlargement of the European Union conducted a research on news-frames and wrote: “A 
news story was manipulated to reflect a conflict frame or an economic consequence 
frame. The two frames provide direction to the audience’s thoughts about the issue but 
do not yield different levels of policy support. Frames in the news are as important as core 
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facts in a news story when citizens conceive of a political issue.”240 
At this point let me introduce another concept, media priming. Whereas agenda-
setting is merely concerned with the perceived importance of an issue, media priming 
goes further by positing that frequently covered issues also become the basis for citizens' 
evaluations of political parties, leaders and institutions. Media priming emphasizes that 
what is available in the media and most readily accessible in people's minds is given 
greater weight in the formation of evaluations. Support for the priming effect has been 
found in different methodological and topical settings. 241 
However, the context of agenda-setting and media priming should not be 
forgotten, namely the news-consumption of citizens, as this process can be conditional on 
individuals’ levels of political knowledge, news exposure and trust in sources.242 In the 
case of European integration, we know that a referendum on an integrative issue – if 
salient on the media agenda – can be the prime ingredient by which citizens evaluate the 
government.243 Continuing the above-mentioned aspects, I will now examine the agenda-
setting initiatives of the European institutions, and journalists, to be able to speak about 
the perception of news and how news-consumption influences individual opinion.  
 
4.2. The importance of the European Institutions in agenda-setting  
 
As introduced in the previous chapter, framing is a term that refers to how 
journalists shape raw information into stories.244 News is more than selecting and giving 
weight to different events and issues. A frame is an emphasis on the salience of some 
aspects of a topic.245 Journalists and politicians use frames when they discuss political, 
economic and social events or issues, by presenting them as alternatives which emphasize 
contrasting aspects and make the information more interesting and understandable. In 
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terms of news production, framing refers to the spin given to an issue and a story in the 
news. Events as such have little intrinsic value, unless they are embedded in a meaningful 
framework or context that organizes and lends coherence to the interpretation of the 
event.  
Putting this theoretical background in the European context we can see 
controversial processes happening. Regarding frequency, on the one hand, as political 
integration is becoming more important and the direct impact on national policy-making 
is increasing the media visibility is growing. “In terms of visibility and share of EU actors, 
the trend between 1999 and 2004 is one of increase”—writes Schuck and colleagues. The 
2009 European Parliament elections were more prominent in the news than in previous 
elections.246 Nevertheless, in the case of European integration, it is known that European 
issues are generally low on both the media and the public agenda.247 On the other hand, 
it is an interesting aspect to investigate to what extent the mere frequency of the coverage 
of European affairs influences how important European citizens consider those affairs to 
be. One would expect that the higher the frequency of European affairs is on the media 
agenda, the higher the perceived importance of those issues will be on the public agenda. 
Following de Vreese and Semetko, when issues of European integration rise on the media 
agenda, however, these can become more important to citizens, in particular those 
heavily exposed to news media.248 Still, the importance of an issue tells us little about 
whether or not individuals support integration in either diffuse terms or specific 
policies.249 
Next after frequency let me consider the positivity of news. In the same study of 
Schuck, it was found that media coverage of the 2009 EP elections was more evaluative, 
polarized, and positive towards the EU compared to previous EP elections. Importantly 
two different components of this overall evaluation were distinguished: in most countries, 
news evaluated the EU positively with regard to more utilitarian benefit considerations 
and, at the same time, negatively with regard to the democratic nature and functioning of 
the EU.250 As Schuck et al. (2011a) conclude, the overall picture is highly balanced, but 
evaluations are clearly polarized into a (positive) benefit and a (negative) democratic 
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deficit dimension. De Vreese, in his study in which he interviewed Brussels 
correspondents, writes about how the European institutions aim to influence news in a 
positive way: “In discussions of how the EU— and the process of European integration 
more broadly—is communicated, a common assumption is that the best strategy for 
communicating Europe is to send out rigidly pro-European messages. However, feel-good 
messages about the benefits of being European do little to solve the communications 
deficit”.251  
A third aspect of summarizing European news-framing is the dominance of a 
national point of view. Beyond the lack of information itself, the scarcity of knowledge 
about European issues is due to national frames being often adopted by news media. 
Whether highlighting a “national interest” angle of specific EU politics (“what does this 
mean for our country”) or turning specific EU events or developments into a backdrop 
story for national politics, particularly inter and intra-party conflicts, the adoption of 
national frames remains constant in EU news coverage.252  
As mentioned before, journalists, correspondents and editors are highly significant 
figures in generating a European public sphere as they are ones who produce news that 
follow certain frames. For this reason, on one hand it is fundamental that editors and 
journalists are acutely aware of and train to cover European issues, and on the other hand, 
that they manage to produce information that fit the formats of different media and 
outlets.253 And in this second aspect the European institutions play an active role. 
Firmstone compared Brussels correspondents and EU officials along a communicative 
dimension and he found that although they are intrinsically different groups, they are 
interdependent in the sense that their routines are governed by a relation of mutual 
influence. 254 Firmstone moreover acknowledges that work division in transnational 
newspapers follows the portfolio division of the Commission. Conversely, the EU seeks to 
adapt to news media logics (such as newsworthiness criteria and agenda-setting), 
although its degree of mediatisation is still considered low to moderate.255 This is due to 
the fact that a viable public sphere demands from institutions publicity, transparency, 
accountability and even predictability.256 The EU’s unique and dynamic character raises a 
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further issue, namely how best to develop a proper understanding of how and under what 
conditions institutions can help foster a public sphere, as according to some, institutions 
are critical vehicles in fostering a European public sphere.  
However, our existing knowledge of EU-media relations presents two fundamental 
constraints. At an institutional level, studies focus either on specific institutions such as 
the Commission and the Parliament or on the EU as a whole. 257 Reflecting a single-
institution and a global standpoint respectively, neither of these approaches primarily 
seeks a direct comparison between the institutions. Regarding the main actors, EU 
correspondents and EU officials tend to be addressed separately and their informal 
contacts neglected.258 And for this reason this chapter aims to take into account all above-
mentioned figures and paint a whole picture. 
For every case, the question is of politicians reacting to the media and public 
agenda. Or do politicians shape the media and public agenda and, if so, how do they try 
to get their issues and messages across? Agenda-building is mainly a focus on the 
interrelatedness of policy, media and public agenda, and in this process journalists and 
news executives play an essential role, as do institutions.259 Agenda-building and agenda-
setting might prove useful for tackling such questions as whether Europeanized politics 
can produce Europeanized media content (or, possibly, vice versa) and if that translates 
into a Europeanized public agenda. Another question may center upon whether 
Europeanized politics are mediated or are mediatized politics and to what extent the 
European policy agenda and public agendas differ.260 These are the questions of the 
following chapters, but before addressing them let me examine the initiatives the various 
European institutions have to prove their agenda-setting capacity. 
                                                        
257 Meyer, C.O.: Political legitimacy and the invisibility of politics: exploring the European Union’s communication deficit. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 4: 617–39. [1999] 
Anderson, P. and McLeod, A.: The great non-communicator? the mass communication deficit of the European Parliament 
and its press directorate. Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 5: 897–917. [2004] 
Gleissner, M. and De Vreese, C. H.: News about the EU Constitution. Journalistic challenges and media portrayal of the 
European Union Constitution. Journalism 6, no. 2: 221–42. [2005] 
258 Terzis, G.: The EU Correspondent. Journalism 9, no. 4: 537–50. [2008] and Foret, F.: Advertising Europe: the production 
of public information by the Commission. In Politics and the European Commission: actors, interdependence, legitimacy, 
(Ed.) Smith, A. London: Routledge. [2004] pp. 134–55. 
Raeymaeckers, K., L. C. and Deprez, A.: Reporting the European Union: an analysis of the Brussels press corps and the 
mechanisms influencing the news flow. Journalistic Practice 1, no. 1: 102–19. [2007] 
259 Lang, G. E. and Lang K.: Watergate: An Exploration of the Agenda-building Process in Wilhoit G. C. and DeBock H. (Eds.): 
Mass Communication Review Yearbook 2. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 447-68.  [1981] 
De Vreese, C. H.:  Public Broadcasting in Transition: News, Elections and the New Market Place. (paper presented at the 
Annual Convention of the Association of Education in  Journalism and Mass Communication, New Orleans, LA, August. 
[1999] 
260 Semetko, H. A.; de Vreese, C. H.; Peter, J., [2000] 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
4.2.1. Agenda-setting initiatives of European institutions 
 
The ambivalent position of the EU between the rules of international diplomacy 
and nationally framed democratic practices261 underlies Jacques Delors’ well-known quip 
describing it as an “unidentified political object”. This sui generis character is compounded 
by the idiosyncratic institutional triangle at its core: the Council of the EU (decision-making 
body which represents the member-states); the European Commission (collegial 
institution with right of initiative aimed at defending general EU interests); and the 
European Parliament (assembly of representatives elected by EU citizens). The evolution 
of European policies from a somewhat more consensual regulatory stage to an era of 
increasingly controversial political subjects has been concomitant with a (re)negotiation 
of power and competencies between these institutions. As Mak262 argues, ‘over the last 
couple of years, the discussion has exactly shifted from whether institutions matter to 
how and how much they matter’.263 This repositioning process can be seen also in the 
various institutions’ communication policy and how their inner organization tends to gain 
more visibility without pushing aside the other organizations. Studies show that the 
institutional set-up and the communicative performance are related to each other. Data 
proves that not only does the perception of each institution’s communication 
performance differ, but it is also closely tied to their distinct political architecture.264 
For every case the European Commision, the European Parliament and the Council 
of the EU are in the spotlight not only because they represent the main actors of EU 
decision-making processes, but because they have also been identified as the primary 
communicators in European affairs.265 Little is known about the interaction between the 
institutions, i.e. the degree of collaboration and synergies in communication activities of 
the institutions. The dominant position of the EC may be counterweighted by attempts to 
foster inter-institutional cooperation.266 Moreover, some claim that the friction point 
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between news practitioners and officials lies in the overlapping agendas of the European 
institutions. In a study of Martins, Lecheler and de Vreese, a newspaper correspondent 
mentions that “I’ve missed important Council meetings because they coincided with the 
EP Strasbourg week.” In the first institution, the simultaneous broadcast of the Presidency 
press conference and national ministers’ press conferences is another example of the 
same criticism.267  
Although we found an unexpected negative evaluation towards institutional 
interaction, most officials recognize an improvement brought about by the 
professionalization of EU communication staff (a trend which was absent in the 
journalists’ discourse).268 It is very important to state that European institutions always 
attempted to create authentic and first-handed information sources for the mainstream 
that nevertheless remained peripherical and only partially implemented by the national 
broadcasting channels (see chapter 3.4). For this reason, the EU has started to put effort 
in providing material to national correspondents and citizens who might want to get 
information about EU policies. 
In the name of transparency and availability, all the EU institutions offer free of 
charge the services of live streaming, recorded materials, press conferences and press 
releases to support the distribution of the information, and each of the institutions give 
individual support to the journalists through their own communication channels. 
Journalists and local correspondents get also production support from each institution, 
which mean they can use TV and radio studios, online streaming connections, various 
technical tools, editing facilities, online streaming connections, camera crews. This way 
broadcasters and journalists don’t even need to set up their own, sometimes expensive 
infrastructure if they are only occasionally reporting from Brussels or Strasbourg. 
Naturally, the institutions offer their press releases online as well. The 
permanently updated EU Newsroom is the ultimate source of official information of the 
European Union across all institutions and bodies. It is complemented by each institution’s 
own database of press releases, speeches and statements that permits individuals to 
subscribe and receive information about the interested areas by email or RSS. Another 
important database offered and operated by the European institutions is Eurostat, which 
offers extensive quantitative information on various topics and policies. 
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Citing Jaume Duch, Spokesperson and Head of Communication for the European 
Parliament, we see the following: “…we have to work a lot for facilitating the journalists, 
with underlining the televisive anchors, assure always different pictures and images. It is 
an important and difficult job, with a modest success for the moment. Respectively to 20 
years ago, nowadays the amount of news broadcasted on television about the European 
Parliament has increased significantly, and this increase is also related to the growing 
importance of this institution. Today if there is news, it will be surely broadcasted.” Still 
there are some challenges that the European institutions need to face, this is what I will 
now elaborate more in detail. 
 
4.2.2. Challenges of the European information diffusion 
 
Without considering the general opinion of journalists and editors on the 
information that European institutions share, nor how they do it (this will be discussed 
later), let me only describe the challenges the EU has to face in communicating. 
The initial issue is complex information. One of the most widely recognized 
challenges of the European communication lies in the complexity of EU politics itself, as it 
is often interpreted in technical and hardly comprehensible press materials269. This 
ongoing tendency is also due to the deepening and widening of EU-policies and policy-
areas and so European topics must be tackled in multiple news-sections—foreign and 
domestic policy-making. 270 The complexity of information gives correspondents a hard 
time as they are overwhelmed by information from the European institutions, and to able 
to explain certain European issues they need to be highly specialized in the regarding 
material. It is also a real challenge to find the most efficient way not only to explain 
European decisions and decision-making mechanisms, but also to make it become an 
appealing story consumed by viewers and readers.271 As Thibault Lesenecal, Head of Web 
Communication of the European Parliament said: “It is normal and natural that it is 
complex, I mean, you can’t play with 28 member states in a simple way. I mean it has to 
be complex.” 
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The second challenge is voluminous information. Numerous correspondents 
interviewed in other studies identified the amount of information emanated by the 
European bureaucracy too high to be shared completely. As mentioned before, the 
increasing amount of information, according to Statham, causes concerns amongst news 
practitioners about the quality of its political content. As a consequence the 
newsworthiness of European matters can decrease.272 
Correspondents, interviewed in the research of Martins, Lecherer and de Vreese, 
complained about the voluminous information flow, depicted as “heaven for a journalist 
from a monthly magazine and hell for a journalist from a daily broadsheet”. In order to 
facilitate this problem, materials and contact lists are distributed according to subjects. 
Nevertheless, a Head of Unit notes that “this screening exercise lives in permanent tension 
with the somewhat individualist ambition of different services to capture media 
attention”.273 Also Justyna Kurczabinska from the European Broadcasting Union added: 
“They [the institutions] have huge statistical data. So if they could translate some of this 
data and flag it out, I am sure journalists would pick up these stories, at least within the 
network of the European Broadcasting Union. So I would say that if the institutions want 
to create an impact, they really have to start telling stories and also start to think how they 
can already pre-filter or flag the data which is useful for the journalists.” 
The third challenge is scattered information. Another obstacle lies in the EU 
threefold institutional model, which has been notorious for provoking internal 
competition and a struggle for media attention.274 Numerous reports acknowledge the 
need of major coordination within institutions and services in order to improve 
communication and its impact.275 In the study of Baisne and also Meyer as well, 
interviewees showed their dissatisfaction concerning EU efforts to foster interinstitutional 
cooperation (cf. EC 2007), considered to be undermined by overlapping agendas and the 
endemic prevalence of the Commission.276 And nevertheless in theory the DG COMM, 
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Directorate General for Communication within the European Commission is assigned to 
plan strategically and centralize information flows, the common communication is 
jeopardized by the autonomy of each institution. 277 
The final challenge is two-step communication. The European institutions admit to 
having limited direct channels to address European citizens and that the European issues 
are shared and discussed mainly on national media platforms. This contributes to 
conflicting interpretations of the same news and therefore news tends to become mostly 
negative. Based on the media data collected by the EU, Norris concluded that the 
directional bias of television and newspapers is consistently negative and that “the 
coverage of the European Community in newspapers and on television therefore often 
proved anti-Europe”.278
 
This conclusion is partially supported by the study of EU news 
conducted throughout the year 2000 reported by de Vreese that says television news is 
generally neutral, but if slanted, then most often slightly negatively. 279 We will discuss 
further figures in this issue in chapter 5, but now let us discuss the communication of the 
European institutions. 
 
4.2.3. How do the European institutions communicate? 
 
European Commission 
 
As mentioned before the three different institutions—Parliament, Commission 
and Council—have different roles in European policy-making, and their decision-making 
mechanisms involve different administratives and their topics have various levels of 
importance for the various member states, and therefore even their communication will 
tend to differ in the selection topics and the way of presenting them. It is undeniable that 
communication officials aim to increase their reach out both in quantity (people reached) 
and in quality (the depth of information) and tend to recognize the opportunities of doing 
better. In order to reach their goals, the European Union offers many services to 
broadcasters and journalists who want to follow EU news. The European Commission, for 
example, operates the Audiovisual Service of the European Commission, also known as 
the Europe by Satellite (EbS), which offers live streaming of press conferences and 
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recorded material about committee meetings, European events, parliamentary sessions, 
etc. 
The DG COMM, the Directorate General for Communication, is responsible for 
strategic planning in communication and also for the coordination with the other 
institutions increased its impact in these two matters. Nevertheless, insiders tend to 
regard the DG COMM as fragile in fulfilling its mission, as according to their opinion, the 
responsibilities among the communications units of other DGs and the Spokesperson’s 
Service is not clearly assigned nor distributed well among each other. This makes it volatile 
and impotent. A Head of Unit acknowledges: “COMM doesn’t own the message. The 
message is owned by the remainder DGs. Guess who the Spokes are going to talk to”. 280  
Others criticize the Commission that it “suffers from the fragmentation of political 
authority, a pervading technocratic mindset and a lack of adequate staffing”.281 And also 
that there is a lack of “juicy” topics due to its consensus-striving nature.282 This is also due 
to the previously mentioned role of the EC in decision-making, as it is more technical and 
bureaucratic than the European Parliament. However general opinion both among 
researchers and correspondents tends toward the “Commission-Parliament comparison,” 
in which all EP press officers considered their services to be of better quality than those 
of the Commission. This dovetails with the insights provided by the journalists. 283 
Moreover there are academics, such as Smith and Curtin, who agree on the relative failure 
of the Commission to communicate effectively with its key-mediators, correspondents, 
and key national audiences. 284 Respective to 2007 when this mentioned study was made, 
and when the two researchers expressed their opinion on the effects of an information 
strategy that had low priority, the activity of the DG COMM gained more importance 
especially in the last election period and is still committed to a transparent information 
regime, a commitment shared also by the Council and the Parliament. 
 
 
European Parliament  
 
“Initially, the Parliament has been ridiculed for its lack of political authority. But 
even though competences have shifted to the Parliament, the institution, its activities, 
                                                        
280 Martins, I.A.; Lecheler, S.; de Vreese, C.H. [2012] 
281 Meyer, C. [1999] p. 617-639. 
282 Martins, I.A.; Lecheler, S.; de Vreese, C.H. [2012] 
283 Ibid 
284 Schlesinger, P; Fossum, J.E. [2007] 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
and its representatives are still seen as peripheral by journalists and news editors,” wrote 
Meyer in 1999.285 Since then the Parliament gained not only significant importance in 
decision-making but also a visible advantage in its communication. This is due to various 
reasons. First the EP has higher organizational freedom, according to interviews with EC 
officials in a study by Martins, Lecheler and de Vreese. This undercuts the production of 
institutional material as the templates used for communication by the Commission limit 
their capacity in selling stories. A Head of Unit notes in this study that “it’s much easier for 
an MEP to come up with a sexy press release, because they can write whatever they like.” 
286 
We have to add that the Parliament’s decision-making dynamics are easier to 
narrate than the highly administrative Commission. For this reason, the Parliament is rated 
in a more positive light by correspondents and officials, as its dimension of party politics 
leads to media-tailored press releases. Among many others, Statham also defines the EP’s 
communication as ‘media-friendly’. 287 
Among operating several social platforms and websites, the European Parliament 
is keen on communicating with the press through press conferences, press releases, and 
the role of the Spokesperson. Moreover, it operates the audiovisual service EuroparlTV, 
which covers sessions, committee meetings and press briefings live. They also offer free 
recordings and background videos. For this reason, the European Parliament manages to 
emerge as a strong public. According to Liebert’s analysis the EP’s “communicative 
practices, not least the focus it provides for networking across different levels of the EU, 
has indeed allowed it to function as a strong public that is in the process of building a 
wider general public, mainly along the lines of the second federal model.” 288 
 
European Council 
 
The Council has a paradoxical communicative situation. Schlesinger and Fossum 
assert that “The Council’s complex role as both legislature and executive – and one that 
has obtained greater executive functions over time – places it in between our two models, 
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with divergent expectations about its public sphere promoting role.”289 This is due in part 
to its everyday work being rather invisible, also because the matters tackled by the Council 
of Permanent Representations are an important reference for Bruxelles-based press 
corps. 290 To the contrary, Council meetings are easier to communicate on a national level 
as they embrace high-level decisions aimed directly at national policy-making tendencies. 
Still the Council suffers from being an institution in flux. This is because the core 
communication activities are largely at the discretion of the incumbent EU presidency, and 
the different member states use different standards and techniques in their presidency 
communication. This discontinuity does little to advance coherent and professional 
communication efforts. 291 Also the European Council, just like the Parliament and the 
Commission, offers services for journalists through live streaming press conferences of 
public Council sessions. It also offers a database of videos and photos that can be used for 
live coverage and can be reused by media.  
 
4.3. What do journalists, editors and EU communication officers think? 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the qualitative evaluation of the information flow 
between the European institutions as message senders, and correspondents and editors 
as message receivers. I have interviewed various figures from the European 
communication space in order to gain insight into the various aspects of the publishing, 
elaboration and distribution of the news. Among the interviewees I have had 
representatives of the European institutions, such as from European media providers and 
news agencies, and journalists and editors from private and state television channels both 
from European member countries – Eastern and Western – and extra-European countries. 
My interviewees were: Alan Quartly, Assignment editor at BBC; Róbert Kollár, Editor-in-
chief of news at RTL Hungary (private channel); Anna Radnóti, Editor of foreign news at 
RTL Hungary (private channel); Adam Renyi, former communication director of two 
private, national television channels; Gamal Abdullatif, reporter for France 24 and France 
24 Arabic; Abdalkarim Elhag, freelancer journalist and news-producer; Jaume Duch, 
Spokesperson and Director-General for Communication of the European Parliament; 
Thibault Lesenecal, the Acting Head of the European Parliament’s Web Communication; 
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Karolina Wozniak, EP Social Media Coordinator ; Mr. Carbajo, Head of Audiovisual Unit of 
the European Parliament  and Justyna Kurczabinska, Head of Eurovision News Exchange. 
 I retained the variety of interviewees important not only because it enables the 
understanding of the dynamics of such dialogue, but also because such representatives 
explain better influencing factors in the editorial line.   
Semi-structured interviews with unstructured interview elements were conducted 
in between 2015 and 2016, where main topics and certain questions were repeated in 
each interview in order to enable the examination of common views, or to depict the 
different opinions of general issues, but I have always left the freedom to the interviewees 
to drive the conversation to topics they wanted to cover in order to gain a deeper and a 
more detailed insight in European news-production and -broadcasting.  
Many other researchers have focused on this topic already: Statham292 on role 
conceptions, Cornia293 on journalistic cultures, Gleissner, de Vreese and Lecheler294 on 
editorial policies and readership demands and also Mak and Foret who have focused on 
officials’ views of EU communication. 295 All these external factors and editorial lines are 
important to be examined as they contribute or block the formation of a European public 
sphere. 
According to the previously written concept of the Europeanization of national 
public spheres also viewed as the European public sphere, I have seen that the current 
knowledge leads to diverging conclusions with respect to extent, scope, nature of this 
phenomenon. One of the key-indicators according to de Vreese is the visibility of European 
topics and their European perspective, their common interpretation.296 Risse and van de 
Steeg retain that corresponding media coverage in different countries with shared points 
of reference are also among the criteria: “speakers and listeners recognize each other as 
legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as 
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common European problems”. 297 Also Koopmans and Statham list visibility and 
inclusiveness among the criteria of the public sphere.298 So European news defines the 
European public sphere in television and for this reason it is indispensable to understand 
how those who produce this news operate. 
Journalists are defined as those who make decisions directly affecting news 
content. Editors and reporters influence information flow and they transmit messages and 
news by selecting the relevant information. “Journalists work within news organizations 
that operate within constraints and opportunities shaped by commercial and institutional 
factors, including ownership, market share, and a nationally specific relationship between 
the media and political systems,” explain Hallin and Mancini299. Although news 
organizations have specific and clear relationships with the public administration, very 
often we can identify some political leaning (both left and right) in their messages and 
agenda-setting that has a direct impact on public. 300 As Adam Renyi, former 
communication director of two private, national television channels said: “The state can 
play with its demand of social advertisements, and through this also has an impact on the 
behavior of market participants. Therefore, let’s say there is a big company, who has paid 
for advertisements at one channel...but to maintain good relations with the state, for 
reasons of lobby will change to the television channel where the state is involved.” And 
he added also that “beforehand broadcasters had also another type of dependency from 
politics. In those times you had ground frequencies, and postponing the validity of the 
license of frequencies was a state decision, this meant a certain dependency from power.” 
Such factors have an impact on the organizational culture and editorial line of certain 
media providers, a set of values with which journalists working at certain broadcasters can 
identify with.301 
These and many other aspects will be discussed followingly in order to better 
understand elaborate the mechanism behind the scenes that shapes news and through 
news the general opinion and the European public sphere itself. Therefore interviews will 
discuss news production logic in general in the first place, only later they are addressing 
the specificities of the EU news, the EU topics and EU news. 
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4.3.1. Operating, making, elaborating 
 
When meeting with journalists and editors, we wanted to know more about the 
aspects mentioned before: namely how much editorial lines influence journalists work? 
How defined are the leaning political views within the news-production? And how do 
editorial decisions influence the agenda?  
 
1. Daily routine 
 
Nevertheless among the interviewees there are journalists, editors, news-
producers, private and public channel representatives and European institution officials 
who gave me an insight into their everyday work they agreed on certain aspects. The first 
thing in common was that in each case there was a team to decide about the agenda, 
which news will be presented and with what content they will fill the time at their disposal. 
For example, at BBC foreign news are elaborated in the following way, according to Alan 
Quartly, Assignment editor at BBC: “I am an assignment editor for foreign news. My boss 
is the formal editor and he has 4 assistants and I am one of them. So my job is to deploy 
people stories around the world. So we talk to bureau chiefs about what stories we need 
to give to correspondents around the world. Sometimes they come to us and say: ‘OK, in 
Washington this is the hot topic and what we need to know is this and that’ or sometimes 
we go to them to tell what they need to do. It depends. Information goes in both ways.” 
The news department at BBC has an editorial meeting every day at 9 o’clock, where the 
director gives guidance to editors about important stories that day. Editors collaborate 
with journalists in making suggestions and then elaborate news. “The reason we have a 
large network of reporters all around the world is that we have people who are experts in 
the countries, they might even speak the language, you know we have Russian, Arabic, 
Chinese, Spanish speakers and that means that they can actually tell you how a situation 
is seen in that country and why it is seen like that,” adds Mr. Quartly.  
Also at RTL, the international television group that operates private channels in 
Hungary, the Editor-in-chief Róbert Kollár and Editor of foreign news, Anna Radnóti 
explained that they have a daily briefing just like the BBC. Usually they receive all the 
potential news from reporters and then they decide in a team which to use that day: “All 
the materials arrive and then we start to elaborate them. So one needs to prepare more 
material,” said Ms. Radnóti. Mr. Kollár added: “Usually we do more or less 3 big materials 
and 7 demos. And this is only the foreign affairs section.” 
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2. Sources 
 
One interesting preliminary aspect is where journalists take their information 
from, as information sources already segment what goes into the news. According to 
some, a European public sphere should reflect national media reporting on the same topic 
using common sources, including EU sources and sources from other EU countries.302 
Therefore, sources are an important asset both to agenda-setting and to the fostering of 
the European public sphere. 
Alan Quartly said in this regard that the BBC bases their agenda on input gained 
from local media, Twitter and also sometimes phone calls: “Before Twitter it was more 
popular getting phone calls, but it is still happening. We have sources in the government, 
in military, hospitals increasingly like I said there are a lot of activist journalists in a place 
like Syria for example. It’s dangerous we know that there are very carefully controlled 
circumstances so we check these people who put their own videos online.” For Abdalkarim 
Elhag, a freelance news producer, news agencies are the main source of information, and 
as he said: “…not every journalist is in the field, not every journalist had access to 
information. In many cases we are not first case witnesses. 90% of journalists are sitting 
behind a desk in front of computers. So maybe less than 10% are in the field.” Gamal 
Abdullatif, reporter for France 24 and France 24 Arabic also added: “You had the 
translation as the core of the story and you’ll have your own imports in it. […] you have 
access to the local news channel, gather this information and write something in-house. 
This is not from the field, this is from the newsroom itself.” But he also complains about 
the news agencies being unbalanced and sometimes unfair in specific countries and for 
this reason not being 100% reliable. 
 
 
3. Other than news agencies 
  
This is why journalists tend to ask people from the ground: “Local media and 
people on the ground because I mean, people from the Pacific area have their own 
contacts on the ground. Maybe friends, maybe journalists, maybe families they know, 
maybe their own family in order to get the feel and the people how they are dealing or 
reacting to this story,” says Mr. Abdullatif, who shared very interesting thoughts on how 
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to put together the narrative by using sources. For example, you can interview just one 
person and in order to avoid unbalancing the picture, you can use the interview as a case 
study. Another way of interviewing local people is doing the so-called vox-pop, asking 
people from the street and trying to get a wider picture.  
Another way to overcome the partial reliability of the news agencies is an inner 
system of news-exchange. For example, RTL Hungary, according to Róbert Kollár, has an 
own internal news-exchange platform that is operated by the colleagues from the 
different countries. “The RTL Group has an internal group, where we put all we have. In 
the RTL Group there are quite a few channels, more than 30 from the various parts of the 
world. And it is divided that when there is morning in Australia, then it’s their turn and 
they are collecting the news from all over the world; when there is daytime in Europe, it 
is Luxenburg; and after when it comes to America, it is somewhere in South-America 
where they collect common news. So we actually operate as news agency, but we do it in 
house.” However, Adam Renyi, former director of communication of RTL Group Hungary, 
reminds us of the limitations of this: “…journalists are human beings, and most probably 
they have an own opinion, that they can’t exclude completely.” 
When it comes to news about formal institutions, like the EU, press releases and 
informal sources are often more useful. Journalists and correspondents asked in the study 
of Martins, Lecheler and de Vreese said that non-official channels are the primary asset 
for communication.303 According to others, the ‘behind-the-scenes’ interaction is common 
in the Brussels bubble. And according to APCO Worldwide, private contacts represent 
Brussels journalists’ most useful source.304 This is also common as EU officials tend to 
promote their own interests and so informal channels are also preferred by 
administrators.305 From the study of Martins, Lecheler and de Vreese, according to a 
journalist from an online media source: “my private network has become routine in the 
sense that I don’t use it just to get scoops, but often as a shortcut that saves me hours of 
digging through endless documents.” Conversely, some civil servants admit that they 
“have a group of regular customers” amongst the Brussels media.306 Interestingly some 
journalists admit that also press releases are useful mainly to contextualise the “authentic 
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information” provided by other means. “EU institutional material is as good to find 
information as it is bad to find the truth.”307 
 
4. Does nationality count? 
 
Last but not least an interesting question to be answered is whether or not 
nationality is an influencing factor in gaining information. Some say that nationality and 
“outlet”308 are factors that determine access to some information. Nevertheless both 
officials and journalists who deny this: For instance, the Portuguese correspondents 
interviewed denied that they had gained more access to information sources under 
Barroso’s Presidency. They claim that subject-driven communication made nationality 
peripheral.309 Accordingly the changing news-consumption habits and the rise of social 
media foster the disappearing weight of nationality. 
 
5. Social media as news-source? 
 
Social media and the diffusion among citizens was already addressed in this 
dissertation, and according to some researchers it provides a unique platform for the 
establishment of a European public sphere. But social media is also an interesting topic 
from a news-gathering point of view. Jaume Duch, Spokesperson and Director-General for 
Communication of the European Parliament expressed his views on this matter: “…it is 
very interesting to see that when there is an argument on a certain topic it is not the 
national difference that emerges, […] but they are all individuals, not related to their 
nationality. There is a notable discussion on the national public opinion and the European 
public opinion: Facebook is very useful and assures very interesting data that show that 
we all are members of a local, national and also European public opinion.” Actually, for 
the European institutions, just like for politicians and news sites, the importance of social 
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media as an information source is growing. Thibault Lesenecal, the Acting Head of the 
European Parliament’s Web Communication stated that now social media is gaining 
importance, the EP is present on 7 different platforms of which Youtube, as the only 
audiovisual media platform existing in 2008 was then was adpoted by the EPTV. This is 
due to the growing interest on these platforms of individuals regarding European topics. 
Still, is social media a news-source? Anna Radnóti, editor of international news on 
RTL Hungary retains that social media doesn’t operate as a news site, even if it shares 
content: “We can witness some evolution in this regard, also on Facebook for instance, 
there appears always more information that seem to be official news. So it is not only 
sharing the broadcasted news as it is, but producing news specifically for that site. For 
example a page of a news-site works completely differently as the online site of a 
television.” But to the question of whether social media can be cited as official news 
source she and her colleague, Róbert Kollár, Editor in chief of news replied immediately 
‘no’. But they also added that if there is a parliamentary session continuing in the night 
then an MEP tweeting something can be a piece of the content shared as news. 
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4.3.2. What influences the editorial decision-making? 
 
Journalism and journalists play a crucial role in the evolution of the European 
public sphere, as media content is an explicit manifestation of the public sphere. For this 
reason, if we want to understand the quality of the European public sphere, we need to 
examine factors that influence the editorial decision-making. Morgan did so when 
analyzing EU correspondents and points such as access, constraints and sources defining 
EU news. 310 Bijsmans and Altides, Martins, Meyer and Morgan have examined the 
relationship between EU institutions and journalists. And numerous studies have 
addressed the role of journalism in European integration. 311 It is needless to say that 
editorial gatekeepers and journalists have a certain power in influencing public opinion, 
political institutions and issues through the daily process of news selection and 
presentation.312 In the view of Adam Renyi, in Hungary journalism has given up its power 
to content-production and the decision of what kind of content will be produced is not 
taken by journalists. Journalism, however, and professional news shall act always as 
opposition to ruling politics. As the BBC editor Alan Quartly said: “There is a kind of 
planning rule that you know as a journalist in a particular country that you need to cover 
like as I said because you have to be aware of the territory as a journalist and you have to 
know what to cover.” The noble mission of journalism notwithstanding, the media’s role 
in society can be viewed as pure market driven business, a “business with a public interest” 
or a special business that requires government intervention, legislation and provisions. In 
other words, ideas ranging from a notion of the media as acting in “self-interest” to the 
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media acting in the “public interest”, according to McQuail.313 Therefore, broadcasters 
today pay more attention to what the audience demands, whereas the public service 
ethos in the past meant a greater emphasis on educating and informing the electorate 
with special attention to what politicians had to offer.314 However, according to Mr. Renyi, 
the demand of the audience is a very flexible thing. 
So what are the aspects taken into account when making editorial decisions? Alan 
Quartly explained the following: “We might have a lot of different news stories being 
suggested to the correspondents but we don’t have the space to put everything so there 
must be some editorial decision-making done, like what is the priority that day.” He also 
added: “Sometimes it is less obvious and there are discussions which story is more 
important and it might be the different editors, different programs decide on different 
talk stories. That’s a kind of relative decision making.” This relative decision-making 
process was confirmed also by Mr. Renyi, who said that “sensation” is still a keyword at 
private broadcasting news-production. This results in a certain “with us or against us” 
narrative is used that makes news become more comprehensible and sensational, even 
when covering something as consequential as politics. According to Justyna Kurczabinska, 
Head of Eurovision News Exchange, in order to show and explain events, stories of 
everyday people are told by the media rather than mere pictures of talking heads from 
the institutions and governments. Gamal Abdullatif, editor at France 24, added very 
interesting statements on what affects editorial decision, such as the language the 
reporter is using, the guests they are inviting and the pictures chosen. For this reason, if 
an event is covered by multiple news-producers, editors and journalists need to follow the 
editorial policies of their company. This is also why technical details are becoming more 
important when comparing the presentation of news of various broadcasters. However, 
we can agree with Abdalkarim Elhag, journalist and news-producer, that journalists and 
editors can’t completely isolate themselves from who they are: “so consciously or 
subconsciously I will always forward a British point of view. As a provider of news, I am 
also influenced by the news that I read then I see and my sources of information.” 
 
1. Framing process in the “newsroom” 
 
And here we can get back to the beginning of this chapter, when speaking about 
the agenda-setting capacity of news in everyday politics, as political events and news 
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inevitably interact. News shall be a continuous opposition to political power315, a public 
sphere that puts political legitimacy under scrutiny, according to many.316 The framing 
process, therefore, plays a key-role in the production of news already at the level of 
framing the “newsroom.” This means that because journalists have to tell a story within 
limited time or space, they need certain frames to simplify and give meaning to the flow 
of events, and to keep audiences interested. Frames guide journalists, editors, and news 
executives to structure and organize news stories, and framing helps audiences to make 
sense of the information provided.317 Actually, as mentioned before, the selection of the 
events tackled in the news itself is a framing, as journalists are filtering information from 
publics.  
According to Mazzoleni and Schultz, in the “mediatized politics” era,318 journalists 
are confronted by a barrage of competing claims, from which only a small number appear 
in print due to limited carrying capacity. Thus, the political discourse carried by the media 
is a competitive field where collective actors engage in acts of “strategic political 
communication” (Kriesi, 2004)319 to gain influence.320 For this reason it is important for 
political figures to engage with the press.  
However frames are chosen also to satisfy the audience’s demand. Anna Radnóti 
of RTL explained that very often international news is also framed from a national 
perspective as they need to keep in mind the national connection and local impact of 
certain international events. Also European institutions work following frames in order to 
offer information to the publics in an appealing way that will be consumed by the 
mainstream. Mr. Lesenecal, Head of the European Parliament’s Web Communication 
Department said: “So that is why we try to target and identify more and more auditor 
issues and to follow those issues, because we know that for each issue (and topic) we have 
an audience out there.” 
According to Cappela and Jamieson, in order to correctly study these frames and 
their effects, one must systematically collect evidence of the way events and issues are 
framed in the news. The scholars suggested that frames must have identifiable conceptual 
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and linguistic characteristics and be commonly observed in journalistic practice.321 And 
actually studying frames is crucial for all the participants of news-production. Mr. Renyi 
said: “So if someone finds a news that he or she elaborated and frames it, others are 
quoting it, it grows big and forms public opinion, so politics needs to react to it and so on. 
This works like this usually. So the political agenda, or better to say the agenda of public 
knowledge is defined quite significantly by the media. How important to society one topic 
can become, depends on how long the news can stay on the agenda or vanishes in 1-2 
days.” Psychology of news is crucial. Also Alan Quartly from BBC added how important it 
is to frame and sometimes re-frame the news in order to keep it alive until the public 
interest erodes. “There is a point where if you do a story everyday it stops feeling new. 
This is a question about news psycho and at some point it will start to fade away. An 
important fact in every news report around the world is that who is reading it and listening 
to it and if you are not getting the numbers, if people are not engaged than you need to 
move on to something else because that means that the people will look at something 
else.” 
Getting the numbers—this can be the thought that connects us to the next topic: 
what are the influencing factors of defining an editorial line and how does objectivity and 
balance come to the picture? 
 
2. Influencing factors 
 
As always, the agenda-setting and the editorial line need to be examined within 
their contexts: the demand of the public, the dynamics of the market and also the 
interdependence with other organizations, institutions, parties. For this reason, in 
communication science it has been forcefully demonstrated that effects of the different 
news media outlets are conditioned by their actual contents.322 This also resonates with 
what our interviewees said about both the editorial line and the journalistic thinking being 
influenced by these factors. For example Gamal Adbullatif, from France 24 said: “The 
national channels has this very clear editorial policy. While the private channels, they 
understand it. I mean, being part of the social system, the founding, the origin, they 
understand that the origin now wants these things to be happened and they have, I think, 
some kind of guidelines to follow.” In this sense broadcasters need to keep in mind where 
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their funds are coming from, whether there are public contributions and what the demand 
is related to this. This idea was supported by the opinion of journalist and news-producer 
Adbalkarim Elhag that journalists actually go in line with the editorial leanings of certain 
broadcasters or newspapers: “Other journalists will always have an agenda depending on 
what organization they are working for. If the Daily Mirror has a totally different agenda 
and totally different type of journalists from The Sun. It’s obvious, The Sun is right-wing, 
Daily Mirror is center-left.” Justyna Kurczabinska from the EBU explains this phenomenon: 
“But I think problem is of the size of Europe. We are a combination of so many countries 
and the national broadcasters are very you know… in a way they are protective of the 
market so I think they want to protect their own culture and individuality.” 
However the common topic that appeared quite often within the discussions was 
objectivity and balance of the news. How important are they? How you can assure these 
principles are practiced? How you can manipulate these principles? These are the 
questions that will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
3. Objectivity and balance 
 
Framing news is a fundamental means at the disposal of both editors and 
journalists, and also European institutions. The framing activities of the European 
institutions has been discussed previously, nevertheless it is important to shed light on 
the connection between one of the main journalistic principles, objectivity, and framing. 
Given that journalists belong to a social group sharing a common orientation and ethos 
that affects how they see their profession,323 their views are a potentially rich data source. 
Many scholars suggest that framing news consists of using varied but specific 
“framing devices” (e.g., headlines, introductions, lead-outs etc.). 324 These studies 
explicitly define the news frame as distinct from other elements in the news.325 News 
frames have an impact on the perception of the information shared as news, as they stress 
specific values, facts, or other considerations and sometimes imbue issues, or pieces of 
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issues, with greater relevance than would alternative frames.326 It is commonly known 
that news values point to the importance of conflict.327 The presence of conflict fosters 
the news story and makes that piece of news go on air if the story is told well, at least 
partially because it “sells”,328 but also because it supposedly meets the standards of 
balanced reporting. 
According to Gamal Abdullatif, journalist and editor, news frames consist of the 
following elements: language, context, guests and visual. These are also the indexes of 
objectivity and balance. Objectivity and balance are not only journalistic principles but also 
basic values in the communication policy of the European institutions: “So in my compass, 
what is important for the media directorate on this level is the use of the directorate. This 
is a guideline, we are transparent. We are objective, we quote each political group. And 
we are particularly balanced. […]  We are accurate. And we are fulfilling the right of the 
citizen to know what is happening in this house. And we want to be interesting. So those 
are our values,” said Mr. Lesenecal, the Acting Head of the Web Communication Unit of 
the European Parliament. “We provide all the content we try to be as transparent as 
possible but the end of the day they put it or not,” adds Mr. Fernando Carbajo, the Head 
of the Audiovisual Unit of the Directorate of Media at the EP. Despite these intentions, 
Jaume Duch, the Head of the Communication Department explains that even with the aim 
of being transparent and highly balanced, broadcasters tend to frame the objective 
information from a national, or even a patriotic point of view as this is what better 
connects to viewers. And to make news more national, journalists make interviews with 
the representatives of their nation who tend to communicate in an unbalanced way: “...for 
example, if I am the Minister of Agriculture, and I go to Bruxelles and there is a positive 
decision than it was my decision. But if it is negative, it is Bruxelles’s decision,” explains 
Mr. Duch. For this reason the framing-capacity of journalists is considered highly valuable 
in contributing to the homogenic European understanding. 
In relation to this, balance and objectivity are important guidelines within the 
journalistic and editorial circles as well. As Alan Quartly, Assignment Editor at BBC said: 
“As a publicly funded broadcasting platform balance is very important and this is very 
different from the British newspaper where you know that if you read the Telegraph or 
the Guardian you get a totally different point of view. The BBC is straight down in the 
middle so we are not putting only our point of view but for us objectivity is very important 
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especially on the issue of the European Union […] So our Brussels correspondents spend 
a lot of time advising everybody in this room.” Róbert Kollár, Editor of foreign affairs at 
RTL television has underlined the same thought when asking him about the importance 
and effects of the terminology, the wording of migrants and refugees within news. They 
personally were using the wording “refugees”, as they did not want to get into a political 
narrative by using the negative-sounding wording with political power. Mr. Kollár 
confirmed our hypothesis that terminology mirrors political views.  
On the other hand, terminology, just as interviewees, pictures and contest can be 
used for manipulating objectivity: “We show 2 sides but one side more than the other. 
You can give them the idea of balance, …, this is what I think,” said Mr. Abdalkarim Elhag. 
He also added: “I mean like anywhere else the agenda is always set by the channel. They 
don’t have to say it explicitly, it can be implicit, they don’t have to write it down for you, 
but you know that what you will sell to Fox will be different from what you are going to 
sell to the BBC or from what are going to sell to Sky.” 
 
 
4.3.1 How do European institutions communicate? 
 
In this chapter I intend to compare how the European institutions think they 
communicate, and what is effectively perceived by news-production actors. Here it is 
important to underscore that European institutions aim to communicate with citizens, 
both who are interested in European matters and those whose attention they try to catch. 
For example, the EP’s communication addresses people outside the “Bruxelles bubble.” 
Mr. Lesenecal explains that “on Facebook, you should know, that 95% of the fans are 
outside Belgium. 95%. That means that we have only 5% of our fans that are in Bruxelles 
or Belgium. Because you will always hear about the Bruxelles-bubble, and it does not exist 
on Facebook. And it has always been the case. I think that we are even above 95%.” He 
says that he doesn’t believe in the existence of a European elite, but rather europhiles and 
eurosceptics. To the contrary, Adam Renyi claims that the European institutions don’t put 
enough effort in establishing and fostering a direct contact with the European citizens: 
“…about the EU, in a way, Hungary communicates. But actually, there is no direct 
communication from the EU. So, that the EU speaks to Hungarian people, is not existing.” 
The truth likely lies somewhere in between. 
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1. What is the main editorial line of the European agenda-setting? 
 
Staying to the goal of getting to citizens that, as previously described, characterise 
the intentions of the European institutions, addressing the information well is crucial. This 
means that European affairs need to appear interesting in the eyes of a very 
heterogeneous audience, so European news being varied and targeted becomes crucial. 
According to Mr. Lesenecal: “I think there is a cliché, that people think it is European Affair, 
so you have to communicate of Europe. But no. You have to communicate to targeted 
audiences, about they subject they are interested in. So if you discuss fishery policy, there 
is a huge audience out there that is interested in fishery policy because they live from it. 
And so it is very important for them and they would like to know more about it. But they 
might not be interested at all in immigrations, or the pipeline in the Baltic states or energy. 
Whereas other people would be extremely interested in these. So that is why we try to 
target and identify more and more auditor issues and to follow those issues, because we 
know that for each issue (and topic) we have an audience out there.” This resonates with 
the point of view of Ms. Karolina Wozniak: “I don’t think there is one image… but there is 
not even one image that the Parliament wants to transmit. Of course we want to be seen 
as transparent, and democratically elected institution, these are the big values that we 
have as an institution, but generally speaking there are so many political groups, so many 
opinions in the Parliament… so I don’t think there is one image.”  
Targeting is possible through various ways. First by use of language. Second by 
using adequate content for the various platforms through which the institutions can 
communicate. Also the Web Communication Unit of the EP sometime choses different 
topics and issues to cover on the different platforms they are present. Ms. Wozniak 
explains: “so let’s say we have 2 or 3 post per day, we try to have a mix of serious things 
with some lighter things because we know that not everyone on our page is interested 
just in politics.” Or messages can be targeted by finding the right frames and point of view. 
According to Mr. Lesenecal, it is an interesting process to find the various anchors of 
presenting information: the human anchor, the political anchor, the conflict anchor or just 
simply presenting the benefits for citizens. This resonates with the opinion of Mr. Carbajo, 
Head of Audiovisual Unit of the European Parliament, who said that “The main principle 
is always what we are doing for an average citizen. And we have to know that the citizens 
are not really interested in the Institutional functions, they are interested in daily life and 
they have to be involved. So the message has to be very clear. We have to repeat our 
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message. The citizens are not interested in Institutional buildings. The citizens are 
interested in daily life and we need to have an impact on their daily life.”  
Parallel with the fragmentation of new interpretation and the diversification of 
targeting, coordination and coherence are other main principles. The Director General of 
Communication of the European Parliament, Mr. Jaume Duch is keen on planning while 
keeping in mind editorial coherence and compatibility among the various communication 
channels, in addition to using proper language for each channel. It should not only be the 
coordination and editorial coherence among the various communication channels, but 
also among the European institutions, says Mr. Carbajo, Head of the Audiovisual Unit of 
the European Parliament: “each Institution needs to have its own means [of 
communication]. But at the end of the day […] we noticed that we have to work all 
together with the same ideas if we really want to inform and engage citizens. It is all about 
Europe and all about our future and all about the European Union.” Unfortunately this 
kind of coordination still does not seem not be functioning: “…for us European Parliament 
and European Commission are two really separated audiovisual, they have separated 
audiovisual departments so they all kind of existing on their own,” says Justyna 
Kurczabinska, from the News Exchange department. Later on we will see what journalists 
think about the coordination among the institutions. 
 
2. How do European institution monitor their results? 
 
In order to target the messages well and find the right audience, the European 
institutions need to monitor their communication and how the transmitted messages are 
interpreted within national media. For this reason the European institutions are investing 
much effort in following up their messages with content analysis, surveys and the 
watermark system. The latter is a method that entails to maintaining an up-to-date 
database on where the audiovisual material offered by the European institutions was used 
and for how long. With this watermark monitoring the European Parliament and 
Commission coordinate their work and the shared system allows them to monitor the use 
of pictures and audiovisual material of more than 280 broadcasters within the EU. This 
represents more or less 80% of the total audience. “We can go in this database and see 
how long they use it, how they lend it. Which are the countries that use more images, the 
members, and the audience. So the time can give an objective feedback but also how our 
images were used regarding a particular topic. As I said we have a lot of live events and 
then 1-2 hour long debate going live in the TV channels. For example we are always 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
present on the 24 hour TV channels. They use it a lot when we have state of the union 
debate,” explains Mr. Carbajo. Ms. Justyna Kurczabinska adds that “…the watermark is 
quite powerful because you can see that the story which is really exciting is used 
immediately for example by 30 or 40 channels and then it’s aired, you know, a thousand 
times. So, you know, and it’s very no-brainer, good pictures or very strong pictures, they 
always get to the top.” Anna Radnóti, the editor of foreign news at RTL, channels confirms 
the utility of these materials. They often use available, pre-recorded visual materials but 
they also connect to the live streaming services to air live sessions and important events. 
While monitoring the use of audiovisual content within broadcasters gives a 
certain feedback of the utility of shared material, it is not necessarily examining the 
positivity or objectivity of the narrative. As previously mentioned, visual is just one 
fundamental element of agenda-setting, the others are language, context and 
interviewees. However their effectiveness can be measured only through surveys 
providing secondary results. 
3. Challenges the EU institutions find in communicating? 
 
Now let us consider the challenges and obstacles that the European institutions 
face within their communication, according our interviewees. Mr. Lesenecal stated the 
following: “It is normal and natural that it [the European Union] is complex, I mean, you 
can’t play with 28 member states in a simple way. I mean it has to be complex.” For this 
reason, besides informing the public on the ultimate updates of European matters, 
European communication also needs to evolve into an active role in education and basic 
information sharing. According to Alan Quartly, BBC: “The biggest problem is that most of 
the people in Britain have no idea how the EU works. They don’t know what the European 
Parliament is and what it is for. They don’t understand and talk about Brussels as one 
word. And there might be that Brussels is referring to the European commission which is 
basically the civil service of the Union which works out and suggests a policy. If Jean-Claud 
Juncker says something it doesn’t mean that will happen but it often gets reported as the 
EU says we must do that.” In other words: “there is a lack of information even if the 
information is all there.” 
This causes European matters to be a difficult topic to cover. As Jaume Duch, EP 
Head of Communication has put, television does not like Europe very much as they think 
this subject is distant and difficult, and that it does not go well with the televised 
narratives. In his opinion television does not like parliaments. Despite the regular use of 
conflict-narratives in television when speaking about parliamentary affairs, this topic can 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
easily become too technical for television to be interesting. That European matters are 
difficult, and communicating Europe is difficult, was confirmed also by researchers also, 
not only officials and journalists. Statham in his overview329 concluded that journalists still 
find the EU to be a difficult topic to cover and to entice editors and audiences about.330  
Also according to Adam Renyi, for private, national tv channels, the EU is not quite apt for 
simple narratives. On the one hand there are numerous talking heads and figures 
representing European issues, on the other hand the organigram of the institutions and 
their everyday functioning is not easily comprehensible for citizens as they are significantly 
different from the national political and administrative standards. Mr. Renyi also adds that 
this low understanding is also caused by the private channels not fulfilling the mission of 
educating publics. Consequences can be observed in the low participation at the elections. 
The European Union is not only difficult but also abstract: “And the biggest thing 
is that European Union is something very abstract so unless you translate it in a very… 
what is means for an individual, how it impacts on the individual, nobody understands, it’s 
functioning,” asserts Justyna Kurczabinska. She also adds: “So we don’t know if they 
cooperate between one and other, for us they are separate. […] I think that if they wanna 
really have the impact then they should produce stories and not only do corporate 
coverage.” 
To conclude, we refer to the DG of Communication of the EP, who explains that 
the biggest challenge of communicating European matters is to reach those who are not 
interested in European affairs. “If someone wants to know about European matters, it is 
easy to communicate. But the real challenge is not this 5% of European society, but how 
to arrive to the other 95% who is not really interested, nor keen on national or local 
politics. […] Media needs to be used to reach out to those, who are not coming closer to 
you on their own.” 
4. How important the national point of view is? 
 
While journalists' own perceptions of the roles of news media have remained 
broadly similar in the US over the past decade, differences in the role perceptions have 
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been observed in several European countries.331 This has important implications for the 
way in which both domestic and European politics are covered in the news. 332 This 
evolution is also due to the increasing intensity of European integration and the widening 
of political topics to be tackled by European decision-makers that have a direct impact on 
national policy-making processes. 
European institutions aim to find the balance between targeting information and 
addressing all Europeans. Ms. Wozniak says “the thing is that for us it’s always difficult to 
define our target because for us the target is all Europeans basically. So we always try to 
engage with as many people as possible….” According to Mr. Lesenecal, the European 
institutions’ communication, besides addressing all citizens, aims to foster the recognition 
of the operation and its impact on them. “We want people to realize that the European 
Parliament is extremely important in their life. That this is the only democratically elected 
institution. And it is very important for them to engage; at least on the subject to be 
consent; because it has been elected by the people and takes decisions in their name. […] 
We want them to see that it is not a decision that comes… you know… it is not that 
Bruxelles has decided. No, it is the council, and the parliament.” 
However European institutions and journalists both admit that news on European 
matters becomes mainstream rather through a national point of view. According to Jaume 
Duch, EP, “there are two different aspects: one is regarding the decision of informing or 
not informing of what is happening in the EU or on a European level, and the other aspect 
is how to inform of informing, if informing from a national or a European perspective. […] 
and if there is not this national prospective it is more difficult to pull the interest of the 
public to the news.” Also from a journalistic side, as Gamal Abdullatif, France 24, puts it: 
“either you have local story from international perspective or international stories from 
local perspective” and also Abdalkarim Elhag, freelancer, puts it this way “There is a 
national sight to every channel, a patriotic sight.” 
This national perspective manifests itself, for example, through the speakers a 
journalist chooses. National politicians explaining European affairs can explain reliably 
what impact European decisions can have on the member states’ citizens. As Jaume Duch 
mentioned, today the European institutions are very important as “they take such 
decisions that change the conditions of citizens regarding economics, budget, social 
politics, labor, health, jurisdiction, immigration, terrorism. These are not technical politics 
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anymore, but they are politics with the big P, the same politics that are also discussed on 
a national level.” However Jaume Duch, the DG of communication for the European 
Parliament aims to communicate that European decisions are as important as national 
parliamentary decisions. Journalists referring to their audience have a different view as 
they retain European decision-making distant from the national level and so “people are 
interested in the results. What is the decision? And this decision what kind of 
consequences has on his or her life? That’s all,” as Róbert Kollár says. Anna Radnóti adds: 
“So if there is no real decision, we usually don’t report on such issues.” This is why, 
according to Mr. Abdullatif, the interpretation of the news-story shall focus on the region 
but without losing touch with the original message. For example if someone interviews a 
local person in order to prove with a case study the core message, or to color it, it should 
only be done to foster and support the principle meaning.  
As we can notice, there is a certain contradiction in communicating European 
decisions, of which one side is represented by the opinion of Mr. Duch, namely that 
European decisions are like national ones and shall communicated similarly as such, the 
other side, according to interviewees involved in news production, European matters 
need to be interpreted from a national point of view, otherwise it is not relevant. 
However, we should not forget one very important fact: regardless how much effort 
European institutions put into direct communication, citizens still gain their information 
from national news sources. 
 
5. Journalist covering EU news 
 
As the European integration becomes more decisive in national policy-making, the 
press needs to dedicate more attention and allocate time and resources to elaborate 
European affairs more in detail, as European decision-making has a direct impact on the 
everyday life of the public. In concordance all national parliaments in the member states 
have established some kind of European affairs committee (EAC) within themselves to 
improve parliamentary scrutiny of their own government’s decision-making concerning 
EU matters. These committees typically focus on the negotiating positions taken by the 
national governments in Council of Ministers meetings.333 
Different broadcasters and newspapers have different means to cover EU news. 
For example the BBC, according to Mr. Quartly, has an international press centre, where 
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international broadcasters have their offices. BBC has 4 permanent correspondents and 
additional 6 periodic political correspondents due to the British referendum. On the 
contrary, Róbert Kollár, RTL, claims not to have any local representative as it is too 
expensive and not reasonable. RTL has Belgian partners who offers them materials, beside 
all the materials offered by the European institutions. Anna Radnóti, the editor of foreign 
affairs at RTL adds that she gets all her information out of these materials as she is deleting 
without opening and deleting all the emails that the European institutions send. 
“In the past 5-7 years 80-90% of the information on the EU, was information about 
the crisis. It is normal that a citizen associates the European Union with the crisis, with the 
cause of the crisis. Therefore citizens prefer that Bruxelles is far away. This could have 
happened also because the means of communication continue to work with Bruxelles as 
years ago in third countries: the correspondent goes to Bruxelles, as it goes to Rio or Paris. 
The correspondent goes to Paris once a week and appears on television to explain what is 
happening in Paris” comments Jaume Duch regarding having correspondents at the 
European institutions. Mr. Carbajo, concerning the topic of correspondent explained that 
the European institutions, especially the EP, works a lot with the correspondents in a close 
manner. In his opinion we could witness a positive tendency in communication with 
journalists in the times when the European Commission was dominating the European 
communication was more distant and technical. The Parliament managed to fill the gaps, 
in his view. Transparency and attracting the media are the two main pillars on which the 
EP’s communication is based.  
Despite this optimistic view, we could hear from journalists and editors that they 
are not investing in correspondents, moreover they don’t even use the releases and 
newsletters the EP emits as information sources. This is also because the EU appears as 
an unknown power, at least in the Hungarian media according to Mr. Renyi. Following to 
Justyna Kurczabinska, the public and thus the media could relate to the European 
institutions better if there were not only talking heads, but also personal stories told from 
the bottom to the top of the citizenry and people of the European Union. European 
communication could be also fostered “…if we’d let citizens to contact the institutions, to 
speak to MEP, to create a dialogue. This seems to be very important, just as informing 
journalists, help their work, activating platforms where we permit citizens to dialogue with 
decision-makers,” explains Mr. Duch. The goals set by the Director General of 
Communication are clear: the European institutions have the mission to explain and help 
citizens understand that European policy-making is nothing more than a particular level 
of decision-making. Just as at the city, the region, and the state, there is a European level 
of decision-making. It is nothing more. 
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5. Analyzing the audience and the main factors of the European public sphere 
 
After examining the underlying tendencies that define the agenda setting 
strategies, I will focus on the reception and perception of this news and therefore the 
characteristics and facts that influence the information-consumption of the audience.  
However, I need to state that there is very limited data regarding the audiences of 
news channels. News channels are niche channels that do not attract large audiences and 
with the digitization and expansion of the multi-channel television this audience has 
become further fragmented, as the choice of the channels to view increased.  
Nevertheless, the Europeanization of the national public spheres can be measured 
by the news media coverage of European matters,334 the perception of the news and how 
they form public opinion is crucial in defining the form and existence of the European 
public sphere. 
 
5.1. Introduction: Contextualization of data-analysis 
 
There is a common notion in defining correlation between the regularity and 
overlapping content of European content within national news-broadcasting and the 
existence of the European public sphere and its quality. Mass media becomes even more 
important in cases, just as the European Union’s, when speakers are unable to reach their 
audience and democratic political entities need mechanisms to link the political arenas. In 
these cases, the media function as ‘glue’ for the segmented public spheres. 335 
In order to define the quality of Europeanness and the European public sphere we 
need to follow the suggested methodology of the classification of topics, actors, degree 
of cross-references, and the framing of issues or visibility, inclusiveness and 
contestation.336 According to de Vreese, who claims that “the notion of Europeanized 
national public spheres has found most resonance in large scale comparative studies of 
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the media’s coverage of European integration and political issues in Europe,” 337 the media 
coverage of European affairs shows a constant flow of news and can be described as 
cyclical, with occasional peaks and long periods of little news. 338 This is seen also when 
key events happen, such as national referendums on EU issues (e.g, de Vreese and 
Semetko 2004;339 Hobolt 2009340), EU summits (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006341; van 
der Brug et al. 2007342), and European Parliament elections can take up a substantial part 
of the news (de Vreese et al. 2006343; Maier and Maier 2008344; Schuck et al. 2011b345). 
Despite that most of the news is seen through the prism of the nation state, 
European integration and the EU are not only present in news coverage of genuinely 
European issues, but also are increasingly an integral part of national political and 
economic coverage. 346  Reflecting on this thought we can refer to Habermas, who wrote 
that the European political public space spans sovereign states and their national public 
spaces within a common system and with shared messages and meanings occupying this 
space.347 Other researchers have defined the same phenomena by “distinguishing 
segmented transnational public spheres which have been conceptualized as issue-specific 
communicative spaces, largely dominated by political and economic elites”.348 Therefore 
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I can say that European news becoming national shows the increasing impact of European 
decisions on national affairs.  
Not only does overlapping content and a nationalized European communication 
drive our attention toward the creation of a “European audience”, so do figures, as 
statistics show that Europe has a large audience for transnational television. “On average, 
37 percent of respondents in the Eurobarometer 189a survey said they watch television 
channels from other European countries. Of course, the proportion varies enormously 
between the 25 member states. In Luxembourg and Malta, watching television channels 
from elsewhere is simply the norm. The proportion is also high in states where the 
country’s borders do not coincide with linguistic ones, such as Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. A majority of viewers in Slovenia and Denmark claim to watch foreign 
channels regularly, and the same applies to half of the viewers in Germany, Portugal, 
Estonia and Ireland – no doubt for a variety of reasons. At the other end of the scale, the 
survey found that in the UK, Spain, Italy and Greece the overwhelming majority watch 
nothing but national channels.” 349 These figures are important in the aspect of the public 
perception of the news and the European issues, by perceiving the same information 
about a common issue through another national prism. This phenomenon alters the 
European public opinion and so the European public sphere. 
The public sphere, in other words, consists of a cultural and a political part where 
the cultural part also has fundamental political importance. Any quality newspaper 
demonstrates in its contents how the public sphere encompasses both politics and 
culture, and the same can certainly be said about broadcasting, at least the sort known as 
public service broadcasting (PSB) – devoted, according to Lord Reith’s classic formula, not 
only to the provision of information and education, but also of entertainment.350  
And so, to continue the widening of the concept, we need to say that analyzing the 
public perceptions of the common issues, framing analysis “expands beyond agenda-
setting research into what people talk or think about by examining how they think and 
talk about issues in the news”.351 These frames select particular aspects of reality, organize 
aspects around that central idea, and, thus emphasize the mainstream opinion by 
allocating values through aspects.352 Framing effects refer to changes in evaluations, 
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judgements and interpretations as the result of aspects made salient through selection, 
organization and emphasis. There is a linkage between the framing concept and public 
opinion that has an impact also on the European integration. Consequently, it can be 
asked whether the frames the media apply to European affairs translate into patterns the 
public uses to interpret those affairs.353 And for this reason, some academics, just as 
Hands, criticize the European identity and the European public sphere. In his view, 
February 15, 2003, the day of the mass demonstrations can’t be seen as the birth of 
European public sphere, rather a manifestation of the ‘maturing of global civil society’ and 
not an expression of a European public sphere. 354  
Therefore, in this chapter let me step aside from framing and content-analysis and 
let me view the perception of the audience, by analyzing the broadcasting space, the offer 
of information-sources, the role of trust and informedness in measuring general opinion. 
 
5.2. News channels in nation states and their accessibility 
 
It is indispensable to analyze the context of news, namely the offer of television 
channels, the broadcasting market and tendencies on it, in order to understand better 
news-consumption of viewers. For this reason, with the basic assumption that television 
has a central role in informing public about the EU,355 I will focus on the growth of the 
market, the diversification of it and the Europeanization (or better to say 
internationalization) of the broadcasting space. 
 
5.2.1. Growth of the broadcasting market 
 
With the rise and diffusion of various communication platforms that can be used 
also as information sources, the public got used to consuming news in a different way than 
before. This evolution can also be seen on the broadcasting space where the main 
tendencies are an increasing number of tv channels, the appearance and join of additional 
news-platforms such as digital TV and internet channels, the increasing market share and 
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geographic diffusion of international news channels, and the growing demand of on-
demand tv channels. 
Based on the statistics gathered in the MAVISE Extra on linear and on-demand 
audiovisual services in Europe356 we can put the above-mentioned observations in 
numbers in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1: Number of on-demand audiovisual services established in the EU28 
 
From the table it can be seen that the on-demand audiovisual services were 
increasing significantly. There is no European country in which there was a decrease 
regarding the variety and number of channels. This is due to the growth of national 
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channels and the wider accessibility of foreign channels, moreover the expanding 
distribution platforms. Almost two thirds of all TV channels established in the EU in 2015 
were divided between six major genres: HD (22%), entertainment/TV fiction/games (13%), 
sport (11%), film (7%), culture/education/documentary (6%) and music channels (6%).  
This positive development is also due to technological innovations such as the 
digitization of cable and satellite platforms which allows for more space for additional 
channels. Also, the implementation of digital terrestrial television (DTT) has played an 
important role in increasing capacity for channel distribution, about which we will write 
more in detail later.357 
The following table, of which the data was taken from the online dataset called 
“Statista”, shows the number of TV channels per country that is followed by the table of 
number of TV channel by citizen, which show very interesting differences. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.2: Number of TV channels per country EU 28 [www.statista.com] 
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Figure 5.2.3: Number of TV channel / citizen EU 28 [www.statista.com] 
 
 
Nevertheless, Italy shows the highest number of TV channels per country, this 
quantity related to the number of citizens appears to be quite low compared to other 
countries. Not like in Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Estonia that relative to the number 
of their citizens have a significant offer of broadcasting channels. These countries, 
especially Malta, have the lowest number of channel on a European level but this 
difference can be explained by their size and the number of foreign languages the public 
understands, as this enables the accessibility of foreign channels. 
The expansion could be witnessed not only among TV channels in general, but also 
among news channels. This can be seen in the following figure: 
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Figure 5.2.4: The growth of the market for television news channels in Europe 
 
Despite the economic crisis, 28 news channels have been launched between 2010 
and 2013 that include several language versions of Euronews.358 And now let me give an 
insight in the two main reasons of expansion: the appearance of digital TV and the 
availability of foreign channels. 
 
5.2.2. Appearance of Digital TV 
 
First of all, I need to state that the scope and scale of the circulation of audiovisual 
media services in Europe has largely been facilitated by the digitization and convergence 
of interactive platforms. As Schneeberger and Fontaine write: “The transition to digital 
television since the early 1990s has led to a spectacular increase in the number of 
television channels available, reducing operating costs and facilitating access to 
interactive services through the convergence of previously separated communications 
networks and services. Digital satellite television for example, which was first introduced 
in France in March 1996, offers up to 500 extra channels and so does digital cable which 
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was launched in Europe shortly after.”359  The near completion of the digitization of 
terrestrial television in Europe and the continuing launch of various IPTV services is further 
adding to the rise of the circulation of TV channels on all major distribution platforms. This 
increased capacity for offering more channels has provided television news channels (both 
national, but more particularly international) with the opportunity to expand their 
distribution throughout Europe, in particular when it comes to DTT networks (digital 
terrestrial television). As write Kevin, Pellicano and Schneeberger: “During a previous 
analysis of news channel distribution, carried out in 2009, we noted that there were 16 
news channels available on DTT networks (free and pay). In September 2012, there were 
45 news channels available on the free to air DTT networks in Europe (including several 
that appear in different countries) and in September 2013 there are 43. International news 
channels are provided in Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. The Euronews channels appear on the Free DTT networks in Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany (only in certain Länder), and Hungary. They appear on pay DTT networks in 
Estonia, Latvia and Malta”.360 
However, there are occasional examples where the number of news channels over 
particular distribution platforms have been reduced, especially regarding languages. 
Reasons are not clear, but one issue might be the dominance of other types of TV channels 
in the broadcasting space as mentioned in the previous section. 
Moreover “despite the incredible push towards HD in the European television 
markets, news channels didn’t seem to be particularly taken up in this hype” write Kevin, 
Pellicano and Schneeberger, who have identified eight news channels which now have HD 
simulcasts: A HABER HD, CNN Türk HD, BFM TV HD, NHK World TV HD, RT (Russia Today) 
HD, TA3 HD, TV4 News HD, and ZDF Infokanal HD.361  
I can say that the digitalization fosters the increase of news channels and also their 
reach, even if high definition is not boosting this growth, nor does the shrinking linguistic 
availability. But than how do foreign channels behave on the European market? 
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5.2.3. The diffusion of foreign channels  
 
As written previously, innovation and the use of digital platforms in broadcasting 
fostered the geographic outreach of foreign channels. This meant that the variety of 
broadcasting channels within the European countries increased as foreign channels—both 
in foreign and native languages—offered services which also include versions of brand 
channels that are established in one country and which broadcast to various other 
national markets. As a result, today, according to MAVISE Extra report, the majority of TV 
channels available on average in a given country are foreign channels: “In the years 2009 
and 2015, the share of foreign channels available was 50% and higher in 24 EU countries; 
in four countries (DE, ES, IT, GB) the share of foreign channels was below the 50% 
threshold ranging from just 9% in the United Kingdom to 41% in Germany in 2015. All four 
countries are counted among the major EU television markets with a significant number 
of channels licensed under their respective national licensing regimes”.362   
 
                                                        
362 Schneeberger, A., Fontaine, G. [2016] pp.18 
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Table 5.2.5: Number of foreign TV channels targeting European countries (2009, 2015) 
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The previous table shows the foreign television channels targeting European 
countries. The European Audovisual Observatory gathered data in 2009 and then in 
2015363 that enables us to examine dynamics on the market. We can see from the table 
that the number of foreign channels by country varies widely: whilst the German-speaking 
Community of Belgium had none, and Malta only 4, Austria instead had 152 foreign 
channels and Poland 140. The countries with the highest number of foreign channels 
targeting their territories are Austria (N=152), Poland (N=140), Italy (N=109), Hungary 
(N=107).  
Approximately two third of the European countries have been targeted by more 
than 50 foreign channels. Nine European countries out of 31 have more than doubled the 
number of foreign channels in their country: Austria, Slovakia, Ireland, Croatia, Italy, 
Slovenia, Greece, Bulgaria and Malta. All the other countries in Europe had an increase 
between 17% and 97%, which are still high numbers and show a general increase all over 
the continent. Only Switzerland (-70%) and the United Kingdom are exceptions (-39%) as 
there you could only witness the decrease of the number of foreign channels.  
Another interesting result is regarding the distribution of private and public foreign 
channels: in 2009 there were 39 private channels in the European countries that tripled 
itself as it became 123 by 2015 out of which 50 (!) were based in Italy. So did the private 
channels grow by 127% and from 670 (2009) it increased to 1521 (2015). 
 
 
5.2.4. The internationalization of news channels 
 
Sticking to the previous chapter, we can note that just as in average for the 
television channels, even news channels showed a growth both in variety and 
geographically.  Nevertheless, news channels, such as the international news channels, 
belong to a niche category in broadcasting that segments its audience notably.364 From 
the European Audiovisual Observatory’s365 database we know that there is almost a 50-
50 split between national news channels and international/pan-European channels. This 
distribution is also due to national channels’ outreach, and despite their concept and 
target coverage they behave as international—or at least— pan-European channels. Two 
growing phenomena are parallel: while national channels become more pan-European, 
some pan-European channels become more global, such as Euronews, France 24. 
                                                        
363 Schneeberger, A., Fontaine, G. [2016] pp.21 
364 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: [2013] 
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Table 5.2.6: Examples of pan-European brand channels that target other markets by country of 
establishment and group 
 
The table above shows examples of pan-European brand channels that target 
markets other than their established group. This shows explicitly the changes in market 
share in this field, also the tendency of internationalization of the broadcasting channels. 
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These channels in their news, such as specific news channels develop an internal system 
of distribution of content. This fosters the uniformization and brandization of the channels 
and therefore contribute to the Europeanization of news. “We have contracts with some 
news agencies and the RTL Group has an independent internal system, in which we all 
share with everyone what we have. And in the RTL Group there are quite a lot of channels, 
if I am correct more than 30 from various parts of the world,” said Anna Radnóti. “And so 
we organize ourselves that when it is daytime in Australia it is Australia’s responsibility to 
collect the materials from all over the world; when it is daytime in Europe than it is 
Luxembourg’s turn; and when in America then from somewhere South-America. So we 
work as a news agency, only that we collect the audiovisual content from each other.” 
Without a doubt, the most important international news channels in terms of 
distribution and presence throughout Europe—available in over 33 countries—are CNN 
International, BBC World News, RT (Russia Today), Al Jazeera (English) and Euronews 
(English)—put in an order that mirrors their size in terms of distribution. These are 
followed by France 24 in English and Deutsche Welle. These top seven form a group of 
news channels that are most widely accessible. It should be emphasized that the language 
used in the top six news channels is English. Other languages represented in the lead table 
of top news channels available in more than 20 countries include French, German, Italian, 
Russian, and Spanish.366 This can be seen also on the table below that shows the 
distribution of international news channels by country. 
 
                                                        
366 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: [2013] 
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Table 5.2.7: Distribution of international news channels by country 
 
Such as in the broadcasting market in general, in news channels there was a 
notable development of hubs of pan-European brand channels by large broadcasting 
corporations, many of which are of American origin. Despite the economic crisis, 28 news 
channels have been launched since 2010. These include several new language versions of 
Euronews (the most recent being Greek and Hungarian), two news channels launched in 
Romania (2012), and the pan-regional Al Jazeera Balkan in 2012. In addition, new channels 
have been launched in Albania, Portugal and Poland in 2013; and in Croatia and Poland in 
2012.367 
                                                        
367 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: [2013] 
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The MAVISE Report also states368: “Among the number of foreign channels 
available in a country, a rapidly increasing share is specifically targeting national markets.  
Two thirds of TV channels established in the UK target other countries: not only did the 
UK have by far the highest number of channels established among EU member states 
(N=1030); a total of 66% were broadcasting to a large number of countries in Europe and 
beyond in 2015. The majority of broadcasting companies that license their channels in the 
UK for distribution in Europe are of American origin.”  
In this frame the European Union is present in the following way: out of 214 
European channels 46 are the Europe by Satellite channels, provided in 23 languages by 
the audiovisual services of the European Union. These provide footage over satellite that 
can be used by national news channels reporting on the European Union. As write 
Schneeberger, Kevin and Fontaine, out of the rest 110 channels are national channels and 
60 have an international, better to say pan-European remit, even if there are numerous 
national channels with a nearly pan-European outreach. 
 
5.3. The role of language in the public sphere 
 
Language is a very interesting factor in examining the European public sphere. This 
chapter focuses on the language as determining circumstance in general in the first place, 
rather than in the broadcasting space. Following this aspect, in a certain sense language is 
a barrier for people to interact within the European space. In general the European 
institutions are putting significant effort into communicating with the citizens in their 
native language and not discriminating against anyone. The internet is such a space where 
people can interact with each other and therefore we can monitor how language 
influences these interactions. I have interviewed the representatives of the European 
Parliament’s Web Communication Unit, Thibault Lesenecal, the Acting Head of the Unit 
and Karolina Wozniak, responsible for the EP’s Facebook page, who depicted the language 
issue in the following way. 
According to Ms. Wozniak, English is a good solution for overcoming the linguistic 
limits of European communication: “I think of course that the fact that we are using English 
is a bit limiting because it’s not the only language and the beauty of Europe is that we have 
all the languages. But I think… we should not maybe officially say it, but people do speak 
English, so it’s the easiest way for them to speak with each others.” English is also crucial 
                                                        
368 Schneeberger, A., Fontaine, G. [2016] pp.24 
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for broadcasting channels as the English language ones have the widest reach in Europe, 
both in the private and the public sector according to the Mavise Report.369 Ms. Wozniak 
also adds that language can have also a function in online communication, especially in 
Facebook targeting: “And sometimes there are moments in which we are targeting either 
by location or by language some information when we see it’s not of any interest for, I 
don’t know, to everyone, but we don’t do it on regular basis.” 
Mr. Thibault Lesenecal on the other hand retains language as a key-strategy in 
European communication: “It is tough, but I mean it is essential. I think it is the right of 
the citizen to know what is going on in their languages. And I think we should have more 
resources for that, if you ask me. […] But it is still an obstacle.” For this reason he claims 
that language and especially the use of all 24 official languages for the communication 
unit shall be a business strategy as language is an added value and therefore it is necessary 
to operate numerous pages and Facebook pages to make citizens interested and 
informed. “But that is a paradox, I mean, on the one hand, to be able to understand what 
is going on and to discuss it, but if you want them to discuss it among French and German, 
let’s take French and Slovenian, the only common language that they could have is English, 
or maybe Italian, if we are a little bit lucky. […] So we have to publish in 24 languages the 
topics, but in each language we should have a national anchor. So we are trying to see 
what could work better for the EPIO370. Because you need to hook better with the national 
news.” And in fact, communicating in the proper language can increase the visibility of the 
European issues. Nevertheless Mr. Lesenecal mentions a very interesting fact of not only 
communicating in a proper language but also to follow a national point of view. This 
thought resonates well with the need of journalists and broadcasters described in chapter 
4.3.1.  
The following two tables reflect on how language knowledge influences the feeling 
of being European. It is an interesting examination from the citizens’ point of view to see 
how the knowledge of foreign languages influences the general opinion of the EU, as it 
enables them to perceive more information.  
The first table shows us if there is a connection between respondents view on the 
usefulness of learning language and the image of the EU. 
                                                        
369 Ibid 
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Figure 5.3.1: Perceived usefulness of learning languages and the image of the EU371 
 
First of all, it is important to note that the national perspective is always more 
dominant than the European. We can see a correlation between finding the knowledge of 
languages useful and having a European image, as more useful languages are according to 
respondents, as the “European and national” judgement increases, just as the “only 
European” that however is always below the first one. Another interesting connection can 
be detected, as more respondents think that languages are useful, the more the image of 
the European Union is becoming European by increasing the portion of the category of 
“national and European” (it increases from 20% to 60%). On the other hand, the contrary 
is valid as well, the more people think that languages are not at all useful, the more the 
national perspective of the European image dominates (it increases from 30% to 78%). 
In the second table I was looking for a correlation between the main advantages 
people learn languages for and their opinion of the EU’s image.   
                                                        
371 Question in the Eurobarometer: Regarding the image of the EU: Do you see yourself as… (European/National)? and 
regarding the language: Do you think knowing other languages than your mother tongue is, or could be, very useful, fairly 
useful, not very useful or not at all useful for you personally? 
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Figure 5.3.2: Main advantages of learning a new language vs image of EU 
 
We can see that the highest importance is dedicated to understanding people and 
meeting people. The most important correlation is that more respondents learn languages 
as they feel European, the more positive they retain the image of the EU. This category 
increases from 4% to 25%. Also those who retain family knowledge the main advantage 
of learning a language retain the image of the EU more positive (increasing from 8% to 
19%). 
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Figure 5.3.3: Being informed affects the understanding of the EU 
 
The third figure reflects the correlation between the regularity of watching 
television news in foreign languages and the feeling of being informed. We can see, that 
more respondents watch television news in foreign languages, the more they feel 
informed on EU matters. In case of watching tv news in foreign languages on several 
occasions, respondents feel the most “very well informed” and “fairly well informed”. Not 
watching television news in foreign languages causes a significant increase in “not being 
informed” and “not very well informed”. 
Concluding, I would like to add Mr. Thibault Lesenecal’s thoughts on language 
within the European communicative space, who said that people of all nationality can 
come and discuss regardless to languages, therefore there is no actual linguistic barrier 
for European communication. Nevertheless the real limit of a European public sphere—in 
which he does not believe—is not language, but content, as content is limiting the 
widening of the audience. As stated before, news channels are niche channels that 
determine a niche audience primarily because of their content, rather than the language. 
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5.4. Public and Private ownership of television channels 
 
Tackling ownership, are there any differences between publicly and privately 
owned channels? Does this influence the European public sphere? Does it have any impact 
on general opinion? How is the balance on the market? 
You could see already in chapter 5.2 on the table 5.2.5 that there is a visible 
difference in the number of private channels (1521 in 2015) and public ones (123) on the 
first is more than 10 times as much. Also among the leading international news channels, 
defined according to the number of countries where they are distributed in the previous 
chapter, six are privately owned while others (such as the various Euronews language 
versions and the Chinese CCTV News) have a mixed public-private ownership status. 372 
The table below shows 26 channels, out of which 8 are publicly financed.  
 
 
                                                        
372 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: [2013] 
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Table 5.4.1: Statue and country of origin of top international news channels 
 
The table 5.4.1., made from of the MAVISE database, lists the major news channels 
adding information also on their financial state. The most distributed news channel is the 
privately-owned US channel CNN international (Turner Broadcasting International), 
licensed in the UK. The second, which follows closely CNN, is BBC World News, which is 
actually not distributed in the UK. We can see that out of the previously mentioned 7 big 
news channels half is private and half is public, moreover the importance of the English 
language can also be seen in the table. 373 
In the next table we can see the news channels listed by each country and grouped 
in the two groups: public and private. 
                                                        
373 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: [2013] 
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Table 5.4.2: Statue of national news channels 
 
When looking at the statute of national news channels in Table 5.4.2.,374 it can be 
clear that the privately owned channels dominate over the public ones. From a total of 
105 national news channels a majority of 84 are privately owned whilst 21 are public. Only 
in a few cases can we say that public channels are more prevalent: On the one side there 
is Spain which has three public channels (Canal 24 Horas, Canal 3/24 and Canal Nou 24). 
On the other hand we find the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Ireland as they have 
exclusively public news channels (this was the case also in Greece before). 
However private ownership plays a decisive role on the market in most of the 
European countries in the national television news industry. Private corporations are 
present and offer a competitive content for viewers in most of the member states. In the 
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case of foreign channels this situation is more balanced (as it could be also seen in chapter 
5.2). 
As it is written in the report called Television News Channels in Europe: “It should 
be noted however that public channels represent about 14% of the entire universe of 
television channels in Europe (contained in MAVISE), whereas public channels represent 
over 30% of the national and international news channels in Europe. Hence the role of 
public service television is heightened with regard to news broadcasting.”375 
We have analyzed the distribution and balance of ownership on the broadcasting 
market as it has an indirect impact on the so-called European public sphere. Studies 
focusing on the public evaluation of public and private television channels, and search for 
the reasons and consequences of the high distribution and outreach of privately owned 
television channels have found for example that the context of availability of cable 
television and channel preference are key variables in analyzing the information. In a 
multivariate analysis Holz-Bacha and Norris (2001) found, after controlling for education, 
that preference for public television was associated with higher levels of political 
knowledge while preference for commercial television was associated with lower levels of 
knowledge. In addition, they found a significant—though much weaker—positive 
relationship between frequent news watching and political knowledge.376 This is why, 
according to Peter and de Vreese, we expect public broadcasting television news 
programs to report more about politics than commercial television news programs and to 
include more relevant political actors in the news.377  
Although this research has not found primer data on the various consequences of 
public television channels being more informative, we can assume that ownership is 
crucial in defining public knowledge on European affairs. The dynamics and means of 
gaining market share are different in the two cases as the sources of their financial stability 
are different. Private channels are more forced to meet market demands and offer 
content that the mainstream can follow, whereas public television being state-financed 
can fulfill rather the educative and informative mission as such.  
According to an interview done with Adam Renyi, ex-communication director of 
the media group of TV2, another topic arises that deserves further academic attention: 
the correlation between ruling political parties and the market share of private channels. 
Albeit it is not within the scope of this research to get into the merit of depicting these 
                                                        
375 Ibid 
376 De Vreese, C.H.; Boomgaarden, H.: News, Political Knowledge and Participation: The Differential Effects of News Media 
Exposure on Political Knowledge and Participation. Acta Politica Vol. 41. Pp. 317-341 [2006] 
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correlations, one interesting element should be underlined: governments do have means 
to influence information-distribution on European topics. “Content providers were 
depending on politics in different ways. Referring to the era in which ground frequencies 
were needed for broadcasting, renewing the channel’s permission of broadcasting was 
due to public administration’s decision” says Mr. Renyi. Also, he explains that directing 
state money towards certain channels in the frame of social advertisements and public 
information can provide channels with significative income in order to stabilize their 
market share, especially that (at least in Hungary) companies tend to follow government’s 
moves in this regard. 
These interconnections between market demand, statal financial aids and political 
views alter the development of a European public sphere as they influence the 
information on European issues and could have an impact on interpreting the European 
affairs. 
 
 
5.5. Diversity of the content 
 
To continue the thought on how external factors might influence the content, let 
me view the aspect of the Europeanness of the interpretation of European information. 
How national the frame is in which European affairs are shared. How much visibility do 
European news gain. This way we can add another layer to the understanding of the 
European public sphere. According to de Vreese I can say that the key indicators for 
assessing the Europeanness of public spheres include the visibility of European topics (and 
issues with a European perspective) and some degree of mutual observation and 
quotation, typically in the form of inclusion of EU-actors and actors from other EU 
countries (see de Vreese 2002378; de Vreese et al. 2006379; Schuck and de Vreese 2011380).  
As we could see in chapter 2, the research, however, is divided about the extent of 
Europeanization of national public spheres measured by news media coverage of 
European matters. I need to distinguish however, two different ways in which common 
issues become European: in the first case we can talk about matters that need to be 
                                                        
378 de Vreese, C.H.: Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration. Aksant Academic Publishers, Amsterdam 
[2002] 
379 de Vreese, C.H., Banducci, S. A., Semetko, H. A. and Boomgaarden, H. G., “The News Coverage of the 2004 European 
Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries”, European Union Politics, 7(4): 477–504 
http://www.claesdevreese.com/research.html. [2006] 
380 Schuck, A. R. T. and De Vreese, C. H.: Finding Europe: Mapping and explaining antecedents of ‘Europeanness’ in news 
about the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. Studies in Communication / Media, no 2, p. 265–294. [2011] 
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tackled by more member states and so as the issue grows geographically so does the it 
gains a European face. For example, immigration and refugees were more prominent 
issues in the media coverage, in particular as the phenomenon was growing. But as 
political observers have noted, these issues were inherently “Europe-related” as much of 
the debate on immigration was centered on the impact of the EU-based Schengen 
agreement. And therefore an issue that initially was more treated in the Balkans became 
a strictly European Union-related issue also in the news. The other option is when there is 
a European decision, for example a new law by the European Parliament that has an 
impact on nation states’ inner politics, then the Europeanness of certain issues derives 
from the European institutions.  
These two groups were explained in chapter 2.6, speaking about the vertical and 
horizontal Europeanization. Vertical Europeanization refers to national actors addressing 
European actors, national actors addressing European issues or European actors partaking 
in national debates on European issues. Horizontal Europeanization is referred to as 
national media covering issues in other EU member states and national actors addressing 
issues/actors in another EU member state. Issues such as monetary politics and 
immigration show signs of vertical Europeanization while horizontal Europeanization is 
virtually absent381. For every case we can agree with Statham, by “normalizing” and 
getting European politics into national politics, we are most likely to see a “legitimate 
Europeanized public politics” develop.382  
Another aspect of measuring the Europeanness of news in broadcasting, as line of 
further research, is the analysis of the audience in this regard, albeit it is difficult to 
examine the audience as the share is quite low as news channels are niche channels. For 
example, an average daily audience share of 1.8% in 2012 (Eurodata TV Worldwide) such 
as that of the French news channel BFM TV (in the multichannel environment) is similar 
to the audience share of ARTE, and close to the shares of France 4 and the children’s 
channel Gulli (for the same period). Similarly BBC News 24 in the UK had an audience share 
of 1% (2012, Eurodata TV Worldwide), which is close to the shares of entertainment 
channels ITV4 and E4 (for the same period).383  
The most important research on audience analysis is made by the European 
                                                        
381 Koopmans, R.: Integrated Report: Cross-National, Cross-Issue, Cross-Time (WP 2: Analysis of Political Claims in 
European Print Media). The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres, D 
2.4, Europub.com, Berlin. [2004] URL http://europub.wzb.eu/projectreports.en.htm.  
382 Statham, P.: Making Europe News: Journalism and Media Performance in Koopmans, R., Statham, P. (Eds.): The Making 
of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention. Communication, Society and Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; New York. P. 125-150 [2010] 
383 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A., [2013] 
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Commission. The Eurobarometer is the most representative research due to the high 
participation of respondents. In 2016 a special Eurobarometer was focusing its questions 
on media pluralism and democracy384 of which we would like to introduce 3 questions and 
their answers concerning the variety of information in the media. 
 
 
Graph 5.5.1: Diversity of views and opinion in media 
 
This first diagram shows in what percentage respondents think that national media 
assures diversity in its content. Two-thirds of respondents agree that their national media 
provide a diversity of views and opinions. The majority of respondents (66%) agree their 
national media provide a diversity of views and opinions. Just under one third (31%) say it 
does not, while 2% of respondents say they do not know. 
The next table shows more background information of the same respondents and 
might provide some correlations. We can see that age and occupation don’t influence 
people’s belief that there is a diversity in media. The other two aspects will be also tackled 
in this research (in 5.6 – Media Independence and 5.7 – Trust in media) as they are 
significantly related to the respondent’s opinion on diversity: 87% of those who believe 
that the national media provides trustworthy information think that media provide 
                                                        
384 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
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diversity in the opinions represented. Also 88% of those who think national public media 
is independent, believe in diversity. These statistics are very interesting in the light of the 
previous findings about politics and media. 
 
 
 
Table 5.5.2: Diversity of views and opinion in media – distribution by social categories 
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The third table385 makes a periodical comparison asking the respondents about 
media diversity in 5 years. We can see that almost three out of four respondents stated 
that national media are providing the same of more diversity of views and opinions, 
compared to five years ago. 44% say the level of diversity is the same,386 29% thinks that 
the national media provides more diversity than five years ago and 18% says they are 
providing less. This distribution is quite homogeneous in the various age groups, education 
level groups and professionality categories. 
 
 
Table 5.5.3: Diversity of views and opinion in media - comparison with 5 years ago 
  
                                                        
385 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
386 QC3 Do you think that, in general, compared with five years ago, NATIONALITY) media (printed, audiovisual, online 
etc.) are now providing: More diversity of views and opinions; the same diversity of views and opinions; less diversity of 
views and opinions; it depends (SPONTANEOUS) 
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5.6. General opinion about the independence of news 
 
News independence and what people think of the source of information they use 
to know more about European affairs is crucial in forming the European public space. Since 
consumers of the information are active parts in the dialogue called communication, they 
decide on where they take the information from and how they interpret it.  
Based on the special Eurobarometer made in 2016387, we have taken 3 aspects. 
Firstly the independence of media in general, secondly of public service media and finally 
the independence compared to five years ago. 
5.6.1. Independence of the general media 
 
The following map from Eurobarometer 452 shows the general belief of media 
independence by European member state. The researchers gathered information from 
around 28 000 people and have found that only the minority of this representative 
amount of people believes that their national media provide independent information, 
free from political or commercial pressure. 38% of the respondents think the media 
provide free information, but the majority, more than the half of the respondents (57%) 
don’t agree.388 
 
 
                                                        
387 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
388  Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6.1: Media independence from political or commercial pressure 
 
Viewing the answers from a member states perspective we can say that in 9 
member states the majority thinks that the media provide information free from political 
or commercial pressure: Finland (78%), the Netherlands, Denmark (both 61%), Austria 
(54%), Germany (53%), Sweden (50%), Portugal (47% vs. 45%), Estonia (47% vs. 45%) and 
Ireland (47% vs. 46%). At the other end of the scale, respondents in Greece (12%), Spain 
(24%) and Cyprus (25%) are the least likely to agree. 
Viewing “no” as a reply to the same question we filter the not respondents. From 
the red map below we can see that the majority of the countries (19 member states) say 
that their national media do not provide information free from political or commercial 
pressure. This view is most widely held amongst respondents in Greece (87%), Spain (71%) 
and France (69%). 
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At the other end of the scale, respondents in Finland (21%), Denmark (33%) and the 
Netherlands (35%) are the least likely to hold this view.389 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6.2: Media independence from political or commercial pressure 2. 
  
                                                        
389 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
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5.6.2. Independence of the Public Service Media 
 
Measuring the same aspect only among public service media we can find the 
following diagram as a result.  
 
 
Figure 5.6.3: Public service media independence from political pressure 
 
Also in this case, only the minority thinks that the public service media of the 
country is independent, only 35% said yes. Whereas 60%, more than the half of the 
respondents disagree. 
 
5.6.3. Independence today compared with five years ago 
 
Just as in the chapter on diversity comparing replies with those of five years ago, 
we can find that 63% say that their national media are at least as free and independent as 
they were five years ago: 18% say media are more free and independent, and 45% say 
they are equally free and independent. Only 28% think media are less free and 
independent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
 
 
Table 5.6.4: Media independence from political or commercial pressure - comparison with 5 
years ago 
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Viewing the previous percentages from a nation state point of view, we can say 
that in 27 member states, which is a high number, respondents think that their national 
media are equally free and independent as they were five years ago even if there are only 
nine member states where at least half think this way. Those in Finland (59%), Croatia 
(56%) and Slovakia (53%) are the most likely to think the level of media independence is 
the same as five years ago, while those in Malta (30%), Cyprus (38%), Slovenia and Poland 
(both 39%) are the least likely to do so. 
The only country, in which respondents are most likely to think their national 
media today are more free and independent than they were five years ago is Malta (48%). 
Although this number is high also in Portugal 39% and Ireland 35%. Respondents in 
Germany (9%), Greece and Hungary (both 12%) are the least likely to give this answer. 
The countries where people are most likely to think that their national media is less free 
and independent as it was five years ago are France (38%), Greece and Hungary (both 
37%). while those in Portugal (6%), Luxembourg (14%) and Ireland (16%) are the least 
likely to say so.390 
 
5.7. Measuring trust in the media  
 
After examining how various factors might influence the European public sphere, 
such as public and private ownership, diversity, language and news independence, let us 
view trust in the media as a main topic. Without entering the debate on trust, in the 
context of measuring trust in the media I will refer to trust in the source of information, 
trust in television and trust in its overseeing body. These are the three main focus points, 
where the results gathered in the special Eurobarometer, cited also previously391, are 
colored by own graphs made from raw data pursued by the European Commission for 
further Eurobarometer reports. 
5.7.1. Trustworthy source of information 
 
Following the previous logic on mapping the member states’ respondents 
according to their view on news independence, researches asked the question on 
trustworthiness as well. Results are shown on the map below. 
Despite 19 member states’ citizens agree that their national media provide 
trustworthy information, result vary on a wide scale. The highest numbers are in Finland, 
                                                        
390 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
391 Ibid 
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where 88% of respondents thinks this way, and also in Sweden and Denmark 77%, more 
than three quarter agree. The lowest numbers are measured in Greece (26%), France 
(34%) and Spain (38%), where the majority of respondents believe that the national media 
don’t provide trustworthy information. 
 
 
Figure 5.7.1: Trustworthiness of media 
 
Trustworthiness is a crucial aspect as it gives an insight in people following media. 
The next topic shall be the identification of the main sources of information. 
 
5.7.2. Trust in the overseeing body 
 
As a side-question we need to take in consideration the general trust in the 
respective overseeing body in the nation states’ mediatic horizont as it might have an 
impact and connection to people’s trust in the trustworthiness of information sources. 
Therefore, we refer to the map that contains the research results first on the general 
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knowledge of the overseeing body taken from the special Eurobarometer 2016 cited also 
previously. 
The map shows that in all member states less than half of the respondents are able to 
name correctly the overseeing body in their country. We can see also that people in the 
Eastern-European states know more this body, and can more likely nominate the 
overseeing audiovisual body in their country. 45% in Poland, 41% in Bulgaria and 41% in 
Greece were able to give the right answer, but on the other end of the scale there are 2% 
in Spain, 5% in Sweden and 6% in Luxembourg. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.2: General knowledge of the overseeing body 
 
The next diagram shows results on what general opinion is on the independence 
of the overseeing body. Respondents were asked about their view whether the overseeing 
body (like AgCom in Italy or ofCom in the UK) is free and independent from political, 
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governmental and commercial pressure.392 From the diagram we can see clearly that only 
a minority of respondents agree the national media regulator body is free and 
independent. 37% of them think the body is independent, 46%, nearly the half of the 
respondents denies that the body is independent, while 17% don’t have a clear opinion in 
this regard. 393 
 
 
Figure 5.7.3: Measuring general opinion on media independency 
 
5.7.3. The most reliable information source 
 
There is an interesting tendency of consumer habits. Previously television was 
named very often as most important source of information. Eurobarometer 46-50 writes: 
“More than 60 per cent of the citizens across the EU member states name television news 
and 40 per cent name daily newspapers as the most important sources for acquiring 
information about European affairs”. 394 Also de Vreese in his research “Communicating 
                                                        
392 The question of the Eurobarometer survey was the following: Are you aware of the body that oversees audio-visual 
media in your country?  
393 As in Germany each region has a separate body overseeing audiovisual media, in this country respondents were 
asked about this body in their region. 
In Belgium there is a different body that oversees audiovisual media in each linguistic community. Respondents were 
asked about the body operating in their linguistic community. 
394 European Commission, Eurobarometer 46-50 (Brussels: Directorate-General X 1996-99).  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Europe: writes: “But this concentration on the print media is very odd given that television 
is repeatedly identified as the most important source of information to a majority of 
citizens and national television news reaches far larger audiences than any printed 
newspaper. While press coverage is undeniably easier to track, all available data show that 
it is the broadcast media that really matters.”395 
Changes prevailed as today radio is dominating the information space as it is 
considered the most reliable form of national media. Results of the 2016 special 
Eurobarometer can be seen below. 
 
 
Figure 5.7.4: Reliability of the media 
 
On a European level, respondents were asked about the reliability of various forms 
of national media. Radio is most likely to be considered reliable (66%), followed by 
television and newspapers (both 55%). Far fewer respondents consider social media to be 
reliable (32%).  
Viewing the same result by each member state, we can see that radio is considered 
the most reliable media in 25 countries, and television in two countries. In Croatia, both 
radio and television are equally considered the most reliable media. According to the 2013 
European Audiovisual Observatory (2011, EurodataTV Worldwide) it is important to 
                                                        
395 De Vreese, C. H.: Communicating Europe. Next Generation Democracy: Legitimacy in Network Europe project [2003] 
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remember that alongside the viewing of news channels and the accessing of news online, 
a very significant part of the public and indeed the majority of the TV viewers still seek 
their news on the main news bulletin of the day. 396 
 
5.7.4. Television and trust 
 
According to the previous findings regarding reliability of information sources it is 
worth not note what de Vreese and Boomgarden have found in their study, where they 
were collecting previous findings on newspapers’ and television’s opinion-forming 
capacity and their influence on general knowledge: “Some research focuses on the 
differential effects of newspapers and television. Robinson and Davis (1990) found that 
newspaper readers are more informed than those who rely on television, while, for 
example, Graber (1990) demonstrated television news’ superiority in terms of audience 
learning. Carpini and Keeter (1996, 145–146, 183) found positive effects of newspaper 
reading on political knowledge and no systematic effects of television news watching. 
Neuman et al. (1992) provide a thorough analysis of the differential effects of television 
and newspapers as sources of knowledge. They show that whether people learn more from 
either one of the two sources is contingent upon issue salience and complexity as well as 
people's’ cognitive skills and level of interest in the issue.”397 Television is undeniably an 
important factor especially that in 22 member states the majority of the respondents think 
national television is reliable, can be seen in the figure below. Those in Finland (90%), 
Denmark (89%) and Sweden (82%) are the most likely to agree with television being 
reliable. On the other end of the scale we find Greece (16%), Spain (31%) and France 
(41%). These three countries are also the one where most people think that television is 
unreliable among the 6 where the majority is on this view: Greece (83%), Spain (65%), 
France (57%), Poland (49%), Hungary (49%), Croatia (49%). The European average is at 
41% believing that television is not reliable, and 55% believing that it is. 
 
                                                        
396 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A.: Television News Channels in Europe, European Audiovisual Observatory 
[2013] 
397 De Vreese, C. H.; Boomgaarden, H.: News, Political Knowledge and Participation: The Differential Effects of News Media 
Exposure on Political Knowledge and Participation. Acta Politica, vol 41, p. 317-341 [2006] 
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Figure 5.7.5: Reliability of the media EU28 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.6: Influence of the trust in TV on the evaluation of media coverage of EU in TV 
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The diagram above reviews trust from a mediatic prospective. The hypothesis on 
which the variables were chosen: the more trust there is in television, the more viewers 
are satisfied with the amount of information on the EU. The correlation is defined as out 
of those who tend to trust TV as the main source the majority is satisfied with the amount 
of information. Moreover, the gap between being satisfied and unsatisfied is much wider 
than among those respondents who tend not to trust tv. 
Along this logic, I have examined how trust in television influences the trust in the 
EU. And I could see that independently from the information source, from the mean of 
mediatic communication, if people trust the news source, they tend to trust the EU.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.7: Trusting media correlated with trusting the EU 
 
Regarding the same trust in television with respect to trust in certain European 
institutions we shall examine the next two figures. In these cases the hypothesis that was 
asked in order to compare data was: the more television is trusted as main source of 
information on EU issues, the more people tend to trust the European Parliament / the 
European Commission. 
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Figure 5.7.8 Trust in the European Parliament depending on news sources398 
 
 
                                                        
398 Question of the Eurobarometer for both institution: And please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these 
European institutions. (EP) Where do you get most of your news on European political matters? Firstly? And then? 
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Figure 5.7.9 Trust in the European Commission depending on the news sources 
 
In both cases an interesting finding is television being the most used information 
source regarding European political matters, and secondly that there is no significant 
difference between trusting and not trusting the named institutions from the aspect of 
used mediatic platforms. Moreover, the tables assure us more information on the chosen 
information sources than on trust as preferences in media-use are invariable regarding 
trust. In each cases television is the most dominant, followed by written press and radio, 
then websites and social media.  
 
5.7.5. Television and general opinion on the EU 
 
The next three figures are related to television as first source to gain information 
on the EU and how this impacts the general opinion on the EU itself.  
In the first figure I was comparing the two indicators of using TV as first information 
source and understanding how the EU works. First it is important to note that all those 
who use an information source on EU affairs feel fairly well informed on EU issues, only 
those who don’t look for information on European politics don’t understand EU politics. 
Those who feel very well informed and fairly well-informed use mostly the web and the 
written press as main information source. 9% of those who use television as first 
information source feel to understand how the EU works, 45% feel to understand fairly 
how the EU works, 32% don’t understand very well and 12% feels not to be informed at 
all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.10: Using TV as first source affecting the understanding the EU 
 
The second figure concerning TV as main information source was based on the 
hypothesis that more television is used to gather information on the EU, the more likely 
respondents think that things are going in a good direction. I assumed a certain relation 
between being informed, understanding how the EU works and being hopeful with the 
political developments. This hypothesis, just as the previous one, are important in regard 
the European public sphere in the broadcasting space as they give an insight how decisive 
television is in shaping the EPS. 
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Figure 5.7.11: Using TV as first source on EU affects the general thinking that EU goes in a good 
direction 
 
This time I was examining only those respondents who use television as main 
information source on EU-affairs. An interesting fact is the independently from where 
people take their information from, they tend to believe that the EU goes rather in a wrong 
direction. Nevertheless, a slightly more respondents (29%) who watch television believe 
that the EU is going into the right direction, respectively to those who gain information 
from other sources, where only 22% believes so. Therefore, I can say that television as 
main source of information doesn’t have an impact on the general belief of the EU going 
to the right direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7.12: Using TV as first source on EU affects the thinking that EU has a positive image 
 
This last figure focuses on the image of the European Union among those 
respondents, who use television as main information source. Just as at the figure before, 
we can’t describe a correlation between broadcasting news on the EU and a general 
evaluation of its image as there is no significant difference in the results of those who use 
other information channels. In both cases the majority of respondents retain that the EU 
has a neutral image, and more people think positively than negatively: 31% of those who 
gain information from other platforms retain that the EU has a fairly positive image, and 
37% of those who watch television believe the same. 
From these figures which defining role of television in the process of the 
establishment of the European public sphere, can be questioned as I couldn’t find any 
significant connection between using television as main information source of the 
European issues and the general opinion on the EU and EU-affairs. 
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5.8. Informedness influencing the general opinion on the EU 
 
After examining diversity, independence and trust we need to take in 
consideration informedness: watching habits of news channels, feeling informed and the 
role of Internet. 
 
5.8.1. Watching news channels 
 
As already mentioned before, such researches face difficulties due to limitations in 
audience data available for news channels. This is partially because news channels being 
niche categories there is a limited market share in viewing them. However, some 
methodology and means were developed in order to gather data, such as the famous EMS, 
European Media and Marketing Survey.399 For every case EMS can’t be compared to the 
data of Eurodata TV Worldwide as it follows completely different methodological 
approach as it examines only 13% of the adult media consumers and measures only 21 
countries, thus it provides an overview of viewers habits on watching international news 
channels. 
The figures below focus on the regularity of watching international news channels 
and puts in order the biggest channels in this prospective. The figures measure 
respondents watching international news channels on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. 
In overall we can see that less than 10% watch international news channels on a daily 
basis, between 10% and 37% are those who watch weekly or monthly. The most viewed 
channels are CNN, Sky News and Euronews of which the order of diffusion varies 
depending on viewer habits. 
 
 
                                                        
399 Homepage of the European Media and Marketing Survey / IPSOS : http://ems.ipsos-nederland.nl 
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Figure 5.8.1: Watching international news channels daily 
 
Sky News, CNN and Euronews are the most viewed channels on a daily basis, that 
gather between 4-6% of the respondents. To make a comparison with other not news 
channels with a daily viewing, the most popular pan-European channels are MTV (8,3%), 
Eurosport (7,9%) and Discovery Channels (6,6%).400 
Results for weekly viewing CNN moves above Sky News. In overall weekly numbers 
are significantly higher than the daily ones: CNN is 18%, Sky News 17%, Euronews 14%. To 
make the same comparison: MTV and Eurosport 27%, Discovery Channel 22%. 
 
                                                        
400 Kevin, D., Pellicano, F., Schneeberger A., [2013] 
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Figure 5.8.2: Watching international news channels weekly 
 
And the third figure on monthly viewing statistics, that show respondents 
preferences in watching at least once a month an international news channel, show CNN 
dominating this segment (36%), with BBC World News following as second together with 
Sky News (around 25%) and Euronews being the fourth most watched news channel by 
monthly viewing with its 24%. Following the previous reasoning, the most monthly 
viewed, non news, pan-European channels are always MTV (42,5%) and Eurosport (42%) 
and Discovery Channels (36%). 
 
 
Figure 5.8.3: Watching international news channels monthly 
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Following the average viewing habits of the public, let me get into the depth of 
how watching television influences their sense of being informed; and does this have any 
impact on their views on the EU and so the European public sphere. 
The following figure shows the correlation between the respondents’ sense of 
being informed on the European Union and their habits of watching television. The 
hypothesis: the more watch television, the more I feel informed about the EU. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.4: Relation between being informed on EU matters and watching television 
 
As it can be seen, independently of how often one watches television, the majority 
of the respondents feels uninformed. Only in the case of watching television 2-3 times a 
week the percentage of feeling fairly well informed and not very well-informed equals. 
Paradoxically those who feel very well-informed watch television less often than 2-3 times 
per month. This percentage is followed by those who watch it 2-3 times a week. 
 
In case I categorize respondents not on the basis of nationality, but their 
assessment country in which they watch news results differ from the previous one. Figure 
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5.8.4 shows notably higher levels of respondents feeling not very well informed relatively 
to feeling fairly well informed. I can say that there is a slight correlation between watching 
television more often and feeling informed, as cumulating respondents positive replies we 
can see a slight increase, but I could state that respondents who watch television at least 
once a week, feel almost the same well-informed on European matters regardless how 
often they watch news channels per week. 
 
Figure 5.8.5: Correlation between feeling informed on EU matters and watching TV 
 
And now let us look into the role of Websites of the news channels in gaining 
information. Does it have any impact on the public’s feeling informed? 
 
5.8.2. Using Internet websites of the news channels 
 
When examining the influence and reach out of the internet websites of the news 
channels themselves, I will follow the same steps just as in the previous chapter: first I will 
focus on the regularity with which people check the websites and then I will give a look to 
some of the correlations depicted using raw data of Eurobarometers from the recent 
years. 
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Regarding the frequency with which respondents go on the websites of the major 
news broadcasters, the figures below show how often survey-respondents access online 
news sources of the news providers.401 First, it is interesting to see, that despite the 
viewing data puts Sky News, CNN and Euronews to the first three places when speaking 
about daily and weekly basis, here BBC World News seem to be the most viewed news 
websites that contrasts with the position of the TV channel in terms of audiences. So is 
the low position of Euronews with regard to the visibility of its online platforms.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.6: Using websites of news channels daily 
 
                                                        
401 I was using the same data from the IPSOS – European Media and Marketing Survey, just as in the previous chapter, 
therefore the same limitations need to be taken in consideration. 
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Figure 5.8.7: Using websites of news channels weekly 
According daily watching BBC represents 4% of all the respondents, whilst in the 
case of weekly watching it reaches up to almost 9%. In both cases CNN, Sky News and 
Euronews are on the second, third and fourth place with the first two reaching significantly 
higher percentages than the latter. In the daily basis CNN and Sky News show around 3-
2,5%, whilst Euronews only 1%. On the weekly basis the first two show around 7-7,5%, the 
last one only the half of it 3,5%. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.8: Using websites of news channels monthly 
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Generally speaking if we consider that both watching television regularly and 
accessing the news channels websites require an active behavior from the consumers, I 
can assume that people are interested in knowing more on these issues. Therefore I have 
asked the hypothesis saying: More people are into political discussion, the more they think 
that things are going into the right direction. The results are shown on the figure below. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.9: Interest in political discussion402 
 
In each case I could see that respondents’ general opinion is that the EU is going 
into the wrong direction, independently from how deep they are involved in political 
discussions, negative replies are almost double as much as the positive ones. 
Replying to the hypothesis I couldn’t find an exact and significant correlation between 
being involved in political discussions and the general opinion on the direction in which 
                                                        
402 Question of the Eurobarometer: When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, 
occasionally or never political matters? At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right 
direction or in the wrong direction, in…? 
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things are going, but we could say that more people are into political discussions the more 
they have a decisive and defined opinion, as the percentage of those who think the EU is 
neither going to a right nor to a wrong direction is decreasing. 
Consequently the next figures could be related to the previous topic of trust, as 
they are comparing how informedness influences trust in the European institutions. The 
first two figures measure this relation regardless of the aspect of the assessment country 
where the respondents take their information from. In the second two this point of view 
is taken in consideration. In fact, there is no significant difference between the level of 
trust of the European Parliament and the European Commission in neither cases.  
In the cases of figures 5.8.10. and 5.8.11, when we don’t consider the assessment 
country we can see that more the people are informed, the more they trust the institution. 
Moreover the percentage of those who feel informed or fairly well informed is higher than 
those who don’t in both cases. 
 
 
Figure 5.8.10: Feeling informed influences trust in the European Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.11: Feeling informed influences trust in the European Commission 
 
Not like in the next two figures, where the differences can be depicted in case of 
the public’s feeling informed. In figure 5.8.12. and figure 5.8.13. the majority of 
respondents tend to feel uninformed independently from trusting the institution or not. 
Nevertheless, there are more respondents who feel well-informed that trust the European 
Parliament and Commission in these cases. 
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Figure 5.8.12: Feeling informed - trusting the European Parliament 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8.13: Feeling informed - trusting the European Commission 2.  
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This means that informedness is significant in measuring people’s relation to 
political discussions and European institutions. It is not necessarily the regularity of 
consuming information on EU-affairs, rather platforms and channels that increase the 
sense of informedness in general. Informedness has a positive impact on trust towards 
things going into a good direction and trust towards both the European Union, and the 
European institutions. Therefore let us dedicate the next chapter to the general opinion 
that is affected by these two: trust and informedness. 
5.9. Measuring general opinion on the EU based on trust and informedness 
 
In this chapter I will examine the connection between trust and the various aspect 
of the general feeling towards the EU, such as the evaluation of its image, the feeling as a 
citizen and how much individuals’ voice counts. These are important features also to 
examine the texture of the European public sphere in this regard by focusing also on the 
impact and role television news have. 
 
5.9.1. The image of the European Union in the general opinion 
 
According to the Eurobarometer from 2015 the image of the European Union is 
changing through years. Respondents when answering the question on how 
positive/neutral/negative they find the image of the EU, tend to see it neutral again, just 
as it was back in 2010. Following the figure below we can see that this neutrality is stable 
(38%) whilst there was a change in positivity to 2014 and 2015, is it was decreasing by -4% 
to become 37% in autumn 2015. The proportion of Europeans for whom the EU conjures 
up a negative image has risen to 23% (+4); before this, it had declined continuously in the 
four previous surveys.403 
 
                                                        
403 Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015 
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Figure 5.9.1: Image of the EU 
 
If we watch these percentages on a country basis we can see that 11 member 
states conjure up a positive image in spring 2015, according to Eurobarometer. The 
countries where respondents are most likely to %have a positive image of the EU are 
Romania (57%), Poland (55%), Ireland (54%), Lithuania (53%) and Croatia (51%). However 
for the majority of the country's (15 member states) retain the image of the European 
Union neutral. Austria and Cyprus are the two countries that conjure up the EU negatively, 
just as in spring 2015. If we would like to explain where the EU has lost percentages in the 
average opinion, we can say that in 24 member states the image of the EU has lost ground, 
most significantly in Estonia (-13%), Germany (-11%) and the Czech Republic (-10%).404 
I was curious whether news have a role on the perception of the image of the EU, 
therefore we have correlated the image of the EU with other two variables gained from 
the raw database of Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015): media coverage of EU issues in television 
(figure 5.9.2) and media presentation of the EU in television (figure .5.9.3). 
 
 
                                                        
404 Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015 
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Figure 5.9.2: Image of the EU - news speaking about the EU405 
 
In this figure above, we can see that the more media covers the EU issues the more 
respondents have a negative image of it. Logically when there is a right amount of 
coverage of the EU, people have a more positive image, even if neutrality is the highest 
also in this case (40%). Another interesting fact—according to figure 5.9.2.—is that 
neutrality is always the highest, independently from the amount of information. However 
the results above don’t take into consideration whether respondents would desire more 
or less news about the EU or how much the EU is covered in general by news. These 
aspects could be developed in further research. 
 
                                                        
405 Question of the Eurobarometer: Do you think that the (NATIONALITY) ... present(s) the EU too positively, objectively 
or too negatively?  
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Figure 5.9.3: Image of the EU - news speaking about the EU 2. 
 
Figure 5.9.3 focuses on the objectivity rather than the regularity of appearance of 
the EU in television news. We can see that neutral image of the EU is the highest 
independently from the media representation of the EU. Interestingly, the second most 
common answer is falling into the category of the EU having a ‘fairly positive’ image. Only 
in case that people retain the media representation too positive, we can see the highest 
negative image ratio. This means that people having a negative image of the EU, retain 
news too positive of it.  
The next two figure focus on the same topic from two aspects. In the first case, I 
have compared the amount of appearance of EU issues in media with the general feeling 
of attachment to it. The main question was, whether people feel more attached to the EU 
if they see more positive image of the EU in television? I could see a negative correlation, 
which is logical. This means that the feeling of ‘not very attached’ and ‘not at all attached’ 
are higher when retaining that there is too much information on the EU. Not like the ‘fairly 
well attached’ and ‘very attached’ categories that are higher among those who retain that 
there is too little information on EU affairs in television, and also among those who retain 
that there is the right amount of information. 
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Also in the second case, in Figure 5.9.5, we can see this opposite correlation that 
explains that more people are attached to the EU, the more they think the media depicts 
EU issues negatively.  
 
Figure 5.9.4: Media coverage of EU issues in TV - Attachement EU 
 
Figure 5.9.5: Media coverage of EU issues in TV - Attachement EU 2. 
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5.9.2. Trust in national governments and parliaments and in the European Union 
 
In this chapter I was focusing on how television influences trust in national 
governments and parliaments, and also in the European Union. On the graph below406, we 
can see how this has changed in more than a decade. In overall we can see that trust is 
not static, but the level of trust changes in time. However these changes show a decrease 
on a longer term. Also trust in the European Union has decreased by 8% since spring 2015 
(in 2016 it is 32%). This percentage is still higher than the level of trust in the national 
parliament (28%) and trust in the national government (27%), although the decrease for 
these two in the last year was less significant than the EU’s one.  
With regard to the opposite, not trusting these entities, the Eurobarometer 452 
study shows an increase in the proportion of not trusting: 55% of European citizens tend 
not to trust the EU, which is a 9% higher proportion than it was a year before. Also not 
trusting national parliaments has risen by 2%, to arrive to 62% of citizens, just as in the 
case of national governments, where there was an increase of 3% to 66%. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9.6: Trust in media and institutions 
 
Trust can determine general opinion and can influence beliefs. For example the 
next figure shows that there is a correlation between having a positive view on public 
                                                        
406 Special Eurobarometer 452: Media Pluralism and democracy, Autumn 2016 
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service and trusting the European Union. 13% of those who tend not to trust the European 
Union have a very positive image of the EU, whilst this number is almost doubled among 
those, who trust the public service (25%). This correlation is also confirmed by the ‘very 
negative’ views as well, as among those who tend not to trust this number is 9%, whilst 
those who trust only 3% think very negatively of the EU. 
 
 
Figure 5.9.7: Believing in public service - believing in the EU 
 
We wanted to understand whether television being the main information source 
affects the trust towards the European Union or not. From the figure below we can 
observe two important things: first that regarding European matters the television is the 
first or second source of information for a significant majority of people independently if 
they trust the EU or not. Second that there is no correlation between trust in the EU and 
the main information source on EU affairs. 
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Figure 5.9.8: TV as information source - trusting EU 
 
5.9.3. My voice counts in the European Union  
 
Another important aspect that influences general opinion on the European Union 
is whether citizens feel their voice count. Following the special Eurobarometer 452, just 
as previously, we can see how the proportion of Europeans who agree that their voice 
counts in the EU changed in a longer period. In 2016 this level was standing at 39%, which 
was -3 since spring 2015. However results of the EU in this regard are not very positive, as 
more than half of European citizens disagrees: 54% (+4) feel that their voice doesn’t count 
in the EU. This is nevertheless the third highest score for this view since 2004, behind only 
the 42% recorded in spring 2014 and spring 2015, and the 40% recorded in autumn 2014. 
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Figure 5.9.10: My voice counts in the EU 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9.11: My voice counts - living in cities 
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In the figure above I have compared the size of the city where respondents live 
with the general feeling of being heard; and I have seen if these results have changed in 
the arch of time. First of all it was an important finding that the size of the city doesn’t 
influence people feeling their voice counting in the EU. But this changed in time slightly, 
as the proportion of those who agree with having their voice count in the EU has increased 
in case of rural/village and large towns, not like in the small and middle cities. 
The following two tables show the same hypothesis but without monitoring the 
changes in time, only viewing the size of the city and feeling the voice count. Still I couldn’t 
find any correlation in this regard. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9.12: My voice counts - living in cities 2. 
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Figure 5.9.12: My voice counts in the EU policy making 
 
 
 
5.9.4. Feeling like a citizen of the European Union 
 
Besides having the ‘voice counts in the EU’, also “feeling a citizen in the EU” is an 
important element that needs to be examined in order to understand trust in the 
European institutions.  
First let us view how citizens of the different member states agree with the 
statement of feeling an EU citizen. The figure below, taken from Eurobarometer 84,407 
depicts a comparison. In general, we see that two-thirds of Europeans feel that they are 
citizens of the EU, 65%, 3% less than in spring 2015. Whereas only 34% disagrees with this 
statement. This question was asked in 2010 for the first time (62%) and since then gained 
only ground slightly. The majority of the countries fell into the part where more citizens 
feel European than not: Luxembourg (85%), Malta (82%), Lithuania (77%), Denmark (76%) 
and Ireland (76%). In Bulgaria (47% ‘yes’ vs. 52% ‘no’), Cyprus (49% vs. 51%) and Italy (49% 
                                                        
407 Standard Eurobarometer 84, Autumn 2015 
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vs. 50%), a slight majority of the population do not feel they are citizens of the EU. In 
Greece, as in spring 2015, the population is evenly divided (50% vs. 50%). 
If we want to do the comparison in time, we can see that since spring 2015 the 
feeling a European citizen decreased in 19 countries, most in Austria (63%, -9) and 
Germany (74%, -7), whereas the other half of the countries, 17 member state show an 
increase in this sense. The most significant ones are Slovenia (75%, +10), Spain (75%,+6), 
Croatia (66%, +3), Denmark (76%, +2), Belgium (72%, +2) and Hungary (69%, +2). In 
Portugal (72%), France (61%) and Greece (50%) the proportion remained unchanged. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9.14: Feeling a citizen EU28 
 
I wanted to know whether feeling European affects trust in the European 
institutions therefore we have elaborated the following two figures. The first one shows 
trust in the European Parliament, the second trust in the European Commission. In both 
cases a significant correlation can be seen between the two variables, and the two cases 
are very much alike. More people feel European, the more they trust the institutions. 
almost 70% of those who trust the EP/EC feel ‘national and European’, whereas the same 
category counts only 40% of those who tend not to trust. The same ideology goes for those 
who feel only national: 22% of those who trust feel only national, and 53% of those who 
don’t trust.  
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Figure 5.9.15: Feeling a citizen and trusting the EP 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9.16: Feeling a citizen and trusting the EC 
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5. 10 Summarizing results 
 
This chapter is crucial mainly for the understanding on the one hand how the 
European broadcasting space is affected by certain elements such as ownership or 
language. On the other hand, it aims to depict the other side of this reciprocal relationship, 
how the European broadcasting affects the perception of certain elements, such as trust, 
informedness, news independence and diversity of news. This latter implies than that we 
can define the main pillars of general opinion: the image of the EU, feeling European and 
trusting the EU. 
First of all, I have seen that not only the European integration evolves, but also 
digitalization and market demand. As a consequence, the accessibility of the European 
broadcasting space and also content changes. I have also seen that the broadcasting 
market was growing in the past decade: new channels appeared, new content-providers 
started to increase competitivity, viewer indexes increased also in a geographic reach out 
and also as digital tv appeared. Many broadcasting companies started to air content 
abroad, or internationally, especially as language doesn’t seem to be a limit. 
This is why, after examining the dynamics and tendencies within the broadcasting 
market, I have focused on language being an element defining the European broadcasting 
space or moreover, limiting the evolution of a European public space. I have found that 
despite provisions, language seem to have rather a positive effect on feeling European 
according to data. Also the audiences are increasing of foreign language channels that in 
addition contribute to this feeling European. Therefore, I can agree with Mr. Thibault 
Lesenecal, the Head of Web Communication Unit at the European Parliament, who said 
that multilingualism is not a barrier. 
The next aspect was ownership. There are significantly more private channels than 
public ones despite the influencing factors that determine their everyday functioning, 
such as content and framing news as they have to satisfy market demand to maintain or 
increase their market share, increase reach out, and last but not least to cooperate with 
the public administration and follow the national laws as the juridical background for the 
European broadcasting space is not harmonized. Some might say that this is also due to 
the televisive heritage that member states carry, as for example the times of the Iron 
Curtain have had an impact on the degrees and forms of modernization. Consequently, 
the present differences in terms of public sphere in general and television in particular 
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between East and West. And this had also an impact on the entire process of media system 
evolution and change. 408 
In relation to the juridical background, I have examined also news independence, 
general trust in media and diversity of content. Regarding this latter, respondents believe 
that news diversity is balanced.  Not like independence. Independence of general media 
varies country by country, and the range starting from 12% (Greece) goes up to 78% 
(Finland). Regarding public service media that shall be more informative and educative, 
60% of the respondents retains public service media not independent only 35% agree on 
public service media being independent. Also the trustworthiness of the main information 
sources move on a wide scale. It came out that radio is the most trusted information 
source, followed equally by television and newspapers. The analysis also showed that trust 
specifically in television varies among member states but the majority of the EU countries 
is above the European media.  
Examining trust was also important to conduct a terziere research analyzing 
correlation between watching television and the EU having a positive image, or things 
going in a right direction and I have found that there is no relationship between the two. 
So television doesn’t seem to influence general opinion of European policy-making. 
Last, but not least I was focusing on informedness. In regard I have found that the most 
viewed news-channels are CNN, SkyNews, Euronews and BBC. This confirms also the 
findings of language, as foreign language channels, especially those English-speaking gain 
more visibility as there is no linguistic barrier. Interestingly I have found that the regularity 
of watching television news doesn’t influence the feeling of being informed, neither was 
there any correlation between being into political discussion and to think that things are 
going into a good direction. But there was a significative relationship between 
informedness and trust as results show that as the sense of informedness increases so 
does trust in European institutions.  
After all this I wanted to depict the general opinion mirroring the image of the EU, 
the feeling citizen and trust in the EU. As I said, there was no correlation between the 
amount of information and the positive image of the EU. So informedness doesn’t 
necessarily increase a positive opinion about EU affairs. Nevertheless, if the information 
is positive, than people feel more attached to the EU. 
                                                        
408 Jakubowicz, K.: Ideas in our Heads: Introduction of PSB as Part of Media System Change in Central and Eastern Europe. 
European Jounral of Communication 19(1): 53-74 [2004] 
Gripsrud, J.: Television and the European Public Sphere. European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications Vol22(4): 
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Regarding trust, trust towards the EU is higher than towards national parliaments or 
national governments, despite the decreasing tendency in general. And even if 54% of 
Europeans think that their voice doesn’t count in EU affairs, feeling citizen has a significant 
impact on trusting the European institutions. 
As a conclusion I can say that this complex matrix of interdependent factors needs 
to be evaluated from different point of views keeping that each element has a connection 
to one another. Language, ownership, diversity, independence, trust and informedness all 
contribute to the evolution of each other and to form a general opinion. These are 
secondary elements that are defined also by news-frames. 
 
 
6. Ending remarks 
 
Communicating the European Union is a complex challenge both for journalists 
and for the European institutions themselves. For journalists the complexity, the quantity 
and the scatterdeness are the main difficulties in interpreting EU affairs. European 
institutions face the limits of direct contact with their citizens that make them become 
dependent from the media. Media following market demands inevitably distort 
information on the European Union by reflecting for example on national perspectives or 
political frames.  
News on the EU often follow two different type of frames: conflict and economic 
consequence frame. The conflict frame follows from the observation that news about 
politics and the economy is often framed in terms of disagreement between, for example, 
individuals or political parties. In this way of framing the news, controversy and diverging 
aspects between conflicting parties are emphasized. 409 On the other hand the economic 
consequences frame reflects a bottom line of preoccupation of profit and loss. Focusing 
on the economic consequences of an issue is a frequently observed frame to make an 
issue relevant to their audience.410 
                                                        
409 Cappella, J. and Hall Jamieson, K.: Spiral of cynicism. Oxford University Press. [1997]  
Patterson, T. E.: Out og Order. News York: Alfred A Knopf. [1993]  
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However, communicating Europe gains major attention and ground within 
national broadcasting, as the European integration increases its impact on national policy-
making, still this only implies the Europeanization of national news and national media, 
not the establishment of a united and solid European public sphere. The public sphere 
itself can’t be tackled independently from its social and political context as news supposed 
to reflect on this. The European integration still maintains cultural differences as 
Kielmansegg puts it: the European Union “is not a community of communication, hardly a 
community of shared memories; it is merely, and in a limited sense, a community of shared 
experiences”411. Cultural and social diversity is one of the main values of the EU that was 
emphasized also with the enlargement of our heterogenic community.  
Also, the EU’s own communication initiatives were evaluated the same way, for 
example in in the light of the Eurovision: “As new (Ukraine, Serbia) or previously marginal 
Eurovision countries (Turkey and Greece) became highly successful participants in the ESC, 
the old Western Europe lost its once hegemonic position in the contest. As a consequence, 
it seems that European enlargement in the ESC stopped being ‘just about getting bigger’ 
and became ‘a matter of cultural transformation’.”412 
According to Jaume Duch this is a slow evolution that shall end with the 
normalization of news in a sense that EU matters will gain more importance in media. In 
order to achieve this political culture of parties, media and citizens will have to be 
modified. This is a change that is boosted by the demand of publics to be informed about 
decision-making processes that contemporary with the increasing weight and influence of 
the EU will be more and more Bruxelles. However, we retain that this Europeanization of 
national news-broadcasting has its limits in the cultural, social and political diversity. 
 
 
6.1. Visibility and objectivity 
 
The above mentioned increasing intensity with which European news appear in 
television are still not regular. Not always EU news manage to enter news, but when it 
does it is fairly prominent in the program. EU stories are generally placed in the first third 
of a news bulletin and are, compared to other political news, not disadvantaged by being 
lumped together at the end of the news program. 
                                                        
411 Kielmansegg, P. G.: Integration und Demokratie in Jachtenfuchs, M., Kohler-Koch, B. (Eds.): Europaische Integration, 
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From this finding of low visibility but, interestingly, relatively high priority, a 
pattern of EU news emerges that is cyclic in nature.413 The EU, it seems, is often absent 
from the news agenda, and then enters the agenda, peaks and vanishes. In effect, this 
means that the news provision about the EU is rather sporadic and that no stable level of 
news and information is present.414 This cyclicality is also due to the peaks in relevance for 
national member states. During, for example, a ‘regular’, non-election period, we find that 
national news programs devote most attention to EU news during the periods in which 
the European Council of heads of state meets. In these days there is 5 to 10 times more 
airtime dedicated to EU affairs.415  
But it shall not be only about quantity, rather quality of the news, better to say 
their objectivity. Very often European news are blaimed to be negative and using 
pessimistic frames. However, De Vreese, who has based his study on the analysis of the 
European election campaign, the summit and the routine news periods, he suggested that 
while EU news is generally negative and with a moderately negative slant so is other news 
about politics too.416 The more appropriate conclusion is therefore that news media tend, 
in general, to be negative about (or critical of) politics and not about the EU in particular.417 
 
6.2. Limits 
 
In the early 2000 the relationship between news coverage and public perception 
of European affairs was scarcely researched. 418 This was also due to the limited assessable 
evidence of broadcast media coverage of the European Union, nevertheless the EU started 
to monitor its media coverage in a number of national television news programs. Also De 
Vreese claimed: “Beyond the descriptive sources, however, the discussion of the media 
coverage of EU affairs suffered from the almost total absence of data.”419 The lack of data 
makes also comparison limited when examining the visibility of the European issues in 
relation to other factors. Thus, it is often difficult to extract comparable data in a reliable 
and systematic manner. 420 Data is also lacking regarding audience responses in television 
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frames despite evidence suggesting an impact different from print’s.421 Also Semetko 
wrote in 2001 that there is lacking information on how the European integration appears 
on domestic news coverage. Moreover, the comparative perspective of political 
communication and news organization was missing, how news differ cross-nationally in 
terms of the reporting of domestic and European political affairs. 422 
However, since the early 2000 we have experienced notable change. Numerous 
studies have appeared with content analysis, doing cross-national comparisons and also 
the European Union institutions have invested in measuring general opinion also with 
regard the news. With the rise of the notion of the European public sphere scholars 
directed their focus to the analysis of the coverage as main indicator of this phenomenon.  
This research aimed to cover all the member states and give an overall European 
picture. However, I have faced difficulties with gathering empirical data in order to extract 
primer, quantitative research results on the one hand because of not accessing European 
institution’s databases of monitored visual coverage. On the other hand, doing a 
comparative content analysis by involving fellow-researchers within the 28 member states 
questioned the objectivity and reliability of the gathered data due to the subjective 
evaluation of news and our replies not being representative. Therefore, I was using raw 
data gathered by the European Commission through international surveys to map general 
knowledge and feelings out of which we have exploit figures by combining the preferred 
variables. 
However this means that I could confirm the dynamic and existence of the 
European public sphere only indirectly, through relying on secunder research results 
rather than monitoring news coverage. These results are enough to detect cause and 
causality relations between television news and general opinion. In order to explain these 
findings we were relying on previous studies and interviews that helped us understand 
not always visible trends and dynamics. 
Another limiting factor is that results procured by these surveys don’t exclude the 
external, influencing elements. When asking, for example, about the feeling European and 
compare it with the regularity with which one watches television news, I am not taking in 
consideration other factors that might influence this feeling European other than 
television. In these cases we might find results that don’t look at the context of the 
European public sphere. 
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6.3. Future research 
 
For this reason future research could be conducted by focusing on the external 
factors and the context of variables mentioned above. Another interesting question to ask 
could be about ownership. I couldn’t get into the depth of the analysis of ownership and 
how ownership influences framing and news. Content-analysis especially the comparative 
content-analysis could enable further primer research on the European public sphere. 
With respect to public opinion and European integration, one interesting question 
is whether and to what extent the predominance of a certain issue (such as, for example, 
common foreign policy in the migration-crisis) has influenced the overall evaluation of 
European politicians and institutions. According to Semetko and De Vreese further 
research can be conducted with regard to the politicians within the European public 
sphere: an interesting research question to pursue could be about the idea of the 
'Europeanisation' of politicians, such as the increased visibility of politicians in the context 
of Europe, for example during the EU presidency of a country. Yet another aspect worth 
investigating is whether the success or failure of EU policies, initiated by a politician, affect 
his or her evaluation in the domestic political platform and mediatic space. One might also 
ask whether those policies have an impact on the public's evaluation of a politician 
concerning his or her general ability to push European integration further. Than they also 
add: “It could be expected that negative news about European integration, echoing topics 
such as bureaucracy, fraud and agriculture, may fuel a negative and cynical perspective of 
politics and current politicians in other areas, and one might ask whether news contents 
and effects differ cross-nationally”. 423 
Also Semetko and De Vreese have suggested regarding frames that the next step 
could be to investigate the extent to which those frames are mirrored in public support 
for further European integration or the opinions concerning the reduction of national 
sovereignty in decision-making. 424 
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